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Preface 
Some data-analytic methods excel by their sheer elegance. Their basic 
principles seem to have a particular attraction, based on a intricate combination 
of simplicity, deliberation, and power. They usually balance on the verge of 
two disciplines, data-analysis and foundational measurement, or statistics and 
psychology. 
To me, unfolding has always been one of them. The theory and the original 
methodology were created by Clyde Coombs (1912-1988) to describe and 
analyze preferential choice data. The fundamental assumptions are truly psy-
chological; Unfolding is based on the notion of a single peaked preference 
function over a psychological similarity space, or, in an alternative but 
equivalent expression, on the assumption of implicit comparisons with an ideal 
alternative. 
Unfolding has proved to be a very constructive data-analytic principle, and 
a source of inspiration for many theories on choice behavior. Yet the number 
of applications has not lived up to the acclaim the theory has received among 
mathematical psychologists. One of the reasons is that it requires far more 
consistency in human choice behavior than can be expected. 
Several authors have tried to attenuate these requirements by turning the 
deterministic unfolding theory into a probabilistic one. Since Coombs first put 
forth a probabilistic version of his theory, a number of competing proposals 
have been presented in the literature over the past thirty years. 
This monograph contains a summary and a comparison of unfolding theories 
for paired comparisons data, and an evaluation strategy designed to assess the 
validity of these theories in empirical choice tasks. 
Chapter 1 contains a classification of the existing probabilistic unfolding 
theories in which a distinction is made between random configuration theories 
and random response theories. 
Chapter 2 presents an organized description of possible properties of pro-
babilistic choice behavior. Among these are the familiar probabilistic versions 
of the transitivity property, as well as properties tied to Coombs' definition of 
the ideal alternative, and properties that apply in unidimensional unfolding 
representations only. For each probabilistic unfolding theory reintroduced in 
Chapter 1, and for each property, proofs are presented on whether or not the 
theory expects that property to hold. 
vin 
In Chapter 3, the kernel of the evaluation strategy is presented. To assess the 
validity of a particular probabilistic unfolding theory, one should look at the 
goodness-of-fit between models of data and models of critical properties of 
probabilistic choice behavior. 
The strategy itself is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. It is based on 
regarding properties of probabilistic choice behavior as conditional ordinal 
restraints in estimating choice probabilities, and uses isotonic regression, a 
branch search strategy and the generalized likelihood ratio principle. The 
technique is applied to some models of data presented in the literature. 
Chapter 5 contains a report on a collection of new paired comparisons tasks 
in which the evaluation strategy presented in the earlier chapters was used. 
After completing my psychology study at the University of Ghent, a grant 
from the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research NWO ( 1983-1987, no. 
40-30) enabled me to undertake this study at the Mathematical Psychology 
Group of the University of Nijmegen, presently integrated in the Nijmegen 
Institute of Cognition Research and Information Technology NTCI. 
I would like to record my gratitude for Geert De Soete, who has put me on 
the tracks, for Professor Edward Roskam, for his inspiring supervision, for 
Math Candel, who has been an arduous beta-tester of PSTRix and has pointed 
out several flaws in earlier versions of the package and the manuscript. I am 
indebted to Frans Gremmen and his colleagues from the Nijmegen GRD for 
assistance with statistical and programming problems. I want to thank the 
students that participated in the experiments and Guillaume Vuist for his 
assistance in running them. Professor Thorn Bezembinder, Professor Ivo 
Molenaar, and Professor Luc Delbeke read the manuscript and helped to 
improve it. 
The Nijmegen Mathematical Psychology Group and the Rotterdam Center 
for Clinical Decision Making have been stimulating environments to work and 
live in. To all colleagues, former and present, go my thanks. 
Last but certainly not least, I owe a very special debt to all that helped me 
without even mentioning "probabilistic unfolding", my family and friends in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Rotterdam 
February 1990 
P.M.B. 
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1 Approaches to 
probabilistic unfolding 
The method of paired comparisons is a technique for the collection of data 
used in a variety of fields such as acoustics, animal ecology, choice behavior, 
dentistry, economics, epidemiology, food science, marketing, optics, personnel 
testing, preference testing, psychometrics, sensory testing, sports, taste testing 
and others (David, 1988). Alternatives are presented in pairs to one or more 
subjects, who are asked to pick one of them. Making such a binary choice is 
probably the simplest of all choice tasks. For this reason, this method is primarily 
used in cases where judgements are necessarily subjective. The method is 
essentially due to Fechner, and several parametric and nonparametric methods 
for analyzing such data have been proposed ever since. Bradley (1976) and 
David (1988) have summarized most of these methodological approaches. 
Some forty years ago Clyde Coombs (1950, 1964) provided the analysis of 
choice data with a powerful paradigm. Coombs assumed that subjects, when 
making a choice, are actually comparing the available alternatives with an ideal 
alternative, which is the alternative they actually want, actually need or actually 
should choose, depending on the choice situation. Asked to choose from two 
alternatives, neither of which may be the ideal, the subject will choose the 
alternative least dissimilar from the ideal. Coombs conjectured that subjects 
differ in the choices they make because they do not necessarily agree on the 
ideal alternative, but that even subjects who disagree in choice will share the 
same underlying cognitive pattern of dissimilarities between alternatives. 
Assuming subjective differences in the definition of the ideal, but intersub-
jectivity in the perception of alternatives. Coombs proposed his "unfolding" 
theory. The unfolding theory is closely related to the data-representation 
technique from which it received its name. With this technique, the latent 
unfolding structure of dissimilarities between ideals and alternatives is repre-
sented as a set of distances in a psychological space, and a smallest-space 
representation is aimed at. 
In the past decades, the unfolding paradigm has never been absent from the 
literature on psychological choice, and the amount of methodological con-
tributions based on this paradigm makes it impossible to review them here. The 
opportunity in Coombs' original unfolding technique of mapping the 
dissimilarities in a unidimensional space has been complemented with options 
involving general Euclidean spaces (Bennett & Hays, 1960; Hays & Bennett, 
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1961) and spaces with ultrametric or path length metrics (De Soete, DeSarbo, 
Furnas & Carroll, 1984a, 1984b; Carroll, DeSarbo & De Soete, 1987). The 
concept of the ideal point has even inseminated other data analytic procedures, 
as in Takane, Bozdogan and Shibayama's (1987) proposal for an ideal point 
approach to discriminant analysis. 
Despite the widespread appeal of the unfolding paradigm, Coombs' original 
unfolding techniques have seen limited application. The principal reason for 
this absence is to be found in the strong predictions made by the unfolding 
theory. For example, all choice patterns are expected to be perfectly consistent 
with a configuration of distances in the underlying psychological space. A 
consequence of this prediction is that transitivity of choices is never to be 
violated. If it is, an unfolding representation is not possible. Another difficulty 
arises when the decision maker of interest in an application is not a single 
subject, but a population of subjects. If a single set of underlying dissimilarities 
governs the choices of the members of this population, then these members 
should not differ in the choices they actually make. This assumption is barely 
tenable. A related problem exists if a single subject is asked to make repeated 
choices: The subject's choices need not be consistent over repeated presenta-
tions of the same option set. In general, these predictions turned out to be strong 
conditions on sets of data, and made a successful use of Coombs' unfolding 
technique a rare event. 
There have been two distinct approaches in turning Coombs' original 
unfolding techniques into less demanding data analytical procedures. Both 
approaches accept the existence of inconsistencies, and view them as marginal 
deviations from the basic unfolding structure. In one of these approaches, the 
supposedly small violations of the unfolding theory are left largely unexplained. 
These procedures simply accept the possibility of inconsistencies occurring, 
and try to construct an unfolding representation that is as close as possible to 
the data, in the sense of some criterion to be optimized. 
Techniques devised in this approach are in some respect just "black boxes", 
or scaling procedures. A major example is the non-metric multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) approach to row conditional data. At an early stage in their 
development, non-metric techniques for smallest-space representations of 
dissimilarity data (Shepard, 1962; Kruskal, 1964) were adapted to suit the 
unfolding paradigm (e.g. Roskam, 1968; Carroll, 1972; Heiser & De Leeuw, 
1981). Similarly, metric MDS approaches have also been used (Schönemann, 
1970). Other techniques are based on a coefficient of scalability, which can be 
probabilistic in nature. An example is the H coefficient in MUDFOLD (Van 
Schuur, 1984), which is based on a comparison of the observed number of 
"errors" with the number expected under an independence assumption. 
MUDFOLD also tries to find a representation for a maximal subset of the alter-
natives, instead of for the full set, as in "classical" unfolding. 
3 
In the second approach to an unfolding representation of data that are not in 
accordance with the requirements of the theory, theoretical assumptions are 
added to the basic unfolding theory, and the representational technique is closely 
linked to them. These assumptions either attempt to explain the origin of the 
inconsistencies, or try to predict particular regularities in the probabilities of 
choosing alternatives. Furthermore, the representational technique is conceived 
from these assumptions. This second approach, which we will call the proba-
bilistic one, will be the concern of this dissertation. In particular, a comparison 
of the distinct probabilistic assumptions presented to accommodate the 
unfolding theory to small, irregular inconsistencies will be aimed at. 
The unfolding theory has been used with a wide variety of data, and proba-
bilistic versions are as numerous. Most of these probabilistic versions have 
been developed for paired comparisons data and representations in Euclidean 
spaces, though most of these spaces are unidimensional. Since this majority of 
probabilistic unfolding theories includes both the oldest proposal (Coombs, 
1958) and the largest number of competing theories, we will restrict our 
comparison to the members of this majority. 
In the remainder of this chapter we will introduce a series of probabilistic 
unfolding theories for paired comparisons data - as well as specifications of 
models of these theories - that have been introduced in the literature during the 
past three decades. Section 1.1 contains a classification and a reintroduction. 
Section 1.2 offers a more detailed discussion of the model specifications of 
these probabilistic unfolding theories for paired comparisons data. 
1.1 PROBABILISTIC UNFOLDING THEORIES 
The subdivision used in this overview is modeled after a distinction made by 
Croon (1983). Croon's subdivision itself was inspired by a more general 
classification of probabilistic utility theories by Luce and Suppes (1965). Luce 
and Suppes distinguished random utility theories from random response 
theories, based on the way in which a probabilistic choice theory attempts to 
describe random variability in choices. 
In random response theories, choice variability is described by thinking of 
choices as Bernoulli trials. The probability of success in such a trial is expressed 
algebraically as a function of the utilities of the choice alternatives involved. 
In random utility theories, choice variability is explained by means of random 
utility variables; the utilities of the feasible alternatives at the moment of choice 
are random variables. The unfolding pendants of these random utility theories 
will be called random configuration theories. They assume that the pattern of 
dissimilarities between ideals and alternatives at the moment a choice has to 
be made is a random variable. 
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1.1.1 Random configuration theories 
Within the random configuration theories, we will distinguish between ran-
dom coordinate theories and random distance theories. The former start from 
randomness assumptions at the level of the coordinates of ideals and 
alternatives, the latter from comparable assumptions at the level of the distances. 
(1) Random coordinate theory 
The first theory of probabilistic unfolding was developed by Coombs (1958) 
himself. Such an early introduction of a probabilistic version of the unfolding 
theory can hardly be surprising. Psychologists had always been aware of the 
difficulties in applying strictly algebraic approaches to the measurement of 
behavior-related variables. Only on rare occasions data seem to be willing to 
agree with assumptions made in algebraic approaches. Due to this ubiquity of 
"error", psychological measurement has witnessed, ever since the days of 
Fechner, an ever increasing plethora of probabilistic scaling approaches. 
Among the best known probabilistic approaches to measurement in psychology 
are Thurstone's collection of techniques (Thurstone, 1927, 1959). 
At the foundation of many of Thurstone's techniques lies what he had called 
the "Law of Comparative Judgment for paired comparisons". Thurstone 
associated the presentation of an alternative in a paired comparisons task with 
a so-called "discriminal process". The latter can be thought of as a scale value 
or coordinate on some underlying psychological continuum, which is subject 
to random variability. The origin of this variability was left unexplained; it 
could be any non-systematic momentary influence on the perception of the 
stimulus. In Thurstone's view, the presentation of two stimuli resulted in two 
discriminal processes, and with each process a momentary coordinate value 
could be associated. The stimulus with the highest momentary value would be 
chosen. An elaboration of Thurstone's ideas can be found in Bock & Jones 
(1968). 
Coombs provided a minor but crucial adaptation to Thurstone's conceptual 
framework. Instead of two discriminal processes, one for each stimulus, 
Coombs foresaw three. In addition to the two discriminal processes for both 
alternatives, a third discriminal process had to be associated with the ideal 
alternative of the choosing subject. Instead of choosing the stimulus with the 
highest momentary coordinate value, the subject would pick the stimulus for 
which the distance to the ideal, computed on the momentary coordinate values, 
was smaller. 
Coombs conceptual change was crucial because a simple comparison of the 
magnitudes of the coordinate values on the psychological continuum became 
irrelevant for the choice process, replaced as it was by a comparison of distances 
5 
to the ideal as the criterion for making a choice. Coombs' approach is based 
on the idea that a random variability of coordinates can be considered as 
reflecting the subject's uncertainty concerning the ideal alternative and the 
alternatives presented. 
At first. Coombs did not present a fully developed specification of how a 
model of this probabilistic unfolding theory would look like, but a few years 
later a joint effort of Coombs, Greenberg and Zinnes (1961) led to such a 
characterization. A decade later, a more elaborate model specification of this 
random coordinate theory was presented by Zinnes and Griggs (1974). 
In the Zinnes & Griggs random coordinate theory, the distributions for the 
coordinates of the alternatives on each dimension are assumed to be of a shift 
family; they are identical except for an additive factor in the expected values. 
The coordinate of the ideal is also thought of as a normally distributed random 
variable, but the variance of its distribution is allowed to differ from the variance 
of the distributions for the coordinates of the alternatives. 
The fact that the coordinates were regarded as normally distributed random 
variables in all models of Coombs' theory will have surprised no one. Despite 
the absence of a solid theoretical basis, the normal distribution had also been 
used by Thurstone, and has never been absent since in probabilistic approaches 
to scaling and measurement in the behavioral sciences. 
In addition to formulating a model for Coombs' original theory, Zinnes & 
Griggs suggested one variation of this theory's assumptions. Instead of 
assuming that only one momentary value of the ideal coordinate is used in 
computing distances from alternatives to the ideal, they offered an alternative 
assumption. According to Zinnes and Griggs, on some occasions the 
assumption that two values are used, one for each distance, would be warranted. 
The first assumption (one value) may be sensible if, for example, the alternatives 
are simultaneously presented. If the alternatives are presented sequentially, the 
second assumption (two values) may be more reasonable. 
In terms of a sampling scheme, this variation implies that one value of the 
ideal coordinate is sampled for computing the distance to the first alternative, 
and a second value for computing the distance to the remaining alternative 
(double sampling), whereas in Coombs' proposal only one value is sampled 
(single sampling). 
Although essentially variations on Coombs' original random coordinate 
theory, two related theories deserve to be mentioned on their own. One theory 
is the random ideal coordinate theory. This is a borderline case of Coombs' 
theory with the assumption of single sampling of the ideal, in which the dis-
tributions of the coordinates for alternatives are degenerated. This means that, 
according to this theory, there is no random variability in the location of 
alternatives in the psychological space; all choice variability has to be attributed 
to a random variability in the coordinates of the ideal alternative. 
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A model specification of this random ideal coordinate theory for a unidi-
mensional space was presented by Bechtel (1968). However, Bechtel did not 
do so with the intention of defining a variation of Coombs' theory. Bechtel 
arrived at his model by adding parametric assumptions to a monotonie relation 
between choice probabilities and interaltemative midpoints, analyzed by 
Greenberg (1965). Because of the selection of the normal distribution for the 
ideal coordinate, Bechtel's model is a limiting case of Zinnes & Griggs' model. 
De Soete, Carroll, and DeSarbo (1986) also provided a model specification 
of the random ideal coordinate theory, allowing of a Euclidean psychological 
space of higher dimensionality. They called their model the wandering ideal 
point model. A highly similar model specification was offered by Gaul (1987). 
A second variation on Coombs' probabilistic unfolding theory is based on an 
assumption that is the opposite of the one Bechtel's model is based on. If all 
choice variability is attributed to a random variability of values of the coordi-
nates for the alternatives, a version of Coombs' theory is obtained that is very 
similar to Thurstone's theory. Here once again choices are governed by a 
comparison of the simple magnitudes of the coordinates of the alternatives, 
though not absolutely but relative to the location of the ideal. 
(2) Random distance theory 
If coordinates are random variables, any metric defined on alternatives 
through their coordinates will also be a random variable. This means that, in a 
way, Coombs' theory and its descendants can also be characterized as random 
distance theories. The reason we prefer to call them random coordinate theories 
is that their basic premises are formulated in terms of randomness assumptions 
on the coordinate level. In this view, the members of a second class of theories 
properly deserve to be called random distance theories. The premises of these 
random distance theories are made on the level of the ideal-alternative distances, 
instead of on their respective coordinates. 
Though differing from Coombs' random coordinate theory, the random 
distance theories proposed in the literature are similarly indebted to Thurstone's 
(1927) Law of Comparative Judgment. Instead of attributing choice variability 
to a random uncertainty in locating stimuli and ideal in the psychological ref-
erence space, these theories assume a random uncertainty in assessing the 
magnitude of distances between ideal and alternatives. 
The first random distance theory was proposed by Ramsay (1980b). Ramsay 
has invested considerable effort in developing a probabilistic approach to 
multidimensional scaling of dissimilarities (Ramsay, 1969, 1977, 1978a, 
1978b, 1980a, 1980b, 1982). He saw an inevitable relation between the 
maturing of a data analysis technology, the explication of the error model 
involved in the fitting process, and some provision for choice among error 
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models. In this development, Ramsay has shown himself to be a determinate 
proponent of the maximum likelihood approach. 
Ramsay's first proposal for a maximum likelihood approach to multidi-
mensional scaling (Ramsay, 1969) was based on assumptions similar to the 
ones made in the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs approach to probabilistic unfolding. 
Crediting Thurstone, Ramsay developed a coordinate-oriented strategy, in 
which coordinates were to be interpreted as values on relevant attributes in the 
discrimination process. Ramsay assumed independent normal distributions for 
these values, with identical variances over alternatives and dimensions. 
In subsequent papers, Ramsay abandoned his original strategy. The reasons 
for this change are nowhere made explicit in his writings, but some grounds 
are to be gathered in his plea for a distance-oriented error model. First of all, 
Ramsay (1977) stated, observed dissimilarities (distances) tend to be non-
negative, either because they have a clearly defined origin or because they are 
transformable to a nonnegative form. Second, the first moment of an error 
distribution should be relatively close to the errorless distance. In particular, if 
one assesses the dissimilarity of two equal stimuli, the first moment of the error 
distribution should approach zero (The latter is not true in the Coombs-
Zinnes-Griggs approach). Ramsay invokes the subjective Weber Law in a third 
argument: The standard deviation of the error distribution should be 
proportional to the errorless distance. 
On these grounds, Ramsay proposed the lognormal error distribution, as a 
first guess at the behavior of dissimilarity data. In a later paper, he examined 
the feasibility of this approach in scaling pairwise preferences, using the 
unfolding paradigm (Ramsay, 1980b). At that time a fourth line of argument 
was appended to the three mentioned earlier: A lognormal error distribution for 
the distances can be thought of as the distribution of the logarithms of normally 
distributed disutilities on an interval scale. 
It should be noticed that Ramsay collected pairwise preference ratings, not 
paired comparisons data. However, Croon (1983) has used Ramsay's line of 
argument for the latter kind of data. Croon also presented a related model of 
the random distance theory, based on a Weibull error distribution. 
A related proposal comes from DeSarbo, De Soete and Eliashberg (1987), 
though they did not exactly specify distributional assumptions for the ideal-
alternative distances. DeSarbo and his colleagues viewed the perceived dis-
utility of an alternative as the squared distance to an ideal with an independent, 
normally distributed, additive error term. For this reason we prefer to classify 
this model as a random distance model. Its distributional assumption implies 
that perceived dissimilarities may become negative, which, as Ramsay noted, 
is something of an oddity. 
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1.1.2 Random response theories 
Random coordinate and random distance assumptions are both variations on 
Thurstone's theme of discriminal processes governing choices. This distin-
guishes random configuration theories from a second class of theories, which 
we will call random response theories. The distinction between random 
coordinate theories and random response theories parallels a more general 
partition of the set of probabilistic choice theories into random utility and 
random response theories, identified by Luce & Suppes (1965). 
Unlike random utility theories, random response theories are not built on 
assumptions of momentary fluctuations in either coordinates or distances. 
Instead, these theories assume that choices are inherently random, and to this 
basic assumption they add others that impose a particular structure on choice 
probabilities. The magnitude of the probability of choosing one alternative 
instead of a second is assumed to be functionally related to key elements of the 
unfolding representation, such as the distances from the ideal to the feasible 
alternatives, or the distance from the ideal to the interaltemative midpoint. 
Usually these structural assumptions are borrowed from scaling procedures 
unrelated to unfolding, a major example being the Fechnerian scaling approach. 
(1) Strong unfolding theory 
The main postulate in the Fechnerian scaling approach is that "equidiscri-
minable pairs of stimuli are represented by equal (scale) differences" (Fal-
magne, 1971). This idea has been used in the development of a Fechnerian or 
strong utility theory for probabilistic choice behavior, in which equal choice 
probabilities are represented by the same difference between utility values 
associated with the alternatives (Davidson & Marschak, 1959; Block & 
Marschak, 1960; Luce & Suppes, 1965). 
In an unfolding context, the Fechnerian approach leads to the condition that 
equal probabilities of choice are to be represented by the same difference 
between two ideal-to-altemative distances, transformed to utilities. Because of 
its basic similarity with the strong utility theory, the resulting probabilistic 
unfolding theory will be called the strong unfolding theory (Bossuyt & Roskam, 
1986). 
Several model specifications of the strong unfolding theory have been 
presented in the literature (Schönemann & Wang, 1972; Bechtel, 1976; Jansen, 
1981; Cooper & Nakanishi, 1983; Andrich, 1985). Basically, the principal 
differences between these strong unfolding models can be traced back to dif-
ferent specifications of the function transforming ideal-alternative distances to 
utilities (cf. Section 1.2.3). 
(2) Moderate and midpoint unfolding theories 
The applicability of the Fechnerian approach in describing choice probabil­
ities has been challenged by several authors. Their main argument is that choice 
probabilities cannot always be adequately described through differences in 
utility alone; the dissimilarity between alternatives also affects the probabilities 
of choosing from them (e.g. Debreu, 1960). Keeping the utility difference the 
same, the choice variability is assumed to increase when the alternatives to be 
chosen from get more dissimilar. These theories of probabilistic choice behavior 
have been called moderate utility models (Halff, 1976). 
Translations of the moderate utility theory to the unfolding context have not 
been presented thus far, though it would not be difficult to define one. Compared 
to the strong unfolding theory, such a translation would imply that the inter-
alternative distance is included as a third parameter in the description of choice 
probabilities. 
A third member of the class of random response theories is very similar to 
the moderate unfolding theory. In the midpoint unfolding theory, equal choice 
probabilities are described by the same difference between the ideal coordinate 
value and the value of the midpoint between alternatives. For a particular pair 
of alternatives, choice probabilities are expected to become more extreme (i.e. 
closer to 1 or 0) when the distance from the ideal to the midpoint increases. 
Specifications of models of this midpoint unfolding theory have been presented 
by Bechtel (1968), Sixtl (1973) and Jansen (1981). The latter two are both 
originally inspired by the Rasch item-response theory. 
1.2 PROBABILISTIC UNFOLDING MODELS 
The following two subsections offer a more detailed analysis of model 
specifications of random coordinate and random distance theories: the 
Zinnes-Griggs model and the Ramsay model respectively. A third subsection 
presents more details on strong unfolding models. More specifically, the 
question of selecting a proper preference function is discussed. A fourth section 
briefly discusses the relation between the midpoint unfolding theory and the 
moderate unfolding theory. 
Before we continue, we will introduce some notational conventions. Sets will 
be notated by single Latin letters in uppercase (e.g. X), elements (or points) by 
single letters in lowercase (e.g. x,y). If possible without creating confusion, 
we will use the same lowercase letters to denote values of functions with the 
set of these elements as their domain (e.g. x, y for the coordinate values of the 
points д:,у). In distinguishing between elements or sets we will occasionally 
use subscripts (e.g. xx,x¿). The ideal alternative will be denoted by the last letter 
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of the alphabet, ζ, subscripted if necessary. 
We will use shorthand notation for the metric - d^ for the distance d(xyy) 
between χ and y - and for the choice probabilities, p^ for the probability of 
choosing χ out of {x,y}. Vectors will be described using bold typefaces (e.g. 
x). In describing random variables we will use uppercase Latin letters, such as 
D^ if the distance is a random variable, or X for a random coordinate vector. 
The same letters in lowercase will be used for the errorless values, say d ,^ x. 
Throughout a choice between an alternative χ and an alternative y in a paired 
comparisons task will be the subject of interest, under the condition that only 
one alternative can be chosen, the no-choice option being eliminated. So we 
have pT) + PyX = l· For subject indices we will use the letters i,j, or k\ p^ stands 
for the probability that subject i' chooses the alternative χ after a particular 
presentation of the pair {x, >}. 
The structure Qi,p), consisting of a finite set X and a probability function ρ 
defined on X xX, will be called a binary choice probability (BCP) structure. 
The structure ζΧ,Ρ), consisting of a finite set X and a set Ρ of probability 
functions {p}, all defined on X xX, will be called a binary choice probability 
system. 
The relation between probabilistic unfolding theories, models of these 
theories, and models of data will be discussed in Chapter 3 later on. At this 
point it will suffice to keep in mind that a model of a theory will be thought of 
as a possible realization of this theory. This is a settheoretical structure of the 
appropriate type in which all the assumptions of the theory are satisfied. In 
probabilistic unfolding, such a settheoretical structure - a model - will at least 
contain a BCP system, and a metric defined on the union of the set of alternatives 
and ideals. 
A model of one probabilistic unfolding theory will be called equivalent to a 
model of a second theory if both models are able to represent the same BCP 
system with the same metric. 
1.2.1 Models of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs theory 
In this section we will explore models in the tradition of Coombs' original 
proposal for a probabilistic unfolding theory (Coombs, 1958). The model for 
a general, r-dimensional Euclidean space will be discussed first. Next some 
special cases will be explored. 
(1) The general model 
In its most general formulation, the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs approach 
assumes that the coordinates of the ideal alternative ζ and alternatives χ and y 
are random variables, Z, X, and Y respectively. The Zinnes-Griggs model, as 
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discussed in the 1974 paper, is considerably less general. All coordinate vectors 
are assumed to follow independent multivariate normal distributions with scalar 
variance-covariance matrices. Furthermore, all variance-covariance matrices 
forthe coordinate vectors of the alternatives are assumed to be equal. The matrix 
forthe distribution of the ideal's coordinate vector is allowed to differ. Without 
loss of generality, we will assume that on each dimension 2(σ| + oj) = 1. 
We will reintroduce the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs model, as proposed by 
Zinnes and Griggs (1974). The case of a r-dimensional Euclidean space will 
be elaborated first, followed by a discussion of representations in a unidi­
mensional psychological space. Obviously, the second situation is but one case 
of the first, but there are some differences in Zinnes and Griggs' approaches 
to each situation. Later on, models of related approaches will be shown to be 
limiting cases of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs model. 
When asked to choose between χ and y, the subject is assumed to sample 
coordinate vectors f or both alternatives, and either one or two coordinate vectors 
for the ideal. These vectors are then used to compute Euclidean distances as 
Dl = (.Zl-\Y(Zi-\) D^ = (Z2-Y)'(Z2-Y), [1.1] 
in which Z, stands for the coordinate vector of the ideal used with the first 
alternative, and Zj for the coordinate vector of the ideal used with the second. 
Obviously, these squared distances between the ideal ζ and alternatives χ and 
y respectively are also random variables. Because of the assumptions made 
earlier, it can be shown that they have noncentral chi-square distributions, with 
the dimensionality r of the Euclidean space as degrees of freedom, and the 
doubled, squared errorless distances 2dl,2d^ as noncentrality parameters. 
In the unidimensional case, the distances can be expressed as the absolute 
values of the corresponding coordinate differences, 
Ο
α
=\Ζ
λ
-Χ\ Dly = \Z2-Y\ 
= \T
a
\ = | r j . [1.2] 
As a consequence of Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs' assumptions of single ideal point 
sampling referred to earlier, the cumulative distribution function for (Τ^,Τ^) is 
a bivariate normal one, with variance-covariance matrix 
if » 2
 к'. 1 
[1.3] 
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In a Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs model, the probability p^ of choosing χ instead 
of y can be expressed as 
p J 7 = P r [ D 1 I < D I , ] . [1.4] 
In the unidimensional case, the choice probability can alternatively be expressed 
as 
p ^ P r n r j s i r , , ! ] . [1.5] 
Zinnes and Griggs have provided an interesting result for this unidimensional 
case, by proving that [1.5] can be expressed as a function of the errorless 
coordinate values and the correlation between the coordinate differences: 
Pl) = G[z,x,y,ç>TaT^ 
= Φ(α
Μ
,)·Φ(β1,) + Φ(-α Ι Ι,)·Φ(-β 1,), [1.6] 
in which Φ(.) stands for the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
with 
^ т п Р
 [ 1
·
7 ] 
β „ = - 7 = = · [1-8] 
(2) Case I: double sampling of the ideal coordinate 
The expression for the choice probability [1.4] can be reformulated as 
P„ = Pr 4 
D2 
Dì [1.9] 
In the case of double sampling of the ideal coordinate vector, the joint distri-
bution of (£>n,D*) has a zero correlation parameter. Values for the probability 
in [ 1.9] can be calculated using the result that the ratio of two random variables 
with independent noncentral chi-square distributions has a noncentral F dis-
tribution (Patnaik, 1949). The distribution of the ratio in [1.9] has three 
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parameters: the noncentrality parameters 2dlt,2d
1
 of the two noncentral 
chi-square distributions, and the r degrees of freedom. 
Zinnes and Griggs acknowledged a previous use of the doubly noncentral F 
distribution in a related context by Heftier (1958). Ramsay (1969) has explored 
the properties of this distribution in a multidimensional scaling context, but he 
did not publish any results on applications. Apparently the doubly noncentral 
F distribution was much too complex to be of any practical use. Bulgren ( 1971 ) 
has given an expression involving a doubly infinite series of terms, each of 
which contains the Pearson Incomplete Beta function. To obtain an acceptable 
level of accuracy, he found it necessary to use between 36 and 903 terms. 
Zinnes and Griggs (1974) developed a rather simple expression for equation 
[1.9], based on an approximation of the noncentral chi-square distribution with 
a normal distribution. They also presented results that showed that this 
approximation was reasonably accurate. The approximation improves as the 
number of degrees of freedom increases, but even with r = 2, discrepancies are 
well within a ±.01 range from the values calculated by Bulgren (1971). 
In the unidimensional case, equation [1.6] obviously still holds with the 
correlation parameter reduced to zero. The choice probability can alternatively 
be expressed as: 
P„ = * K , + 0 ФЦ, -dJ + 4-d^-dJ <b(d
a
-dj. [1.10] 
(3) Case II: single sampling of the ideal coordinate 
A model of the random coordinate theory with the assumption of single 
sampling of the ideal coordinate vector has not been explored for the general 
multidimensional case. The squared distances still have noncentral chi-square 
distributions but since these distributions are correlated, expression [ 1.9] for 
the choice probabilities becomes much more cumbersome to evaluate. 
Zinnes-Griggs have studied the unidimensional case. In this case, the joint 
distribution of (Τπ,Γ^) has a nonzero correlation parameter, which, due to the 
assumptions made for the general model, is equal to 
According to Zinnes & Griggs, the variance of the distribution for the coordinate 
of the ideal can be either greater than, equal to, or strictly smaller than the 
variance of the distributions for alternatives, depending on whether or not the 
subject has a clear conception of what the ideal alternative is, or should be. The 
following relationships can be deduced from [1.11]: 
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σ
ζ
> σ
χ
 =» ρ
Γ ι ι Τ ν
> -
σ
ζ
< σ
χ
 => Ρ Γ „ Τ 1 , < 2 · [ 1 1 2 ΐ 
Using equations [1.6-1.8], binary choice probabilities can easily be evaluated. 
(4) Case HI: ideal coordinate only, single sampling 
A special case of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs approach can be obtained by 
assuming degenerate distributions for the alternative coordinate vectors. The 
multidimensional version of this case has been studied by De Soete, Carroll 
and DeSarbo (1986), who baptized their model the "wandering ideal point 
model". They obtained a fairly simple expression for the choice probability: 
/V, = ФПГ-^У - x'x) - 2(y -x)'zj [1.13] 
with 
Y = 4(y-x)'Z(y-x), [1.14] 
where Σ stands for the covariance matrix of the coordinate distributions. The 
specification of a "probabilistic ideal point model" by Gaul (1987) is highly 
similar. 
Zinnes and Griggs did not explicitly discuss a model for the unidimensional 
version of this case, but it follows easily from the relation in [1.5]. Let m^ stand 
for the midpoint between alternatives χ and y, with coordinate value (x + y)/2, 
defined through the equality 
<*», =d
m
 . [1.15] 
Define a function (;с) over the reals, with 
Q(x) = -l for;c<0 
Q(x) = 0 for χ = 0 
θ{χ) = 1 for χ > 0. 
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Expression [1.5] can be rewritten as 
P* = P f [ | r j S | 7 y ] 
= PT[2(Z-miy)Q(y-x)<0] 
= PrlT¡2(&-m¿Q<y-x)- (z-mJWy-x)) < 
-tfiz-mjfy-x)] 
= ф( 2(2-іп
:
,) (х-у)) 
= ф(л/2а
ІМіт
 ( ^ - о ) · [Мб] 
Basically the same model for this limiting case of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs 
theory was presented by Bechtel (1968). He arrived at it by adding parametric 
assumptions to a relation between choice probabilities and interaltemative 
midpoints, detected by Greenberg (1965). 
(5) Case IV: coordinates of the alternatives only, single sampling 
If we, within the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs approach, are willing to assume that 
the distribution of the ideal coordinate vectors degenerates, once more the 
distributions of the coordinate differences and, hence, the distances will be 
independent. Any model of this theory will be equivalent to a model of Case I 
(double sampling of the ideal). This means that if an appropriate set of dis­
tributions exist for a BCP system to make it a model of the theory Case IV, a 
model of the Case I theory will also exist. 
1.2.2 Random distance models 
In a random distance theory, distances from the ideal to alternatives are 
assumed to be random variables. So a random distance model is a BCP system 
for which there exists distributions for £>„, D^, such that relation [ 1.4] holds for 
the binary choice probabilities. 
The approach followed by Ramsay (1977) imposes restrictions on the dis­
tributions of the ideal-alternative distances: These are assumed to be inde­
pendent distributions of a specific parametric family. Croon (1983) has 
developed a model for choice probabilities in a paired comparisons task, based 
on Ramsay's strategy. In Croon's model specification, the logarithms of the 
dissimilarities between alternatives and ideal Ιηφ^)· In(D, ) have normal 
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distributions, with variances equal to l/(2c2) (c a positive real), and expected 
values ln(d„), In^,,) respectively. The expression for the choice probabilities 
[1.4] can then be formulated as 
pI,=Pr[lnDI,<lnDJ7] 
= Pr[lnD
u
-lnD I,<0] 
= PTi(lndIt-\nD^-(}nda-lnDJU(\ndtt-lndJi 
= ф ( с ( 1 п ^ - 1 п о ) . [1·Π] 
where Φ(.) stands once more for the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. 
Croon also described another model specification, which is similar to this 
lognormal one. It satisfies all of Ramsay's assumptions, but uses the Weibull 
error distribution instead of the lognormal distribution. In this model, the dis­
tances D^, D^ are independent Weibull variâtes with a common shape parameter 
с (a nonnegative real) and location parameters d
a
, d,y respectively. The latter 
assumption implies that the deviations c{\nd
a
-\nD
a
) have standard (Type I) 
extreme value distributions. Since the distribution of the difference between 
two standard extreme value distributions is a logistic one (Gumbel, 1961), the 
choice probability can be expressed as 
P^^PTtlnD,. SInO,] 
= Pr[lnOXI-lnD1,<0] 
= Pr [(In4, -InDJ-(lnd B -InDJ < (liid„ -IndJ] 
= 2 _ . [1.18] 
The expression for the choice probabilities in both the lognormal and Weibull 
random distance model is a simple function of the two errorless distances from 
the alternatives to the ideal. This makes these models very similar in behavior 
to the strong unfolding models, to be discussed in the next subsection. 
Random distance models with lognormal or Weibull distance distributions 
cannot be reconciled with assumptions of randomness on the coordinate level. 
If one starts from the latter, the distribution of the ideal-alternative distance 
will have a nonzero variance, even if the (errorless) coordinates of the ideal 
and the alternative coincide. In the Ramsay-Croon model approach, this vari­
ance is assumed to be proportional to the errorless distance. As a consequence, 
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such a distribution degenerates if the distance from the ideal to the alternative 
becomes zero. 
In their design of a random distance model, DeSarbo, De Soete and Eliashberg 
(1986) started from the following relation: 
p i, = Pr[D„<DI,] 
= PT[d
a
 + t
a
udt) + Et>], [1.19] 
with ε„, ε
ζ> two error terms. They assumed that these error terms have normal 
distributions, with zero location parameters and a standard deviation σ„ which 
may differ between subjects. DeSarbo and his colleagues assumed zero cor­
relations between all distributions. With these assumptions they arrived at the 
following relation 
= P r U
u
- e „ < 4 y - 4 . ] 
f2z'(x-y) + x'x-y'y^ 
1.2.3 Strong unfolding models 
In Section 1.1.2 the strong utility theory (Block & Marschak, 1960; Luce & 
Suppes, 1965) was discussed. A strong utility model {Χ,ρ,α,Η} is a BCP 
structure QC,p) for which there exists a real-valued function и over X and a 
cumulative distribution function Η such that for every two elements x, у e Χ: 
р
ж
, = Н(и0с)-и(у)). [1.21] 
(1 ) The strong unfolding model 
If we have a BCP system QC, P), and a strong utility model exists with the same 
distribution function/ƒ for each BCP structure QC, p) in this system, we can arrive 
at a strong unfolding model if the Fechnerian scale values can be related to 
ideal-alternative distances in a space (X,d). For this purpose we require the 
following function, which we will call the preference function: 
",(*)=ДО· [1.22] 
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A preference function (PF) is a real valued function ƒ, decreasing over the 
nonnegative reals, which transforms ideal-alternative distances ¿
ы
 in the 
unfolding model to scale values u^x) in a Fechnerian strong utility model for 
binary choice probabilities. With this preference function we can link together 
the Fechnerian scaling approach and probabilistic unfolding. A strong 
unfolding model is a BCP system (Y, P) for which there exists a set of ideal points 
Z = {z}, a metric d defined over X uZ xX uZ, a preference function ƒ and a 
distribution function H such that 
^ " W O - z M ) · [ ι · 2 3 ] 
holds for every two elements x, y s Χ. 
Specifications of this strong unfolding model were proposed by Bechtel 
(1976), Schönemann & Wang (1972), Jansen (1981), Cooper & Nakanishi 
(1983), and Andrich (1985). These specifications differ in the nature of the 
cumulative distribution function proposed - which is usually either the standard 
normal or the logistic one - but even more so in their choice of a preference 
function. 
(2) Preference functions 
Coombs' original unfolding technique required complete preference order-
ings from the subjects and resulted in ordered metric information on the psy-
chological space if the latter was a real line. In so called 'metric' unfolding 
however, quantitative preference assessments of the alternatives are 
represented in a more direct way as distances between the alternatives and an 
ideal alternative. Consequently a major theoretical problem is the selection of 
the proper function relating preference evaluations and the conresponding 
ideal-alternative distances. A related difficulty emerges when an unfolding 
representation of probabilistic choice is called for. Here also a plausible 
quantitative relation has to be justified, in the form of a function relating the 
probability of choosing an alternative to relevant parameters in an unfolding 
representation. 
Basically the same problem presents itself in the metric multidimensional 
scaling of similarity judgments. In this area the properties of a function relating 
quantitative dissimilarity assessments, or choice probabilities, and distances 
representing them has been investigated by such authors as Shepard (1958), 
Luce (1961) and Krantz (1967). They have developed a theoretical analysis of 
the cognitive processes that are involved in the judgmental task of assessing 
dissimilarities. From this analysis they derived what Krantz (1967) has called 
'a rational distance function'. 
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Rather surprisingly, a similar examination is lacking in the unfolding liter-
ature, and the impression prevails that it seems possible to by-pass the question. 
Most authors seem to have submitted themselves to the view that unfolding is 
just a collection of related techniques for data reduction and representation. In 
our view however, the points made by Krantz (1967) and Beats, Krantz & 
Tversky (1968) on the scaling of similarity judgments apply just as well to 
unfolding representations of preferential choice data. The absence of a theo-
retical justification for the relation between choice probabilities or numerical 
preference evaluations, and distances makes it hard to evaluate the quality and 
the interpretability of the resulting representation, if not the validity of the 
representational technique itself. 
In his Theory of Data Coombs (1964) introduced the notion of a single-peaked 
preference function. This is a function that is defined over the psychological 
space, reaching a unique maximum at the ideal alternative. Later on. Coombs 
and Avrunin (1977) have provided necessary and sufficient conditions on a set 
of alternatives to imply single-peaked preference. They showed that a single-
peaked preference function is a fairly common phenomenon, based on basic 
psychological principles for the perception and processing of good and bad 
attributes. 
Coombs (1964) showed that his ordered metric unfolding technique required 
these preference functions to be strictly monotonically descending from the 
ideal point, symmetrically in all directions. Monotonicity and symmetry are 
sufficient properties for the unfolding technique to be applicable, and no further 
characteristics of the single-peaked preference function affect the ordered 
metric information obtained. 
If the function decreases symmetrically in all directions from the ideal point, 
the single-peaked preference function can be replaced by an equivalent pref-
erence function, monotonically descending over the distances to the ideal. If 
the aim of an unfolding analysis is a metric defined over all the alternatives and 
ideals, and if more than ordinal information is to be extracted from the data, 
the form of the preference function is critical for the properties of the model 
constructed. 
A first candidate for a preference function in a strong unfolding model is the 
simple sign transformation: 
This transformation of distances to Fechnerian scale values had been proposed 
by Luce (1961) and Krantz (1967), within the context of choice probabilities 
of similarity judgments. Jansen (1981) has used it in a strong unfolding model. 
Schönemann & Wang (1972) proposed a squared sign transformation in their 
specification of a strong unfolding model: 
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",(*) = " Ю - [1-25] 
These authors make the following comparison. 
" This means, psychologically, that the preference between two 
stimuli (...) should become more pronounced as their joint distance 
from the ideal increases. Geometrically it means a shrinkage of 
peripheral stimulus distances - a distortion somewhat akin to that of 
an orthographic projection (a plane projection in cartography with 
eyepoint at infinity). " 
(Schönemann & Wang, 1972) 
Cooper & Nakanishi (1983) and Andrich (1985) adopted the same function. 
Actually, this quadratic transformation is a popular one in metric multidi-
mensional scaling (see, for example, Carroll, 1972, 1980; Davison, 1977; 
Srinivasan & Shocker, 1973). A conceptual justification for using this function 
is largely absent, but its popularity can likely be attributed to the mathematical 
convenience of working with squared Euclidean distances. 
Amore general class of preference functions was proposed by Bechtel (1976): 
и,(х) = - ( 0 · [1-26] 
Bechtel suggests the successive evaluation of goodness-of-fit indices for 
unfoldmg representations obtained under different values for τ. He points to a 
resemblance with the psychophysical power relation between subjective 
magnitude judgments and physical measures. However, ideal-alternative dis­
tances in an unfolding space do not have an immediate perceptual correlate, 
and since the psychophysical scaling problem is quite unrelated to unfolding, 
this resemblance cannot have a substantive interpretation. 
An alternative not explored so far within the context of the strong unfolding 
theory is the logarithm of the inverted ideal-alternative distance, 
и
І
(х) = -1п(0 · [1-27] 
For models of the random distance theories as discussed in Section 1.2.2, there 
always exists an equivalent strong unfolding model with a logarithmic pref­
erence function. 
Few specifications of the preference function are inspired by an analysis of 
the unfolding model itself. Later on, in Chapter 2, we will examine differences 
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between strong unfolding models with different specifications of the preference 
function, in terms of diverging predictions on properties of probabilistic choice 
behavior. 
1.2.4 Midpoint unfolding models 
The moderate utility theory (Halff, 1976) was discussed in Section 1.1.2. 
Although no unfoldmg pendants have been proposed, it is not difficult to do 
so. A moderate unfolding model would then be a BCP system (X,P) for which 
there exist a set of ideal points Ζ = {ζ}, a metric d defined overXuZxXuZ, 
a real valued function ƒ decreasing over the nonnegative reals, an increasing 
concave transformation g of the nonnegative reals, and a cumulative distri­
bution function Я such that 
JñdJ-f(d¿\ 
•
= я | _
жг 
[1.28] 
holds for every two elements x, у e Χ. 
In the same Section 1.1.2, we discussed the midpoint unfolding theory. A 
midpoint unfolding model is a BCP system (X, ƒ*) for which there exist a set of 
ideal points Ζ = {ζ,}, a unidimensional metric d defined overX uZ XXKJZ and 
a distribution function Η such that 
holds for every two elements x, у e X, where т^ and Q(x) are defined as in 
equation [1.16]. 
It can be shown that a midpoint unfolding model is always equivalent with 
a moderate unfoldmg model with the same cumulative distribution function H, 
a preference function f(x) = -x1 and a dissimilarity function g (χ) = 2x. To prove 
this, we will just have to show that for a given binary choice probability, the 
arguments of the cumulative distribution function are the same. 
Two cases have to be distinguished: 
(a) dT) = dI) + da, the ideal is located between χ and y (a bilateral pair), 
and 
(b) diy = (dir-da)Q(dzy-da), the ideal is on either side of χ and y (a 
unilateral pair). 
This follows from the unidimensionality assumption. In case (a) 
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(4,-dJ 
^ θ ( ^ - 0 =
 2 
and in case (b) 
(rf„-0(d„+rf
a
) 
dì,-G 
- ^ г
 [ 1
·
3 0 ] 
(^+4). 
2 ( 4 , - 0 " н 
which delivers the proof. 
1.2.5 Summary 
A wide variety of probabilistic unfolding theories for paired comparisons 
data have been presented in the literature ever since Coombs' (1958) original 
proposal appeared. In this chapter, we have reintroduced most of them within 
a classification that mirrors an existing distinction between random utility 
theories and random response theories (Luce & Suppes, 1965). 
We distinguished between two major classes of theories (cf. Table 1.1). One 
class we called random configuration theories. These theories are based on 
assumptions of randomness for central elements of the unfolding space. These 
theories can be subdivided further into random coordinate and random distance 
theories. The former start from assumptions on the level of the coordinates, the 
second from assumptions on the level of the distances or perceived dissimi­
larities from the ideal. Within the random coordinate theories we are offered a 
choice between the assumptions that the coordinates of either the ideal, the 
alternatives, or both, are random variables. If one assumes that the ideal 
coordinate is a random variable, there is an additional choice between the 
assumptions of single sampling and double sampling. 
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Table 1.1 
A classification of probabilistic unfolding theories 
THEORIES MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
RANDOM CONFIGURATION THEORIES 
Random coordinate theory 
Case I (double sampling ideal) 
Case II (single sampling ideal) 
Case III (single sampling ideal only) 
Case IV (alternatives only) 
Random distance theory 
RANDOM RESPONSE THEORIES 
Strong unfolding theory 
Midpoint unfolding theory 
Zinnes & Griggs (1974) 
Zinnes & Griggs (1974) 
Zinnes & Griggs (1974), 
Bechtel(1968), 
De Soete, Carroll & 
DeSarbo(l986), 
Gaul (1987) 
Zinnes & Griggs (1974) 
Ramsay (1980b), 
Croon (1983), 
DeSarbo, De Soete & 
Eliashberg(1987) 
Schönemann & Wang (1972), 
Bechtel(1976), 
Jansen (1981), 
Cooper &Nakanishi (1983) 
Andrich(1985) 
Bechtel(1968), 
Sixtl(1973), 
Jansen (1981) 
Any random coordinate theory can alternatively be considered to be a random 
distance theory, since assumptions of randomness on the level of coordinates 
make a coordinate-based metric a random variable. Yet there are other random 
distance theories whose assumptions cannot be reconciled with randomness 
assumptions on the coordinate level. In genereal, random distance unfolding 
theories are but a subclass of the multitudinous family of random utility theories. 
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The second class of probabilistic unfolding theories contains random response 
theories (Luce & Suppes, 1965). Unlike random configuration theories, these 
theories do not start from randomness assumptions for either distances or 
coordmates. Random response theories just see choices as fit for a probabilistic 
description, and assume that the choice probabilities in this description can be 
functionally related to key elements of an unfolding representation. These 
functional relations are usually borrowed from other probabilistic scaling 
techniques. The two main theories proposed so far in this category are the strong 
unfolding theory and the midpoint unfolding theory. 
Any random coordinate model is equivalent to a random distance model, and 
any random distance model is also equivalent to a random response model. If 
there exists amodel of a random coordinate theory forone specific BCP structure, 
then there will also exist a model of a random distance theory for this BCP 
structure. Similarly, if there exists a model of a random distance theory for this 
BCP structure, then there will also exist a model of a random response theory 
for this structure. 
2 Properties of 
probabilistic choice behavior 
In Chapter 1 we offered a reintroduction of all proposals for a probabilistic 
unfolding theory for paired comparisons data that have appeared in the literature 
during the past thirty years. The classification we used in that review was based 
on the conceptual equivalencies between theories. We distinguished between 
random configuration theories, random distance theories, strong unfolding 
theories, and the midpoint unfolding theory. 
Pointing out similarities in concepts and structure between theories, and 
between model specifications, is but one way of making these approaches 
comparable. Maybe such a distinction is not the most relevant for a functional 
comparison, if one wants to determine peculiarities in (probabilistic) choice 
behavior some of these theories try to account for. A classification based on 
structure and concepts does not lend itself too easily to a pertinent assessment 
of a theory's potential for validity. For example, all assumptions of random 
configuration theories are expressed in terms of entities that are not observable, 
be they either coordinate or distance based dissimilarities. On the other hand, 
the assumptions of the random response theories are not related to any aspect 
of the choice behavior at all, except its probabilistic nature. 
This section offers a second classification, or Crossclassification, of proba-
bilistic choice theories. This classification is based on properties of choice 
behavior that are necessarily implied by theories on probabilistic unfolding, or 
whose violation is implicit in these theories. Due to the probabilistic nature of 
the theories, all properties are expressed in terms of probabilistic choice 
behavior, dealing with probabilities of choosing alternatives in particularchoice 
situations. Stated formally, these are properties of BCP structures, or BCP sys-
tems, and a property is implied by a theory if it is always fulfilled in a BCP 
system (structure) for which a model of this theory exists. From an alternative 
point of view, these properties act as necessary conditions for the existence of 
a model of a probabilistic unfolding theory. This leads us to calling these 
properties, somewhat loosely, "necessarily fulfilled" in the model, or "required" 
by a theory. 
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The value of these properties both for analysts and theoreticians in the study 
of choice behavior can be inferred from the way new probabilistic choice 
theories are introduced in the literature. Several if not most expositions of new 
probabilistic unfolding theories include a discussion on the theory's implica-
tions in terms of assumed properties of probabilistic choice behavior (see, for 
example, Bechtel, 1968; De Soete, Carroll & DeSarbo, 1986, DeSarbo, De 
Soete & Jedidi, 1987, p. 103). It seems that these properties are regarded as 
valuable indications on what kind of probabilistic choice behavior a proba-
bilistic choice theory wants to describe. For this reason, we will compare the 
requirements of alternative probabilistic choice theories regarding a series of 
well-known, and some newly described properties. 
We do not want to claim that this approach to comparing theories is new in 
the literature on probabilistic choice behavior. Marschak (1960) and his col-
leagues, for example, have explored several of the properties that will be used 
in this section, with an intention similar to ours, and in their 1965 review of 
probabilistic choice theories, Luce and Suppes used a related approach. The 
properties will be discussed in Section 2.1. All proofs will be given at the end 
of this chapter, in Section 2.2. 
2.1 PROPERTIES 
We will distinguish between three classes of properties. The first class 
(Section 2.1.1) contains probabilistic formulations of transitivity in choices; 
the second class (2.1.2) has to do with the nature of the ideal alternative, and 
properties in the third class (2.1.3) describe characteristics of probabilistic 
choice behavior in a unidimensional psychological space. 
2.1.1 Stochastic transitivity 
In deterministic unfolding, transitivity is a property of choice behavior that 
is necessary for an unfolding representation, as an obvious consequence of the 
transitivity of distance comparisons. In probabilistic unfolding this transitivity 
requirement is not abandoned altogether, but relaxed to a probabilistic analogue. 
Probabilistic expressions of the transitivity property of rational choice 
behavior are among the first and most extensively documented properties of 
probabilistic choice behavior. For historical reasons they are called "stochastic" 
- not probabilistic - transitivity definitions. 
The following five probabilistic versions of the transitivity condition are 
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known from the literature. They are expressed as conditions for all elements 
w, x, y, 5,, Sfr ..., s„ (n>2) of the set of potential decision alternatives X in a BCP 
structure QC, ρ ) 
Stochastic Acyclicity (STA) 
~
<P,Í Л*<Р,-1
 л
 ···
 Л
~<Р, , =* ~^Р,, [2.1] 
2 '\'г 2 л 2 '«-ι'· 2 >» 
Weak Stochastic Transitivity (WST) 
2^Р«,*2-Р*> ** 2-p»> l 2 · 2 1 
Moderate Stochastic Transitivity (MST) 
2-P'»*2-p*> ** inin{/'».· Л*} - Ρ»» [ 2 · 3 1 
Strong Stochastic Transitivity (SST) 
2 á Ρ», л 2 - ^ =* max{P-» · ^ > - Р~, f2·4! 
5/ricí Stochastic Transitivity (STST) 
5 < P « V 2 < ^ =* т а х ^ « . Р „ } < Р
ж 
[2.5] 
As far as we know, Fishbum (1973) has been the first to describe stochastic 
acyclicity (STA), which can be considered to be a probabilistic analogue of the 
acyclic form of transitivity. Marschak (1960) attributed the second definition 
(WST) and the fourth (SST) to Valvanis-Vail, who formulated them in 1957 as 
a result of his work in cooperation with Coombs. The third expression (MST) 
is attributed to Georgescu-Roegen (1958) and Chipman (1960). The fifth 
definition (STST) was formulated by Tversky and Russo (1969), and is some­
times refenred to as the "strong version of strong stochastic transitivity" 
(Roberts, 1971) or "strong stochastic transitivity" (Tversky & Russo, 1969). 
All five probabilistic transitivity levels are related to distinct preference 
relations, defined through choice probabilities, which are each required to be 
transitive. Some of these preference relations will be elucidated later on in 
Section 2.1.2. 
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Table 2.1 
Leve/s о/ stochastic transitivity necessarily fulfilled in probabilistic unfolding models 
MODELS STOCHASTIC TRANSITIVITY 
STA WST MST SST STST 
RANDOM CONFIGURATION MODELS 
Random coordinate models 
Case / (double sampling) + 
Case // (single sampling) + 
Case /// (single sampling - ideal only) + 
Case IV (alternatives only) + 
Random distance models + 
RANDOM RESPONSE MODELS 
Strong unfolding models + 
Midpoint unfolding models + 
Note - (a) Depends on the cumulative distribution functon 
These five forms of stochastic transitivity are hierarchical; STA being the 
lowest and STST the highest form. Any higher form of stochastic transitivity 
implies all lower ones, as can be inferred from the definitions. For example, 
let ρ,,, = .8 and p^ = .6. Stochastic acyclicity then requires p,,. > .5, weak sto­
chastic transitivity implies p^. > .5, MST implies p^. > .6, SST implies p^ > .8 and 
STST implies p^. > .8. As can be easily inferred from this example, no lower 
form of stochastic transitivity necessarily implies a higher one. 
Several experimental results have led researchers to question the appropri­
ateness of choice theories requiring strong and strict stochastic transitivity, 
especially when not all alternatives are equally comparable (Coombs, 1958; 
Chipman, 1958; Krantz, 1967; Tversky & Russo, 1969; Rumelhart & Greeno, 
1971). Doubts on the validity of the weaker levels of stochastic transitivity are 
scarce. Theoretical reflections were presented by authors as May (1954), and 
Morrison (1963). Only Tversky (1969) has reported demonstrations in which 
even stochastic acyclicity seemed to be violated. 
+ + + + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + + 
+ + + + 
+ + + (a) 
+ + 
29 
As could be expected, not all probabilistic unfolding theories imply the same 
level of stochastic transitivity. For each class of models presented in Chapter 
1, Table 2.1 indicates which levels of stochastic transitivity have to be present 
in each BCP structure. As in the remainder of this chapter, we will read "random 
distance models" as models that satisfy the specifications of either Ramsay 
(1969), Croon (1983), or DeSarbo, De Soete and Eliashberg (1987), unless 
explicitly stated otherwise. Proofs of the necessity of the respective stochastic 
transitivity conditions, and all other necessary conditions, can be found in 
Section 2.2. 
The Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs theory implies that at least moderate stochastic 
transitivity holds. The assumption of double sampling of the ideal coordinate 
even implies strict stochastic transitivity. The random distance theories imply 
strict stochastic transitivity. The BCP structures in a strong unfolding model 
necessarily satisfy strong stochastic transitivity, and strict stochastic transitivity 
if the cumulative distribution function in the model is strictly increasing. On 
the other hand, midpoint unfolding models necessarily satisfy moderate sto-
chastic transitivity only. 
As can be concluded from this overview, the required level of stochastic 
transitivity is rather high for all theories. All theories expect stochastic trans-
itivity to hold at least on the moderate level. 
2.1.2 The ideal point 
The next class of properties are all related to the ideal alternative. Coombs 
(1958) defined this ideal in unfolding as "a (hypothetical) stimulus which the 
subject would prefer to all other stimuli". This is a clear definition, if one 
assumes that preferences are revealed in choices. If so, the ideal will always be 
chosen from every option set containing it. Despite its apparent clarity, the 
meaning of this definition is less obvious in terms of probabilistic choice 
behavior. In order to clarify it we need to know how preference is to be expressed 
in terms of choice probabilities. 
Elsewhere (Bossuyt, 1985) we have explored several preference relations 
defined through binary choice probabilities, and their implications for proba-
bilistic choice behavior, given Coombs' definition of the ideal. From these we 
derived four possible "Ideal Point" properties of probabilistic choice behavior, 
as alternative probabilistic elaborations of Coombs' definition of the ideal 
alternative. Each of these properties regards probabilistic choice behavior in a 
paired comparisons task, when one of the available alternatives is the ideal one. 
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Relationships between binary preference relations and binary choice prob­
abilities have been studied by quite a number of authors (for a review, see 
Fishbum, 1977). A simple probability-based binary preference relation is the 
following: 
yD
xa
x ^р^р^ 
«*1У2<р . [2.6] 
The alternative χ is preferred to the alternative y if the probability of choosing 
χ out of the pair {x,y} exceeds the probability of choosing y. If this preference 
relation D
xa
 is adopted, then Coombs' definition implies that no alternative 
should have a choice probability exceeding one half when the other alternative 
in the pair of options is the ideal. We will call this condition IP.l: 
Ideal Point condition 1 (IP.l) 
Α , δ Λ , · [2-7] 
The relation D1/2 can be easily extended into a family of preference relations 
Dj, (Luce, 1959), by requiring the choice probability to exceed a constant λ, a 
point in the half-open real interval [.5 ,1): 
yD#**\<p^. [2.8] 
This index λ can be interpreted as a "level of decisiveness", to be determined 
by an analyst of probabilistic choice behavior. If λ < р^ we say that χ is preferred 
to y on level of decisiveness λ. This notion of a level of decisiveness is 
exemplary for a particular interpretation of probabilistic choice behavior: 
Extreme choice probabilities are assumed to reflect greater ease in making a 
choice, while probabilities close to one half reflect more difficult choices. If 
there exists a λ, and a λ, for which 
yDiX л yD^w 
yD-jt л -τ y D i W 
we say that χ is preferred to у on a higher level of decisiveness than w is to y. 
For each one of these preference relations Ο
λ
, conditions comparable with 
IP.l can be formulated. If we translate Coombs' description into the postulate 
that no alternative is preferred to a second on a higher level of decisiveness 
than the ideal is, we arrive at condition IP.2: 
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Ideal Point condition 2 (IP.2) 
Pr* Pu- [2-9] 
A more stringent Ideal Point condition states that the ideal is always preferred 
to all other alternatives, for all values of λ in the class of relations D
x
: 
¡deal Point condition 3 (IP.3) 
P„ = l . [2.10] 
Condition IP.3 states that there is no random choice variability if the ideal is 
one of the available alternatives: The ideal will always be chosen. Of the three 
Ideal Point conditions presented so far, it is obviously the strongest. 
To understand the following condition IP.4, which describes the probabilities 
in a BCP system, we have to consider two alternatives a and b, and two subjects, 
i,j with their corresponding ideals ζ,,ζ,. Our question is: Which subject will 
prefer a to b on a higher level of decisiveness? A general answer is that this 
will obviously depend on the magnitude of the respective ideal-alternative 
distances. However, the following assumption seems plausible: If a coincides 
with the ideal for one subject, but not for the other, the second subject will not 
prefer a to b on a higher level of decisiveness than the first subject will. This 
is captured in condition IP.4: 
Ideal Point condition 4 (IP.4) 
^ = 0 Α ^ > 0 =» PmÏP*y [2-11] 
Condition IP.4 implies that if for some subject the ideal and an alternative χ 
coincide, no other subject with an ideal different from χ will prefer χ to some 
other alternative y on a higher level of decisiveness than the first subject will. 
It is very well possible to discuss at length the theoretical plausibility of these 
four Ideal Point conditions, as could be done for the stochastic transitivity 
conditions. Yet contrary to the transitivity conditions, none of the Ideal Point 
conditions has ever been subjected to an evaluation based on empirical data. 
We ourselves are not inclined to make any a priori statements on their validity. 
As we announced, the principal aim in formulating these possible properties 
of probabilistic choice behavior involving perfect or ideal alternatives was to 
obtain a set of conditions that could be used in comparing probabilistic 
unfolding theories. 
32 
Table 2.2 
Ideal point conditions necessarily satisfied in probabilistic unfolding models 
MODELS IDEAL POINT CONDITIONS 
IP1 IP 2 IP3 IP4 UI UD 
RANDOM CONFIGURATION MODELS 
Random coordinate models 
Case I (double sampling) + + - + 
Case II (single sampling) + - + 
Case II (single sampling ideal only) + · + 
Case IV (alternatives only) + + - + 
Random distance models + 
Ramsay-Croon + + + + + 
DeSarbocs. + + + 
RANDOM RESPONSE MODELS 
Strong unfolding models - convex PF + + (a) + + 
Strong unfolding models - concave PF + + + 
Midpoint unfolding models + - + 
Note · PF preference functon, (a) Depends on the preference function 
It should come as no surprise that existing probabilistic unfolding theones 
do differ on the kmd of Ideal Point conditions they require. The results are 
summarized in Table 2 2. In all models the most elementary condition IP 1 
holds. However, condition IP.2 does not necessarily hold in a number of models 
In midpomt unfolding models, for example, pit will exceed />„ if y is more 
similar to χ than ζ is. Condition IP.3 is always satisfied m Ramsay-Croon 
random distance models, and in some strong unfoldmg models. In Ramsay-
Croon random distance models, the vanance of the error distribution degen­
erates as the errorless value approaches zero. If the errorless value becomes 
zero, there is no longer any random vanabihty, the probability of confusion 
tends to zero, and choice probabilities become zero and unity. 
Condition IP 4 is not supposed to hold m every probabilistic unfolding model. 
In a model of a random coordmate theory, in which the coordinate of the ideal 
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is a random variable, it is not required to hold, since the assumed uncertainty 
in locating alternatives and ideal in the psychological space influences the 
choice probability, even when the errorless distance between the coordinates 
of the ideal and one alternative approaches zero. Condition IP.4 holds in random 
distance models, because enror distributions in these theories degenerate when 
the errorless distance reduces to zero. In a midpoint unfolding model IP.4 may 
be violated, and in a strong unfolding model, the necessity of this condition 
depends on the form of the preference function. In a strong unfolding model, 
IP.3 and IP.4 will always be satisfied only if the limit of the preference function, 
as the distance approaches zero, becomes infinity. In a unidimensional strong 
unfolding model, IP.4 will be satisfied if and only if the preference function is 
convex. (A real-valued function g over the nonnegative reals is convex if, for 
any two M 
8((l-a)r+at)<(l-a)g(r) + ag(t) (α<1). [2.121 
holds. A function g is strictly convex if the inequality is strict. A function g is 
(strictly) concave if and only if -g is (strictly) convex.) 
The remaining Ideal Point conditions require the introduction of a new 
concept, which will be of use in describing unidimensional unfolding appli­
cations. An unfolded order is a ranking of the alternatives that is monotonie 
with respect to the ordering of the corresponding coordinates. This means that 
the alternatives abc are sequenced as abc in the unfolded order if their (errorless) 
coordinates can be ordered as a<b<c or a>b>c, or, alternatively, if 
daC = dal,+dlx. 
The following condition is related to condition IP.4, but it applies in the 
unidimensional case only. Whenever we have yxzlzl in the unfolded order, then 
either the 
unilaterally decreasing condition (UD) 
P^P„ [2-13] 
holds, or the 
unilaterally increasing condition (UI) 
P«,ÏP„- [2.14] 
is satisfied. 
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(a) (b) (с) 
Figure 2.1 · Tracelines for the choice probability in two unidimensional strong 
unfolding models (a), (c) and a random distance model (b). Each line indicates 
the probability of choosing χ over y, as a funcbon of z. Coordinates for x, у are 
-.5, .5 respectively. Tracelines (a) and (c) correspond to strong unfolding models 
with a standard normal distribution function and a power preference function with 
τ = 1.3, τ = 0.3 respectively. Tracelme (b) corresponds to a model of Ramsay's 
random distance theory. 
As Croon (1983) was the first to notice, in some probabilistic unfolding 
theories the choice probabilities are predicted to become more extreme when 
the distances to the ideal are jointly increased, whereas m other theones these 
probabilities approach one half. An example of the former class are the existing 
random coordinate theories, with the assumption of random ideal coordinates. 
For alternatives more removed from the ideal, choices will be less influenced 
by the vanability in the location of úit ideal coordinate and, hence, will become 
more extreme. On the other hand, the Ramsay-Croon random distance theories 
predict the unilaterally decreasing condition. Increasing the errorless ideal-
altemative distances in these models increases the variances of the corre-
sponding error distributions, which in its tum leads to a higher probability of 
confusion. Whether a strong unfolding theory predicts the decreasing or 
increasing property, or both, depends entirely on the form of its preference 
function. A concave decreasing preference function leads to the increasing 
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Figure 2.2 - Seven alternatives and an ideal (z), with the probability density 
function of its coordinate, in a unidimensional space. The coordinate of the ideal 
has a normal distribution, with expected value 0 and variance .5. 
condition, a convex preference function to the decreasing condition. 
In Figure 2.1 choice probabilities are represented that satisfy either the uni-
laterally increasing or decreasing condition. The choice probability p^ is 
depicted as a function of the coordinate of the ideal in three different models. 
In all three models the coordinates of the alternatives are χ = -.5, y = .5. 
Tracelines (a) and (c) correspond to strong unfolding models with a standard 
normal cumulative distribution function and a power preference function (see 
equation [1-24]), with τ = 1.3, τ = 0.3 respectively. Tracelme (b) corresponds to 
a model of Ramsay ' s random distance theory. The choice probabilities depicted 
by tracelme (a) satisfy the unilaterally increasing condition, whereas the 
probabilities depicted by the two other tracelines (b) and (c) satisfy the uni­
laterally decreasing condition. One can also easily infer from this figure that 
only the probabilities for (b) satisfy the Ideal Point condition IP.3. 
Finally, there is a also a bilateral and a symmetry condition: 
bilateral condition (BIL) 
x^y => р^йр^ [2.15] 
symmetry condition (SYM) 
x=zl*y=zJ =* P„,=/V. [2-16] 
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Table 2.3 
Choice probabilities satisfying characteristic monotonicity 
a 
b 
с 
d 
e 
f 
9 
a 
0.500 
0.990 
0.940 
0.871 
0.802 
0.690 
0.500 
b 
0.070 
0.500 
0.931 
0.856 
0.782 
0.664 
0.472 
С 
0.060 
0.069 
0.500 
0.611 
0.500 
0.362 
0.198 
d 
0.129 
0.144 
0.339 
0.500 
0.335 
0.218 
0.102 
e 
0.198 
0.218 
0.500 
0.664 
0.500 
0.144 
0.060 
f 
0.310 
0.336 
0.638 
0.782 
0.856 
0.500 
0.02β 
9 
0.500 
0.528 
0.802 
0.898 
0.940 
0.972 
0.500 
/Voie - Row and column indices are arranged m the unfolded order; d is the alternative 
closest to the ideal ζ ; row minimum ¡n italics. 
Both conditions are predicted by all probabilistic unfolding theories discussed 
in Chapter 1. The meaning of the bilateral condition is simple: If two ideals are 
located in between two alternatives χ and y, the probability of choosing χ over 
y is not higher for the subject located closer to y. 
2.1.3 Unidimensional unfolding 
In this section some properties of probabilistic choice behavior in a unidi­
mensional unfolding space will be examined. We will distinguish between three 
related conditions, that can be defined using the notion of the unfolded order. 
To arrive at these conditions, three distinct random coordinate assumptions will 
be used. These will illustrated by a set of seven alternatives and an ideal, as 
shown in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. 
(]) Characteristic monotonicity 
The first condition holds in a model of the random ideal coordinate class of 
random configuration theories. In these theories, all choice inconsistencies are 
attributed to a random variability in the location of the ideal. We assume only 
one ideal coordinate value is sampled when making a choice from a pair of 
alternatives. 
If we consider the alternatives {d,f,g} in Figure 2.2, we see that the random 
ideal coordinate assumption implies that the probability p^will not exceed pa¡, 
and that p^ will not exceed pff. Since the coordinate ƒ is closer than g to the 
errorless value of the distribution of the ideal coordinate, the possibility of 
picking a coordinate for the ideal closer to d is higher for a choice between d 
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Figure 2.3 · Seven alternatives and an ¡deal, with the probability density function 
for their coordinates, in a unidimensional space. The coordinate of the ideal has 
a normal distribution, with expected value 0 and variance .4. The coordinates of 
the alternatives have independent normal distributions, with variances equal to . 1. 
and g. This relation between the unfolded order and the choice probabilities is 
captured in the following condition, which has been called characteristic 
monotonicity (Dijkstra, van der Eijk, Molenaar, Van Schuur, Stokman & 
Verfielst, 1980): 
characteristic monotonicity (CM) 
w*y =» A™ * А», л P., ^ ч , · f 2 · 1 7 ! 
In Table 2.3 we have listed binary choice probabilities for the alternatives of 
Example 1 in a random ideal coordinate model, with a normal distribution with 
a variance of one half for the ideal coordinate. The row and column indices are 
arranged in the unfolded order. Each entry in this matrix, which is usually called 
a dominance matrix, contains the probability that the row element is chosen 
out of a pair consisting of the row and the column element. Upon an inspection 
of the dominance matrix in Table 2.3, we see that the choice probabilities in 
each row decrease from the left towards the main diagonal, and increase from 
the main diagonal to the right. 
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Table 2.4 
Choice probabilities satisfying bilateral monotonicity 
a 
0.500 
0.540 
0.874 
0.913 
0.874 
0.756 
0.500 
b 
0.460 
0.500 
0.851 
0.895 
0.851 
0.724 
0.460 
С 
0.126 
0.149 
0.500 
0.570 
0.500 
0.334 
0.126 
d 
0.087 
0.105 
0.430 
0.500 
0.430 
0.270 
0.087 
θ 
0.126 
0.149 
0.500 
0.570 
0.500 
0.334 
0.126 
f 
0.244 
0.276 
0.666 
0.730 
0.666 
0.500 
0.244 
9 
0.500 
0.540 
0.874 
0.913 
0.874 
0.756 
0.500 
Note - Row and column indices are arranged in the unfolded order; d is the alternative 
closest to the ideal ζ ; row minimum m italics. 
Characteristic monotonicity is always found in Zirmes-Griggs models Case 
III (ideal coordinate only random - single sampling) and in all midpoint 
unfolding models. Characteristic monotonicity can also be found in Zinnes-
Griggs models Case Π (all coordinate random variables - single sampling), 
though not necessarily, and is never to be found in a model of one of the 
remaining theories. 
(2) Bilateral monotonicity 
If we assume that the coordinates of the alternatives are also random variables, 
and assume double sampling of the ideal coordinate, we arrive at a different 
structure, which resembles a model of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs theory Case 
I (see Figure 2.3 for an example). We make the additional assumption that the 
alternative coordinate distributions have the same distribution, except for their 
location parameters. 
As could be expected, characteristic monotonicity is no longer required in 
this structure. In fact, for unilateral pairs - pairs of alternatives for which the 
expected values are both either smaller or greater than the ideal coordinate -
the choice probabilities will be uniquely determined by the amount of overlap 
between the corresponding coordinate distributions. If we consider once more 
the triple {d,f,g}, in Figure 2.3 this time, we see that the shared area under the 
density distributions for d and/exceeds the corresponding area for d and g. For 
this reason, p,^will not exceed p^. This ordinal relation will always exist, even 
with different interaltemative distances, as long as these three stimuli are 
organized as zdfg in the unfolded order. Similarly, pft will not exceed pdt. 
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We have captured these relations in an implication whose premises do involve 
the relative location of alternatives w.r.t. the ideal alternative, and whose 
conclusion, like the one of characteristic monotonicity, consists of ordinal 
restrictions. 
bilateral monotonicity (BM) 
[wxyz => Р„*Р„
у
лр„,£р
г
,лр
ШІ
£р„лр
п
<р
уж
] л 
[Шу =* Р^^Р^лр^йр^). [2.18] 
Table 2.4 contains choice probabilities for a model with the distributions 
depicted in Figure 2.3. The coordinates of the alternatives are independently 
identically normally distributed, except for their location parameters, with a 
common variance of .1. The variance of the distribution of the ideal is .4. We 
see that the probabilities in each row of this dominance matrix decrease rowwise 
from left to right, reaching a minimum at the column corresponding to d - the 
alternative for which the errorless difference with the ideal coordinate is 
smallest - and increasing thereafter. 
Bilateral monotonicity is required by the Zinnes-Griggs theory Case I and 
Case Г , and by the random distance theories. It is also necessarily satisfied in 
all strong unfolding models. It will never be found in a midpoint unfolding 
model, or a model of the Zinnes-Griggs random coordinate theory Case ІП. It 
can be satisfied in a model of the Zinnes-Griggs theory Case П, but not nec­
essarily. 
(3) Bilateral/characteristic monotonicity 
If we take the same assumptions as in the previous section, considering all 
coordinates to be random variables, but assume single sampling instead of 
double sampling, we arrive at a structure that looks like a model of Zinnes-
Griggs' (1974) theory Case П. 
Take again the alternatives {d,f,g} in Figure 2.3, consider the distributions 
depicted, but make the assumption of single sampling of the coordinate of z. 
Will pdt exceed pft or not? The answer to this question is not straightforward, 
since it depends on the amount of overlap between four distributions: the three 
distributions of the coordinates of the alternatives, and the distribution of the 
ideal coordinate. If the overlap between the distributions of the coordinates for 
ƒ and g is very small, and the overlap between the distributions for d and ζ is 
large, p^ will not exceed pfi. For example, with a variance. 1 for the distributions 
of the alternatives and .4 for the ideal coordinate, (as in Figure 2.2), we have 
p4 = .609, pM = .910 and pft = .946. In that case, the choice probabilities will 
approximately or even perfectly satisfy bilateral monotonicity. 
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Table 2.5 
Choice probabilities satisfying bilateral-characteristic monotonicity. 
a 
0.500 
0.587 
0.946 
0.883 
0.814 
0.699 
0.500 
b 
0.413 
0.500 
0.935 
0.868 
0.754 
0.673 
0.470 
с 
0.054 
0.065 
0.500 
0.596 
0.500 
0.355 
0.186 
d 
0.117 
0.132 
0.404 
0.500 
0.391 
0.219 
0.09O 
в 
0.186 
0.206 
0.500 
0.609 
0.500 
0.229 
0.054 
f 
0.301 
0.327 
0.645 
0.781 
0.771 
0.500 
0.078 
9 
0.500 
0.530 
0.814 
0.910 
0.946 
0.922 
0.500 
Note - Row and column indices are arranged in the unfolded order; d is the alternative 
closest to the ideal ζ ; row minimum in italics. 
On the other hand, if there is a considerable overlap between the distributions 
for ƒ and g, there will be an increased possibility of confusion, rendering pfs 
less extreme. If so, pä/ might exceed pfi. For example, if we do not change the 
location parameters of the distributions in Figure 2.2, but take the variances to 
be .4 for the alternatives and .1 for the ideal, we have р^= .572, р^ = .917 and 
pfg = .892. In that case, the choice probabilities will approximately or even 
perfectly satisfy characteristic monotonicity. 
With the assumptions of single sampling, the choice probabilities can satisfy 
either bilateral or characteristic monotonicity, or violate both. However, they 
will always satisfy the following condition: 
bilateral/'characteristic monotonicity (BCM) 
[w*yz => p^ >р^ л р„ й р„ л р^ 5 ρ,J л 
ívwzxy => ->(jJvl>pv>^pwl<pwy)] . [2.19] 
Of the probabilistic unfolding models presented in Chapter 1, models of the 
Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs Case Π approach are the only ones in which both 
bilateral or characteristic monotonicity may be violated, yet in which the weaker 
condition BCM always holds. 
In Table 2.5 we have listed choice probabilities in a model of this Zinnes-
Griggs theory, Case Π, with variances equal to . 1 for the distributions of the 
coordinates, and equal to .4 for the ideal. When we inspect this dominance 
matrix, the minimum in each row is not necessarily located in column d, as in 
bilateral monotonicity, nor on the main diagonal or in the column next to the 
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main diagonal, as in characteristic monotonicity. In the row corresponding to 
g, the lowest probability is in column e, instead of in column/, (Table 2.3) or 
d (Table 2.4). 
2.2 PROOFS 
The proofs will be grouped for the three classes of conditions discussed in 
the previous section. 
2.2.1 Stochastic transitivity 
A few Lemmas will help us in proving most of the theorems on stochastic 
transitivity for the probabilistic unfolding models we discussed earlier. We start 
with a definition. A BCP structure (X,p) satisfies simple distance decompos-
ability if there exists a cumulative distribution H and a metric d defined over 
X u{z} such that for all x, y e Χ 
where Η is strictly decreasing in its first argument and strictly increasing in the 
second. Simple distance decomposability is nothing but the equivalent in 
unfolding of simple scalability, a property introduced by Krantz (1964). A proof 
of the following lemma can be found in Tversky & Russo (1969). 
LEMMA 2.1 
Simple distance decomposability implies strict stochastic transitivity. 
If we require the function in [2.20] to be just nonincreasing in its first argument, 
and nondecreasing in the second, we arrive at a weaker form of simple distance 
decomposability, which we will simply call weak simple distance decompos­
ability. 
LEMMA 2.2 
Weak simple distance decomposability implies strong stochastic 
transitivity, but not necessarily strict stochastic transitivity. 
PROOF 
Strong stochastic transitivity (cf. equation [2.4]) is equivalent to the following 
combination of implications 
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[ Ρ „ = ·5 л piy = .5 => P^ = -5] л 
[ Ρ « < · 5 л р^к.5 => р „ < р ^ лр^йр^]. [2.21] 
From the definition of binary choice probabilities follows the equality 
H(d
a
,d
a
) = .5. So if the first premise of the first part of [2.21] holds, 
H(d„,d
a
)=H(d
a
,d
a
) and d„ = d
u
. Similarly, if the second premise holds, we 
have H(d
u
,dI>)=H(dty,dl)) and dIX=dtJ. By transitivity, d,w = dJt and 
H{d„,dzy) = H(dIt,dI)) = .5, which proves the implication in the first part in [2.21]. 
If the first premise of the second implication of condition [2.21] holds, we have 
H(dzw,dIZ)>H(dIZ,da) and dIW<du. If the second premise holds, 
Η(d^, djy) > Hid^, d^) andrf,, < d^. The two inequalities in the implication follow, 
since the distribution function Η is nonincreasing in its first argument and 
nondecreasing in its second. Strict stochastic transitivity may be violated, if Η 
is not strictly decreasing in its first argument or not strictly increasing in its 
second. 
QED 
LEMMA 2.3 
If a moderate unfolding model exists, each BCP structure satisfies 
moderate, but not necessarily strong stochastic transitivity. 
PROOF 
The proof relies on results obtained by Halff (1976). Define γ as follows 
M J - M J ж.)-м,)і ..
 991 
*MJ ' «(4,) J l J 
and obtain 
Т * Ц , ) а М . ) - / Ц , ) . [2-23] 
By summing both inequalities, using the triangle inequality -d^ud^ + d^- and 
the fact that g is concave by definition (cf. Section 1.2.4)- g(d^)<g{dy„)+g{dIi) 
- we obtain 
γ=ππη 
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J{dIW)-f{dn) 
^—^Γ·
 [ 2
·
2 4 ] 
from which the implication of moderate stochastic transitivity follows. 
The violation of strong stochastic transitivity can be easily demonstrated by 
a counterexample, e.g. d„ = l,d
a
=2,d
v
 = 3,dWM=diy = 1, f(x) = -x2,g(x)=x. 
QED 
LEMMA 2.4 
In a Zinnes-Griggs model Case I (double sampling of the ideal 
coordinate), each BCP structure satisfies simple distance decom-
posability. 
LEMMA 2.5 
In a Zinnes-Griggs model Case IV (coordinates only), each BCP 
structure satisfies simple distance decomposability. 
As we saw in Section 1.2.1, the choice probabilities in a Zinnes-Griggs model 
are functionally related to the model's parameters through a doubly noncentral 
F distribution function. The lemma follows from the relation between the 
cumulative doubly noncentral F distribution function and its noncentrality 
parameters. Bezembinder and Bossuyt (1989) described this proof more 
extensively. 
LEMMA 2.6 
In a random distance model, each BCP structure satisfies simple 
distance decomposability. 
This also follows easily from the expressions for the probabilities, as they have 
been derived in Chapter 1, combined with the strictly increasing nature of the 
normal and logistic cumulative distribution functions. 
LEMMA 2.7 
In a strong unfolding model each BCP structure satisfies weak simple 
distance decomposability. 
Lemma 2.7 follows from the definition of a strong unfolding model (cf. 1.2.3). 
LEMMA 2.8 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model, the following relation 
holds: 
d <d =^> ρ <ρ . [2.25] 
PROOF 
Equation [2.25] can be broken down into two equivalencies: 
(1) d
a
 = djy**pxy = p}Iand 
(2) d
a
<dT)**pyi<pI,. 
(1) Suppose d
a
 =djy and piy * pfI. Using equation [1.6], the equality α ^ = a,,, 
and β^ = -β>χ (cf. equations [1.7] and [1.8]), we derive from p^ * pyi the fol­
lowing inequality: 
[Φ(α^)-.511Φ(β<,)-.5]*0. [2.26] 
This inequality holds if both a„y * 0 and β^ * 0. Now since dtl = dzy, either α,,, 
or β^ has to be zero, so [2.26] cannot be true, and (1) has to hold. 
(2) Suppose d
a
 < d^ and p^ < pt¡. Using equation [1.6] once more, we derive 
from pMy < pyx the following inequality: 
[Φ(α„,)-.$][Φ(β<,)-.5ΐΕ0. [2.27] 
Sinced^ <dty, ct,,,andβ^areeitherbothpositiveorbothnegative,[2.27]cannot 
be true, and (2) has to hold. 
QED 
LEMMA 2.9 
If a unidimensional Zimes-Griggs model exists, then for every 
alternative у there exists a point u, with zuy, such that for every two 
alternatives w and χ with nonidentical coordinates, each distinct 
from у 
( й а м = > р ^ < р
м
] л [ й й а = > р ^ > р „ ] . [2.28] 
PROOF 
We have to prove that p^ as a function of χ increases up to the point u, and 
decreases afterwards. The proof follows from the behavior of the partial 
derivative of G{z,x,y,p) in equation [1.6] w.r.t. the coordinate of x: 
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^ — ^ ^ - [ 1 - 2 Ф ф , ) 1 --Ш-И-гЧа.,! (for р ^ < 1) 
дх Vï^Pvi ' AFP^ 
^ - ^ в & - х ) ( f t - P ^ - l ) [2-29] 
This partial derivative exists everywhere forx * y. Assume that ζ <y. We will 
distinguish between three situations, which exhaustively cover all possibilities: 
(1) m^uz л x<y, 
(2) ζ <mX) л χ < у 
(3) ζ ой,, л у < * . 
In case (1), а ^ is nonnegative and β,, is negative, so the derivative in [2.29] is 
positive. In case (3), o ^ is negative and β^ is positive, so [2.29] is negative. In 
case (2), both a ^ and β^ are negative. If ρ equals unity, the derivative in this 
interval is positive. For ρ < 1, the derivative is negative for χ = у, (in that case 
ßiy is zero) and positive for* < у (Case (2)). The derivative reaches a maximum 
at a point M, for which [2.29], with χ = и, is zero. To show that this point is 
unique, take x<u. In that case, α ^ χ χ , ^ and ßI,<ßu,, so [2.29] has to be 
positive. Take χ > и. In that case, a^ < a ^ and β^ < β,,,, and [2.29] will be 
negative. The proof for ζ > у can be handled in a similar way. 
QED 
We can now prove the following theorems. 
THEOREM 2.1 
In a Zinnes-Griggs random coordinate model Case I, each BCP 
structure satisfies strict stochastic transitivity. 
THEOREM 2.2 
In a Zinnes-Griggs random coordinate model Case III, each BCP 
structure satisfies moderate stochastic transitivity; strong stochastic 
transitivity can be violated. 
THEOREM 2.3 
In a Zinnes-Griggs random coordinate model Case IV, each BCP 
structure satisfies strict stochastic transitivity. 
THEOREM 2.4 
In a Ramsay-Croon random distance model, each BCP structure 
satisfies strict stochastic transitivity. 
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THEOREM 2.5 
In a strong unfolding model, each BCP structure satisfies strong 
stochastic transitivity; strict stochastic transitivity can be violated. 
THEOREM 2.6 
In a midpoint unfolding model, each BCP structure satisfies moderate 
stochastic transitivity; strong stochastic transitivity can be violated. 
THEOREM 2.7 
In a Zinnes-Griggs model with a unidimensional space, each BCP 
structure satisfies at least moderate stochastic transitivity. 
Theorems 2.1 and 2.3 can be proved using Lemma 2.1, and 2.4 and 2.5 
respectively. Theorem 2.4 can be proved using Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.6. 
Theorem 2.5 can be proved using Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.7; the violation of 
STSTcan occurr if the cumulative distribution function is not strictly increasing. 
Theorem 2.6 can be proved using Lemma 2.3 and the result that a midpoint 
unfolding model is equivalent with a moderate unfolding model (cf. Section 
1.2.4). Theorem 2.2 can be proved using the result that a Zinnes-Griggs random 
coordinate model Case Ш is equivalent with a midpoint unfolding model, and 
Theorem 2.6. A proof for Theorem 2.7 follows. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.7 
Take a triple for which the premises of moderate stochastic transitivity are 
fulfilled: w,x,y with p„z> .5 and pIi>.5. Four distinct unfolded orders are 
possible: 
( 1 ) wzxy {bilateral below) 
(2) zwxy (unilateral) 
(3) ywix {bilateral split) and 
(4) yzwx {bilateral above). 
Using Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9, it can be shown that in case (1) and (2), 
Pwr < P~y, and in case (3) and (4), p
wy> p^, which delivers the implication of 
moderate stochastic transitivity. 
QED 
2.2.2 The ideal point 
Again we start with a number of Lemmas. 
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LEMMA 2.10 
If a BCP structure satisfies weak simple distance decomposability, it 
satisfies IP.l and IP.2. 
This needs no proof. 
LEMMA 2.11 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model, p^ increases in ζ when 
у <x. 
PROOF 
The partial derivative of the function in [1.6] and [1.16] with respect to ζ is 
equal to: 
%'Ш; 12φ(P',-11 ( " " ^ 
- ^ = ф(л/2 (z - ія^)) QOc-y) ( for p ^ = l). [2.30] 
From у <x, it follows that β^ and Q(x-y) are positive, so the derivatives in 
[2.30] are positive. 
QED 
LEMMA 2.12 
In a midpoint unfolding model, p 4 is not decreasing in ζ when у < χ. 
In a midpoint unfolding model, p^ is not increasing in χ when у < χ. 
PROOF 
The partial derivatives of the function in [ 1.29] with respect to ζ and with respect 
to χ when у < χ are equal to 
-^• = h(z-mX)) [2.31] 
Эр„ h(z-m„) 
-g = -
 2 " [2.32] 
48 
in which h stands for the probability density function corresponding to the 
cumulative distribution function// in equation [1.29]. The first partial deriv­
ative is positive, the second negative. 
QED 
THEOREM 2.8 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model IP.l is satisfied in each 
BCP structure, but IP.3 is not. 
THEOREM 2.9 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model Case I or Case IV, IP.2 is 
satisfied in each BCP structure. 
THEOREM 2.10 
InaRamsay-Croonrandomdistance model IP.l and IP.2 are satisfied 
in each BCP structure. 
THEOREM 2.11 
In a strong unfolding model IP.l and IP.2 are satisfied in each BCP 
structure. 
THEOREM 2.12 
In a midpoint unfolding model IP.l is satisfied in each BCP structure, 
but IP.2 is not necessarily. 
THEOREM 2.13 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model Case II or Case HI, IP.2 
is not necessarily satisfied. 
Theorem 2.8 can be proved with Lemmas 2.8, 2.9. Theorems 2.9, 2.10 and 
2.11 follow from Lemma 2.10, and Lemma 2.4 and 2.5,2.6 and 2.7 respectively. 
The first part of Theorem 2.12 follows from the definition of a midpoint 
unfolding model, the second part can be proved with the help of Lemma 2.12. 
Theorem 2.13 follows from Lemma 2.9: The partial derivative of p^ w.r.t. χ is 
positive for χ = ζ when ρ > 0. 
THEOREM 2.14 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model, the unilaterally increasing 
condition is satisfied, but not necessarily IP.4. 
THEOREM 2.15 
In a midpoint unfolding model, the Ut condition is satisfied, but not 
necessarily IP.4. 
THEOREM 2.16 
In a strong unfolding model, IP.3 is necessarily satisfied if and only 
if the limit of the preference function, as the ideal-alternative distance 
approaches zero, is infinity. 
THEOREM 2.17 
¡η a strong unfolding model, IP.4 is necessarily satisfied if and only 
if the preference function is convex. 
THEOREM 2.18 
In a strong unfolding model, the Ul condition is satisfied if the pref­
erence function is concave; the UD condition is satisfied if the pref­
erence function is convex. 
THEOREM 2.19 
Conditions IP J and IP.4 are satisfied in a random distance model if 
it satisfies the Ramsay-Croon description and violated if it satisfies 
the DeSarbo c.s. description. 
THEOREM 2.20 
The unilaterally decreasing is satisfied in a random distance model 
if it satisfies the Ramsay-Croon description; the unilaterally 
decreasing is satisfied if it satisfies the DeSarbo c.s. description. 
Theorem 2.14 can be derived from Lemma 2.11, and Theorem 2.15 from 
Lemma 2.12. If the condition in Theorem 2.16 is not fulfilled, p
u
 will exceed 
zero. Theorem 2.19 and 2.20 follow from 2.16-17 and 2.19 respectively. A 
Ramsay-Croon random distance model is equivalent with a strong unfolding 
model with a logarithmic preference function, and a DeSarbo random distance 
model is equivalent with a strong unfolding model with a squared preference 
function. A proof for Theorem 2.17 and 2.18 follows. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.17 AND 2.18 
The implication in condition IP.4 is true in a strong unfolding model whenever 
for a pair of alternatives x, y and a pair of ideals ζ,,ζ, 
d <d ν d <d [2.33] 
is true, so we will just have to consider situations in which [2.33 ] is false. Define 
d
'f~d*? „ d',>~d·? 
α
=7^Γ Ρ = Γ ^ [ 2 · 3 4 ] 
then 
^ ( l - ß M v + ß V [2-35] 
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If ƒ is convex, we can derive from [2.35] the following inequality: 
/ ( O + Z ^ J S [2-(o+ß)] /(rfv)+(a+ß)/(</v) . [2.36] 
Since d1JC = 0 and diy=dIJ (premise of IP.4), we can use the triangle inequality 
to deduce 1 < α+β. From dtf<dl1 and ƒ nonincreasing, we derive 
[(α+β) -1] /(d J < [(α+β) -1] j[d J 
[2 - (a + β)] / ( d j + (a + β) y(d
v
) < / (d j+/(d
v
) . [2.37] 
From [2.36] and [2.37] we derive 
^М-^Ц^И'О) [ 2 · 3 8 ] 
(because Я is nondecreasing) which delivers the implication of condition IP.4. 
To show that a concave preference function may lead to a violation of IP.4, 
and to deliver a proof for Theorem 2.19, take the premise of the unilateral 
conditions [2.13] and [2.14]: a unidimensional space with an unfolded order 
yxz,z
r
 In that case, α + β = 1. If the preference function is convax, the inequality 
[2.38] can be derived immediately from [2.36]. If the preference function is 
concave, then 
/ ( d J ^ d - ß ^ J + ß / ^ J . [2.39] 
Summing, rearranging, and applying Η leads to 
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which delivers the unilaterally increasing condition, but may violate IP.4 if 
dtil = o. 
QED 
2.2.3 Unidimensional unfolding 
We need just one more lemma. 
LEMMA 2.13 
If a unidimensional probabilistic unfolding model exists and each 
BCP structure in the BCP system satisfies weak simple distance 
decomposability, then this BCP structure satisfies bilateral mono-
tonicity. 
We can now prove the following Theorems: 
THEOREM 2.21 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Criggs model Case I or Case IV, each 
BCP structure satisfies bilateral monotonicity. 
THEOREM 2.22 
In a unidimensional random distance model, each BCP structure 
satisfies bilateral monotonicity. 
THEOREM 2.23 
In a unidimensional strong unfolding model, each BCP structure 
satisfies bilateral monotonicity. 
THEOREM 2.24 
In a midpoint unfolding model, each BCP structure satisfies charac-
teristic monotonicity. 
THEOREM 2.25 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model Case III, each BCP struc-
ture satisfies characteristic monotonicity. 
THEOREM 2.26 
In a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model, each BCP structure 
satisfies bilateral/characteristic monotonicity. 
Theorem 2.21 to 2.23 follow from Lemma 2.13, and Lemma 2.4 and 2.5, 2.6, 
and 2.7 respectively. Theorem 2.24 can be proved using Lemma 2.12. Theorem 
2.25 follows, since a unidimensional Zinnes-Griggs model Case III is equiv-
alent with a midpoint unfolding model. Theorem 2.26 follows immediately 
from Lemma 2.9. 

3 Evaluating 
probabilistic unfolding theories 
In this section we will deal with the problem of how probabilistic unfolding 
theories can be evaluated. The approach that will be advocated has been hinted 
at in Chapter 2, in which properties of probabilistic choice behavior were 
explored. An examination of the properties of probabilistic choice behavior 
that are necessarily implied by a probabilistic choice theory resulted in a second 
classification of existing probabilistic unfolding theories. Looking at it from a 
different angle, one can consider the assumption that a particular property is 
satisfied in probabilities of choosing alternatives as axioms of alternative 
theories on probabilistic choice (Type I). Contrary to the theories presented in 
the Chapter 1 (Type II), these Type I theories are built then on assumed reg­
ularities in probabilistic choice behavior, instead of on some cognitive structure 
of a presupposed form, though the latter may (indirectly) lead to the same sort 
of regularities. 
Examining equivalencies between Type I theories and Type II theories -
between axioms on properties of choice behavior and axioms on cognitive 
structures - can lead to a better understanding of the relationships between these 
categories of theories. For example, it is very well possible that two Type Π 
theories, differing in their basic, structural and conceptual approach to choice 
behavior, are nevertheless highly similar in the kind of probabilistic choice 
behavior they try to account for, in terms of the properties they expect to hold. 
These equivalencies may also prove to be of worth in an evaluation of the 
relation between theories and observations on choice behavior. 
The first section of this chapter contains a description of such an evaluation 
strategy, within the context of theories of probabilistic choice behavior in 
general. It provides also a description of basic concepts, such as "model" and 
"theory", in order to be able to be more precise in describing what is implied 
by a "test of a model". The section is based on a paper by Bossuyt & Roskam 
on the subject (1987b, 1989b). The second part of this section contains a dis­
cussion on relevant topics in data collection designs and subject sampling 
schemes. 
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3.1 TESTING PROBABILISTIC CHOICE THEORIES 
AND MODELS 
Probabilistic choice theory, and with it, the use of probabilistic choice models, 
originated from the psychophysical laboratories. The primary aim was the 
assignment of numbers to alternatives in a way that could be theoretically 
defended. Gradually, the ideas became intertwined with notions from classic 
algebraic utility theory and axiomatic measurement theory. During the past 
decades we have wimessed a further development of probabilistic choice theory 
in psychology, largely separated from a growing field of behavioral choice 
studies. On the other hand, some of the basic ideas have been taken up by 
economists. The latter has resulted in a research area known as (probabilistic) 
discrete-choice modelling. 
Though both fields now exist for a number of years, anyone trying to get 
acquainted with the literature is hindered by a surprising lack of unanimity in 
the terminology, especially when it comes to the use of words as "theory" or 
"model". As a consequence, it will seldom be immediately clear what is meant 
if an author writes that a "model is tested". 
We were faced with this difficulty when we tried to evaluate members of a 
numerous subclass of probabilistic choice theories, known as "probabilistic 
unfolding theories". In order to define what was actually at stake in this eval­
uation, we felt ourselves forced to construct a conceptual framework with a 
clear, distinct meaning for "model" and "test of a model", and within which the 
relation between theory and observations could be adequately described and 
evaluated. A sketch of this framework is presented in this section. We do not 
present an overview of probabilistic unfolding, for which the reader is referred 
to the first chapter. In fact, the theories quoted in this paper only serve an 
exemplary purpose. They are discussed within their axiomatized form, with a 
set and a binary choice probability function as variables, the familiar settheo-
retical and logical constants, and the usual predicates and operations on the 
reals. 
Within the probabilistic choice theories we will make a somewhat uncommon 
distinction between Type I and Type Π theories. Contrary to Type I theories, 
Type Π theories presume the existence of real-valued functions over the set of 
alternatives, to which the choice probabilities can be functionally related. Close 
to its meaning in logic, a possible realization of a theory will be an appropriate 
settheoretical structure. For a theory on probabilistic choice, this will be an 
ordered couple, consisting of a particular set of alternatives and a binary choice 
probability function. A possible realization of a theory will be called a model 
of this theory if it satisfies all its valid sentences: its axioms and all sentences 
that can be logically derived from them. 
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Within our view, a model of a theory cannot be a model of the data, for the 
simple reason that probabilities are in general not part of recorded data, which 
means they cannot be derived from observations through a coding or a clas­
sification procedure. At most they can be estimated, but never observed. 
Corresponding to the idea of a possible realization of a theory, we therefore 
use, following Suppes (1962), the notion of a possible realization of the data. 
This also is a settheoretical structure of the appropriate type, containing all the 
information needed to test the theory in question. A possible realization of the 
data will be called a model of the data if the information it contains is valid. 
The relation between Type Π theories on probabilistic choice and observations 
is usually evaluated through astatistical approach. In this section, we will defend 
the thesis that this relation should more frequently be evaluated through an 
evaluation of the relation between observations and Type I theories. This 
relation can be evaluated through a statistical approach that is similar to the 
one used for evaluating the goodness of fit between models of data and models 
of Type Π theories. The difference between the first, or direct strategy (model 
of data - model of Type Π theory) and the second, or indirect strategy (model 
of data - model of Type I theory - Type Π theory) parallels the distinction 
between "scaling" and the evaluation of necessary and sufficient axioms for a 
homomorphic mapping of an algebraical relational system on a numerical 
relational system in axiomatic measurement theory (Krantz, Luce, Suppes and 
Tversky, 1971, pp. 32-33). 
3.1.1 Models of theory 
To ease the exposition, we will restrict ourselves to paired comparisons, and 
one choosing subject, which can either be a single person or a group of persons. 
In a paired comparisons task, a researcher wants to gather information on 
choices from a nonempty set of feasible alternatives. Out of this set, option sets 
of two elements each are constructed. From each option set, the subject has to 
choose one and only one element, the no-choice option being eliminated. 
A probabilistic choice theory views a choice from such an option set pro­
babilistically. A choice is regarded as the realization of an independent Ber­
noulli trial, with a particular probability of choosing the first alternative. This 
choice probability is supposed to remain constant over repeated presentations 
of the same option set. 
A possible realization of this general theory of probabilistic (binary) choice 
is an ordered couple <X,p), satisfying the following axioms: 
BCP.l X is a nonempty set 
BCP.2 ρ is a real-valued function defined on X xX as follows: 
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Vx.yeX: а. 0<р
п
<1 
1 
We will call such a couple Qi,p) a binary choice probability (BCP) structure, 
and read p^ as "the probability that the alternative χ is chosen out of an option 
set consisting of χ and у only". 
Besides these mathematical constraints a theory on probabilistic choice 
assumes some additional form of consistency in the choice probabilities. We 
will distinguish between two classes of theories, which we will introduce with 
some simple examples. 
(1 ) Theories on probabilistic choice - Type I 
In a first class of theories the consistency is imposed through a number of 
constraints on the choice probabilities. A simple theory capturing this consis­
tency assumption is the "weak stochastic transitivity" theory Ту defined through 
the following axiom A.l: 
AXIOM A. 1 
Vw,x,yeX: ±Up„*±Up4 =» ¿Sp . , . [3.1] 
Loosely interpreted, this axiom expresses the notion that if a subject is inclined 
to choose w out of [wj} and χ out of {x,y}, this subject will also be inclined 
to choose w out of [w.y]. In a way, weak stochastic transitivity is the simplest 
probabilistic analogue of the rational transitivity prescription in algebraic utility 
theory. 
A second theory, which we will the "strong stochastic transitivity theory" T2, 
is defined through axiom A.2: 
AXIOM A.2 
Vw,x,yeX: ^<p„A-<pXJ => тйк{р„,pj <p^ . [3.2] 
This axiom implies that whenever a subject is inclined to choose w rather than 
χ out of [wj], the probability of choosing w instead of some third element у 
from any other option set will exceed the probability of choosing χ out of {x,y} 
(for a proof, see Tversky & Russo, 1969). 
57 
To complete our set of examples of Type I theories, we present theory Т
г
. It 
is defined through axiom A.3, which states that the probabilities of any two 
intransitive choice cycles in a subset of three alternatives are identical: 
AXIOM A.3 
Vw,x,yeX: P
w
,PTyPyw=pw,PiXP„. [3.3] 
So far we have three examples of Type I theories of probabilistic choice. In 
each theory a distinct forni of consistency in the choice probabilities is assumed 
to exist, either through ordinal constraints (АЛ, A.2) or through an equality 
restriction (A.3). 
For any of the theories on probabilistic choice, a possible realization (i.e., a 
BCP structure) will be called a model of a theory Г, if it contains no violations 
of the corresponding axiom A^ So, given a BCP structure, testing whether or 
not it is a model of a particular theory is a straightforward task: One simply 
checks the relevant axioms. As an example, consider the BCP structure (E, p) 
E = {e,f,g} 
/V = 3/5, pA = 2/3, /»„ = 7/10. 
It is easy to verify that this BCP structure satisfies weak stochastic transitivity 
(A.l) and is therefore a model of Г,. It satisfies strong stochastic transitivity 
(A.2) and is a model of T2, but it fails to satisfy A.3, so it cannot be a realization 
of theory Г3 and, hence, fails to be a model of this theory. 
The three theories presented ait hierarchically related to one another. Strong 
stochastic transitivity implies weak stochastic transitivity, so any model of Г2 
will also be a model of Г,. The same relation holds between theories T2 and Г3: 
Axiom A.3 implies A.2. As a consequence, if a BCP structure fails to be a model 
of Tj, it cannot be a model of Ту 
(2) Theories on probabilistic choice - Type II 
Whereas in the Type I theories the consistency was imposed through con­
straints on the choice probabilities themselves, the Type II theories state the 
existence of a real-valued function over the set of alternatives X (or, 
alternatively, its product set), to which the choice probabilities are related. 
Usually these functions are interpreted as utility functions. We present three 
simple examples. 
The first is the weak utility theory Г4. A BCP structure Qi,p) is a weak utility 
model if there exists a real-valued function и defined on X such that 
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AXIOM A.4 
Vx.yeX: p^^p^^u^^uiy). [3.4] 
A second example is the Fechnerian or strong utility theory T¡. A strong 
utility model is a BCP structure Qi,p) for which there exist a cumulative dis-
tribution function H and a utility function и defined over X such that 
AXIOM A.5 
Vx,yeX: p
xy=H[u(.x)-u(y)] . [3.5] 
As a third example we present the strict utility theory Г6. A strict utility model 
is a BCP structure ÇC, p) for which there exists a utility function и defined over 
X such that 
AXIOM A.6 
Vjc.yeX: ρ = . . . . • 3.6] 
^ u(x) + u(y) 
How can we test whether or not a BCP structure is a model of any of these 
theories? Since each of the axioms contains an existential part, the model 
relation can be demonstrated if one succeeds in finding a function и to satisfy 
the corresponding axiom. Consider once more the BCP structure {E,p). It is a 
weak utility model, because axiom A.4 is satisfied with the function u' on E: 
u'(e) = 3, u'(f) = 2, u'(g) = 1. It cannot be a strict utility model, because there 
does not exist a function и to satisfy the necessary equalities. As to the strong 
utility theory, we were not able to find a function satisfying A.5, so we cannot 
take a decision on the model relation between (E,p) and the theories T5. For­
tunately, there exists another way to test these model relations. 
Ever since the late fifties, a number of authors have been studying the 
equivalence relations between what we have labelled Type I theories and Type 
Π theories (see for example Block & Marschak, 1960; Luce & Suppes, 1965). 
Simultaneously, the study of the formal foundations of measurement led to the 
formulation of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for homomorphic 
mappings of particular algebraic relational systems to numerical relational 
systems (Suppes & Zinnes, 1963; Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971). The 
study of probabilistic choice has also taken advantage of these results. 
Some examples might illustrate these relations. If a BCP structure {X,p) is a 
weak utility model, then it is also a model of Γ,, but not conversely. So realizing 
axiom A. 1 is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a BCP structure to 
be a model of the weak utility theory Γ4. If (Χ, ρ > is a model of Γ,, then it is also 
a model of Т
л
 ifX is finite. 
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Consider a second example. If a BCP structure QC, p) satisfies A.6, and, hence, 
is a model of theory T6, then it will also satisfy A.3 and be a model of Γ3, but 
not conversely. The converse relation holds if the setX is finite, and if 0 < p^ < 1 
is true for all pairs of alternatives in X. A third example: A BCP structure sat­
isfying A.5 will also satisfy A.2, but no sufficient conditions are known for a 
BCP structure satisfying A.2 to be a model of Γ5. 
These relations can help us a great deal in evaluating the model relation 
between a BCP structure and a Type II theory. If the BCP structure fails to satisfy 
a necessary condition, the model relation has to be rejected; if it satisfies a set 
of sufficient conditions, it is amodel of the corresponding theory. In othercases, 
no decision can be made. Consider once more the BCP structure (E,p). It failed 
to satisfy A.3, so it cannot be a strict utility model. However, it satisfies A.2, 
so it still may be a model of the Fechnerian theory T5. 
According to some authors, only Type Π theories should be called proba­
bilistic choice theories. In their view, the axioms of Type I theories are just 
"observable properties" of choice behavior (see Luce & Suppes (1965) for an 
example). We think that this distinction is both unwarranted and incorrect. Type 
I and Type Π theories differ primarily in the content of their axioms. Type I 
theories formulate a set of constraints on the choice probabilities, whereas Type 
Π theories state the existence of one or more functions defined over the set of 
alternatives. In a way, both classes of theories can be seen as defining "prop­
erties" of probabilistic choice behavior, but neither the first set of axioms nor 
the second is "observable". It will be obvious that the utility functions и are 
unobservable, but the same holds for the binary choice probabilities. Since we 
never observe choice probabilities as such, there is no way that a BCP structure 
might be a possible realization of empirical data. 
3.1.2 Models of data 
In evaluating the relations between theory and data, we will use the notion 
of possible realizations of data, which is similar to the notion of possible 
realizations of theory, presented earlier. As far as we know, Suppes (1962) has 
been the first to make this distinction. Due to the background of probabilistic 
choice modelling, our conception of 'models of data' differs slightly from his. 
A possible realization of data will be a set-theoretical structure of the 
appropriate type, designed to incorporate all the valid information about the 
experiment that can be used in tests of the adequacy of the theory. In our view, 
"data" refers to "recorded observations", which refers to everything obtained 
from empirical observations through a coding or classification procedure. 
In this Theory of Data, Coombs (1964) mad a distinction between two 
meanings of the term data, which is commonly used to refer both to the recorded 
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observations, and to that which is analyzed. He preferred to reserve the use of 
the term to the latter. This distinction parallels the difference we make between 
data and model of data. A scientist interested in choice behavior, who has 
decided to design a choice experiment has an embarrassing richness of (po­
tential) observations to make a selection from. From this abundance, only a 
few observations are actually recorded. The researcher registers the choices 
that are made, when, and by whom, and nothing more, for example. What is to 
be coded will depend on the theoretical framework used. In this respect, we 
never collect "data" as such: "Behavior does not yield data by parthogenesis." 
(Coombs, 1964). 
The model of the data is nothing more than an orderly structure that capture 
the essence of these data; we call it a model of the data if it is a possible real­
ization of the data. If, in our study of the probabilistic choice theories, a choice 
experiment is carried out, an ordered couple Qi,C) can be a realization of the 
data, if it is defined as follows: 
BC.l X is a nonempty set, 
BC.2 С is a set of binary-valued functions c,, defined on X xX, such that 
the following is true for every function and every pai r of alternatives : 
( % = 1 А С ^ = 0 ) У ( С / 1 , = 0 Л С ( , 1 = 1)У(С І І ,=0ЛС, У 1 = 0 ) . 
We call <X, C) a binary choice (ВС) structure, reading c^ = 1 as "the alternative 
has been chosen out of the option set {*, y} by subject /" and с^ = 0 as "the 
alternative χ has not been chosen out of the option set {x, y} by subject /". 
А ВС structure will be called a model of the data if the information on the 
data it contains is valid, both within the sense of the empirical observations and 
the fundamental probabilistic assumption. A complete evaluation of this 
validity relation is not easily made, since it involves checking a plenitude of 
assumptions, related to the data collection procedure used, the experimental 
design, and what Suppes (1962) has called "ceteris paribus conditions": dis­
turbing environmental conditions, such as unwanted noises, bad lighting, and 
so on. To mention one, our basic probabilistic assumptions imply that every 
presentation of an option set of two alternatives can be treated as equivalent to 
any other presentation of this option set. This assumption will not be auto­
matically met and will require a careful design of the choice environment. 
A model of the data is in general not unique. In addition to the вс structure 
mentioned earlier, a binary choice frequency (BCF) structure Ç(,k) can also be 
a possible realization of the same data, with к defined as 
^ = Σ cl)X. [3.7] 
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The вс structure is a model of the data if every comparison of the same two 
alternatives can be treated as similar, no matter when and where it is made; the 
BCF structure is a model of the data if these comparisons can be treated as 
similar, without taking notice of who makes them. 
We do not gather data as we might collect autumn leaves; theoretical 
assumptions are generally not confronted with data in an unstructured way. 
Models of theory are well-organized structures in which all of a theory's 
assumptions are satisfied; one might alternatively look at theories as definitions 
of the classes of their models. On the other hand, models of data are close to 
Coombs' (1964) restricted definition of data: well-organized structures that 
capture the quintessence of recorded observations. Theory guides the selection 
of observations that are to be recorded, and theory guides the organization of 
these data into models. 
3.1.3 Theory versus data: evaluating goodness of fit 
Suppose we have a model of the data and we are interested in the relation 
between the observations and a particular probabilistic choice theory T. This 
means that we are interested in the question whether our theoretical assumptions 
can be maintained in the light of the empirical observations made. This does 
not imply that we will try to evaluate whether or not the model of the data (the 
binary choice structure) is a model of the theory. We cannot check axioms 
expressed in terms of choice probabilities in а вс structure. 
By calculating the relative choice proportions we could obtain a structure that 
satisfies the definition of a BCP structure. Yet if such a structure of choice 
proportions failed to satisfy the relevant axioms, this would still be an incon­
clusive result. It will be hard to say whether this violation is a consequence of 
the latent BCP structure violating the axioms, or a corollary of binomial 
variability. 
For Type Π theories the following strategy is usually adopted (see Figure 
3.1). One tries to construct a model of the theory that corresponds optimally 
(in some sense) to the model of the data. Most frequently, the likelihood will 
be the correspondence criterion. The likelihood function expresses the joint 
probability density of а ВС structure, as a function of the estimated BCP structure. 
Because of the basic probabilistic assumption, each choice (i.e. each c^) is 
considered to be a realization of an independent Bernoulli trial, governed by 
the choice probability p^. For example, to construct a strict utility model, the 
utility function и is sought for which the likelihood is maximized, where the 
choice probabilities are calculated through the functional relation A.6. To a 
model of the Fechnerian theory T5, a particular distribution function Η is 
selected and the maximum likelihood utilities и are sought. 
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Figure 3.1- Relations between theory, data, and models. 
Suppose all this has been done. At this stage, a number of authors proclaim 
that they will continue with a "test of the model". This terminology cannot be 
correct. Obviously, the BCP structure obtained through the maximum likelihood 
strategy will be a model of the theory, by construction. On the other hand, the 
ВС structure has to be a model of the data, for, if not, the whole procedure is 
meaningless. What is actually done at this stage is an evaluation of the corre­
spondence relation between the model of the theory and the model of the data, 
a more common word for "correspondence" in this context being 
"goodness-of-fit". 
If the maximum likelihood principle has been used, the likelihood function 
is the indicated device for this purpose. Within the Neyman-Pearson approach 
to statistical testing, the generalized likelihood ratio test statistic can be used 
to test the null hypothesis that the model of the data is a set of outcomes from 
a BCP structure that is a model of the theory, versus the alternative hypothesis 
that it is not. 
It is worth reemphasizing that this is neither a test of the model relation 
between a theory and a BCP structure, nor a test of the model relation between 
the observations and а ВС structure, but an evaluation of the statistical corre­
spondence relation between both models in terms of the likelihood. 
Unfortunately this likelihood ratio test is not very useful when it comes to 
evaluating why a model of the theory did not correspond to the model of the 
data. A rejection of the null hypothesis in a likelihood ratio test tends to be not 
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particularly instructive: It tells us that the goodness of fit is in fact rather bad, 
without indicating why. However, there exists an alternative way of evaluating 
the relation between empirical observations and Type II theories. Suppose we 
were able to construct a model of a Type I theory, fulfilling the sufficient 
conditions for being also a model of a Type Π theory, and showing an acceptable 
goodness-of-fit with the model of the data. In that case we know, without having 
estimated the utility function, that the BCP structure constructed will also be a 
model of the Type Π theory. If, on the other hand, the model of the data shows 
a doubtful goodness-of-fit relation with the most plausible model of the Type 
I theory, and the axioms of this Type I theory are necessary conditions for the 
existence of a model of a Type Π theory, it is similarly doubtful whether this 
Type II theory applies to the choices observed. Figure 3.1 represents these 
relations. 
The axioms of Type II theories are useful for anyone looking for a latent 
structure in the data, to be interpreted as preferences governing choices for 
example. The axioms of Type I theories have a more intuitive meaning, 
describing regularities in probabilistic choice behavior in terms of choice 
probabilities only, not in terms of some latent structure. Whereas Type II 
theories tend to have more practical applications, Type I theories offer better 
diagnostic tools in understanding and describing probabilistic choice behavior. 
We do not claim that this idea of evaluating the goodness-of-fit of a model 
of the data with a Type Π model through a model of a Type I theory is a new 
one. However, the evaluation of the correspondence relation between models 
of the data and models of Type I theories has usually been done in an unsat­
isfactory way. Luce and Suppes' quotation still applies to a major practice in 
the field: 
"Lacking satisfactory statistical methods, authors often simply report, for 
example, the number of violations (...) and, on some intuitive basis, they 
conclude whether the failures are sufficiently numerous to reject the 
hypothesis. In other situations, tables or plots of data are reported and 
the reader is left pretty much on his own to reach a conclusion. Because 
the results are almost never clear cut, one is left with a distinct feeling 
of inconclusiveness. " 
(Luce & Suppes, 1965, p.379) 
Usually the evaluation between observations and theory is not based on the 
goodness-of-fit relation between a model of the data and a model of the theory, 
estimated on the basis of the maximum likelihood principle. Instead a structure 
of choice proportions is constructed and the model relation with the theory is 
evaluated. A failure of the relevant axiom does not usually lead to a rejection 
of the model relation, since, due to binomial variability, one is likely to find at 
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least a number of violations. So the correspondence relation is only rejected 
with a sufficient number of violations. However, as Luce & Suppes remarked, 
the determination of the acceptable number of violations is based on grounds 
that appear to be equally intuitive as shallow, and so is the assessment of the 
relation between theory and observations. 
To give an example, take the following ВС structure (F, C) which we take to 
be a model of the data, with F = {d,e,f,g,h} andC a set of 10 functions. Each 
pair of elements of F has been presented 10 times. From this ВС structure, a 
structure of binary choice proportions (F,q) can be obtained. Defining q^ as 
10 c, 
4^=1^^, [3.8] 
we have 
?A=0.6, ^=0.4 , ^ = 0 . 6 , 4^=0.9, qtf = Q.l, 
9., =0.3. <7.A=0.4, ^ = 0 . 2 , ^=0.6, ^ = 1.0. 
One can easily check that the structure (F,q) of binary choice proportions fails 
to be a model of the strong stochastic transitivity theory Т
г
. It even fails to be 
a model of the weak stochastic transitivity theory, since there are four intran­
sitive triples: {d,e,f),{d,f,g}, {d,f,h},and {e,f,h}. One may wonder whether 
or not these violations constitute enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that 
there exists a model of Т
г
 with an acceptable goodness-of-fit to (F, C). We have 
no instant answer to this question. All intransitive triples would have been 
transitive if ¿had been chosen five times from the option set {d,f} instead of 
just four times, and if ƒ had been chosen five times instead of six from {ƒ, h}. 
However, we can proceed in much the same way as we would do to evaluate 
the relation with a Type Π theory. Taking the likelihood as the criterion, we 
can look for the "best fitting" model of T2. Using a branch and bound algorithm 
developed for this purpose, we found that the BCP structure (F,p) was the 
maximum likelihood strong stochastic transitivity model, with 
^ . = 0 . 6 , ρ « = 0.5, pd¡=0.5, р
м
=0.9, p.f = 0.5, 
p. ,=0.25, /5.A=0.5, рд=0.25, ^ = 0 . 6 , p i A = 1.0. 
To obtain a test with an approximate size of .10 of the hypothesis that the вс 
structure was generated by a model of theory 7*2, the generalized likelihood 
ratio test statistic was used. In this case, its value turned out to be equal to .2099. 
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For an estimate of the value of the .9 quantile of the distribution of this statistic 
under the null hypothesis, we randomly generated 1000 choice structures sat-
isfying strong stochastic transitivity. Using order statistics, our estimate of the 
.9 quantile turned out to be .0847. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis. 
Since (F, p) is a model of Tj, a model of theory Tb may exist for this structure 
of binary choices. 
We can proceed in a similar way for other Type I theories. Contrary to 
evaluating the goodness-of-fit relation for each model of a Type II theory, the 
subsequent goodness-of-fit evaluation for models of hierarchically related Type 
I theories gives us more information on which theoretical assumptions on 
probabilistic choice survive a confrontation with the data, and which do not. It 
is our conviction that the construction of appropriate BCP models based on the 
maximum likelihood principle offers both a more promising way of evaluating 
the relation between theoretical assumptions and empirical observations, and 
an approach to the representation of choice probabilities which is more in line 
with the principles of axiomatic measurement theory. 
3.2 SAMPLING SCHEMES IN PAIRED COMPARISON TASKS 
In the previous section we described a strategy to evaluate the validity of 
probabilistic choice theories. The evaluation was based on an assessment of 
the correspondence between a model of the data and a model of the theory, and 
the likelihood was proposed as a suitable criterion. However, this layout of a 
strategy did not address a number of practical questions. One of the most 
important is: How do we arrive at a model of the data that allows us to make 
any statements on the validity of a theory. In this section, we will tentatively 
examine some answers to these questions. Furthermore, we will reflect on the 
question whether or not the probabilistic choice theories introduced earlier can 
be used to describe probabilistic choice behavior of a different nature. In these 
applications the uncertainty is not uniquely related to an unexplained incon-
sistency in a single choosing subject, but it is (also) tied to a scheme of sampling 
subjects from a heterogeneous population. 
3.2.1 Data collection design based on specified subjects 
If several, well specified subjects have answered at most once to questions 
on which alternative they would pick from all pairs from a (limited) set of 
alternatives, a model of these data may not be very adequate in answering 
questions on the potential validity of a particular probabilistic unfolding theory. 
With choice frequencies being one or zero, it will be hard to evaluate the 
correspondence with models of the various theories. Especially conditions 
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defined on binary choice probability structures (a single subject's choice 
probabilities) would be very hard to evaluate; a distinction between the different 
forms of probabilistic transitivity will be impossible to achieve, and will be 
reduced to an mere evaluation of (deterministic) intransitivity. 
A possible solution to this problem consists of confronting the subject with 
a series of repeated presentations of all pairs of alternatives. This method has 
the advantage of increasing the possibility of building a statistical test with an 
acceptable power. Some authors have argued that, since probabilistic choice 
theories pretend to describe properties of asymptotic behavior, each pair of 
alternatives should be presented for as many trials as are needed to have some 
empirical evidence that the behavior is indeed "asymptotic" (cf. Luce & Suppes, 
1965, p. 377). 
Alas, confronting a single subject with repeated presentations of the same set 
of all pairs of alternatives suffers from a considerable number of drawbacks. 
Several of them are merely practical. To name one, as the number of possible 
pairs increases with η for every addition of one more alternative to a set of л 
elements, a series of repeated presentations of all n(n -1)/2 pairs will be a very 
time-consuming procedure, though one may resort to incomplete designs (cf. 
Bock & Jones, 1968; Box, Hunter & Hunter, 1978). A more principal objection 
however is that a model of these data may even fail to correspond with a model 
of the most general probabilistic choice theory. The basic assumption of pro­
babilistic choice theories is that each choice from the same pair of alternatives 
can be considered as an independent Bernoulli trial, where each alternative has 
a well-determined, non-changing probability of being chosen. This assumption 
is very susceptible to violations, even in an experimental design where each 
pair is presented only once to every subject. A particular sequencing of the 
presentations may lead to a task-specific structuring of the preferences, which 
could have turned out otherwise if the sequencing had been different. None of 
these theories tries to account for this kind of memory effects, yet they are 
bound to occur in practical choice tasks. 
Several of these problems have been addressed earlier by authors with an 
interest in (and a concern for) the paradigm of paired comparisons (e.g. David, 
1988). One of the solutions has been the construction of so-called spaced 
presentation orders, in which all alternatives have a left-right balance in their 
presentations, and in which subsequent appearances of an alternative are 
interleaved in an intricate way. 
When presenting all pairs is likely to lead to a task-induced structuring of the 
problem and a violation of the basic probabilistic choice assumption, these risks 
are only aggravated when subjects are asked to repeat their choices. If recall 
of earlier answers is a problem to be worried about in single presentations, it 
will make a paradigm of repeated presentations a questionable venture. It seems 
to us that such a paradigm will only be feasible in a choice situation in which 
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it seems likely that memory effects can be ruled out, such as tasks with psy-
chophysical stimuli or alternatives that are otherwise difficult to identify. 
Other strategies have been developed to circumvent these design difficulties. 
In the first experiment on probabilistic unfolding, Coombs (1958) tried to solve 
these problems by asking his subjects to rank subsets of four alternatives, instead 
of making paired comparisons. By assuming that these rankings where 
reflections of underlying comparisons within pairs, Coombs "decomposed" 
them as such. However, Luce and Suppes (1965, sec 6.1) have successfully 
questioned this procedure, which is based on a rather strong assumption that 
need not be true. 
3.2.2 Data collection designs based on sampled subjects 
When Coombs (1958) introduced the first probabilistic unfolding theory, he 
did so with the intention of creating a theory to describe - or, alternatively, 
explain - intrasubjective variability in choices. This variability was held 
responsible for the inconsistencies in choices that lead to the frequent failure 
of applications of the original, non-probabilistic unfolding methods. In this 
respect, probabilistic choice theories are the road of choice towards the pres-
ervation of the attractiveness of the unfolding paradigm: a merging of inter-
subjective unanimity in the perception of alternatives with individual 
differences in choices, leading to a powerful data-analytic tool. 
All subsequent proposals of alternative probabilistic choice theories have 
kept the same spirit. In a fairly early stage, however, probabilistic choice 
theories were also used for an alternative purpose: the description of inter-
subjective variability in choices, as a consequence of the uncertainty related to 
a particular subject sampling scheme. Basically, this can be nothing but a 
remarkable mutation of the intentions of the original unfolding theory: indi-
vidual subjects are not treated as such, but as manifestations of some 'generic' 
subject, as a member of a particular population of interest. An analysis of these 
choices does not try to describe individual differences, but treats them as 
deviations from some 'center of gravity' in the population. 
One particular purpose this approach can be adopted for is a description of 
intersubjective dissimilarities between alternatives in choice tasks, rather than 
a description of individual differences in choices. In this kind of applications 
of probabilistic unfolding, the basic probabilistic choice assumption receives 
a new interpretation: We now assume that the process that can be described as 
an independent Bernoulli trial, with a constant probability of success, is whether 
or not a subject randomly selected from the population of interest chooses one 
alternative over another. 
In the remainder of this section we will discuss the potential applicability of 
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probabilistic choice theories for this type of observations, distinguishing 
between three out of four combinations of the following two assumptions: The 
individual ideals do (do not) coincide, the individual choices can (cannot) be 
described as random variables. The case of identical ideals and consistent 
individual choices bares no relevance to our topic. Throughout this exploration 
we will assume some form of intersubjectivity in the location of alternatives 
in the psychological space. 
(1) Different ideals - individual choices not random 
Assume we have a choice task in which several subjects choose once from 
every pair of alternatives, and made diverging choices. Assume we are willing 
to adopt the supposition that individual choices are not random, yet satisfy a 
latent unfolding structure: Each subject choose the alternative that most closely 
resembled his/her ideal. In that case, all intersubjective variability in choices 
has to be attributed to differences in individual ideals. 
This is the kind of choice situation Greenberg (1965) conceived his model 
specification for. In this case, individual choices need not be described pro-
babilistically, yet the location of each ideal in the joint unfolding space can be 
described probabilistically. Greenberg's model specification is functionally 
identical to a non-parametric midpoint unfolding model. Bechtel's (1968) 
theory is based on a parametric specification of Greenberg's assumption. 
Bechtel suggested a normal distribution of the coordinates of ideals over the 
psychological continuum. 
The midpoint unfolding theory, or the equivalent Zinnes-Griggs theory with 
the assumption of degenerate distributions of the alternatives' coordinates, 
seems particularly apt for this kind of data. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
imagine how the existing random distance theories might be suited for these 
choice tasks, especially since they assume independent distance distributions. 
As to the strong unfolding models, we doubt whether they will prove to be 
suited. 
(2) Same ideal - individual choices random variables 
If we assume that the ideals of all subjects coincide, but their individual 
choices have to be described as random variables, we arrive at a design that 
bares some resemblance with one of a single subject asked to repeat his choices. 
These assumptions may hold in tasks in which the choice criterion is com-
paratively unambiguous, leaving no room for intersubjective variability in its 
interpretation. A choice task with judgments of preference will rarely be 
appropriate for such assumptions, yet some tasks involving similarity judg-
ments may be more suited. A task in which subjects are asked to choose from 
a pair of stimuli the one most similar to a reference stimulus can be easily 
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viewed as one suited for an unfolding representation. In such a task, the ideal 
alternative is explicitly presented, not assumed to be implicitly present, as in 
preference tasks. 
A distinction should be made between two extreme sampling schemes. In 
one, every subject makes only one choice at the most. In the other, more common 
sampling scheme, every subjects chooses from all possible pairs of feasible 
alternatives. This means that replications over different pairs of alternatives are 
obtained within subjects, and replications within pairs are obtained across 
subjects. Takane (1987) has called this a multiple-judgment sampling scheme, 
and argues that probabilistic choice theories should take into account the sys-
tematic individual differences that give rise to statistical dependencies among 
observations. 
Despite the apparent popularity of the multiple-judgment sampling scheme, 
this question of systematic individual differences has largely been overlooked 
in all probabilistic choice theories. Perhaps it is mathematical tractability that 
convinced researchers to stick with the questionable independence assumption. 
Others have even argued that doubts on the tenability of this statistical inde-
pendence assumption are unwarranted (Indow, 1975). 
If one neglects the validity of the independence assumption, the Zinnes-
Griggs theory may be adequate for these observations» if it seems plausible that 
distributions of the coordinates of ideal and alternatives are identical for all 
subjects involved. All of the cases of the Zinnes-Griggs theory we distinguished 
earliercould apply: single sampling of the ideal ornot, degenerate distributions 
of the coordinates of either alternatives or ideal. For the Ramsay-Croon theory, 
a sufficient condition is the existence of identical distributions over all subjects 
for each perceived dissimilarity. For the random response theories, sufficient 
conditions are more difficult to establish. 
(3) Different ideals - individual choices random variables 
An alternative set of suppositions is that ideals of subjects do not necessarily 
coincide, and that individual choices can be described as random variables. 
This is the combination of assumptions that we are most likely to encounter in 
choice tasks. Though subjects may agree in their behavior on the perceived 
similarity between alternatives, they need not share opinions on the alternative 
that best suits the choice criterion. 
The Zinnes-Griggs theory may be adequate for these observations, if it is 
plausible to assume identical distributions over subjects for the coordinates of 
all alternatives, and if coordinates of the ideals can be described in terms of the 
population ideal and an additive, normally distributed subject-related deviation. 
Obviously, the assumption of single sampling of the ideal coordinate cannot 
hold, so the only two cases left are those in which single sampling of the ideal 
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is assumed, which implies correlated distributions of the distances. 
It is very unlikely that the assumptions of the Ramsay-Croon random distance 
theories are fulfilled in this variety of choice situations. Both the theory pro-
posed by Ramsay and its distributional variation presented by Croon assume 
independent distributions for both distances involved in arriving at a choice. 
Furthermore, Ramsay's and Croon's theories expect condition IP.3 to hold: 
The ideal alternative is always chosen. With subjects having divergent ideals, 
it is highly unlikely that they will always pick the alternative that is the "cen-
troid", no matter from what option set. We have similar doubts on the appli-
cability of the equivalent strong unfolding models, or, forthat matter, all strong 
unfolding models. 
Since a midpoint unfolding model is equivalent with a model of a variation 
of Zinnes-Griggs theory (single sampling of the ideal coordinate and degenerate 
distributions of the coordinates of the alternatives), it is possible that a midpoint 
unfolding theory turns out to be adequate, if the description of the distribution 
of the ideal's coordinate over and within subjects is appropriate. 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
To evaluate the goodness-of-fit relation between a model that satisfies a 
particular property - strong stochastic transitivity, for example - and a model 
of data, one actually needs a model of data reflecting repetitive choices. 
Unfortunately, repeated choices sampling schemes with non-psychophysical 
stimuli are difficult to design. 
On the other hand, probabilistic choice theories have been successfully used 
in choice tasks in which basically identical option sets are presented to several 
subjects and each subject is asked to choose only once from each option set. 
The model of the data is then built at the group or population level. For this 
reason, we will be using choice tasks with a multiple-judgment sampling 
scheme in our experimental evaluation of probabilistic unfolding theories. 
We will try to build tasks in which all ideals coincide, and tasks in which the 
ideals differ. Similarity judgements may well be suited for the former situation. 
Asking subjects which one of two stimuli most closely resembles a third is a 
comparison that is functionally similar to a comparison of the similarity of two 
alternatives to an ideal one. Furthermore, explicitly presenting the "ideal" 
alternative has the additional advantage of allowing a test of the ideal point 
conditions. In order to make a valid test of these conditions, one needs to know 
the ideal a priori. 
Testing properties of probabilistic choice behavior that are very much prone 
to violations in multiple-judgment tasks - as condition IP.3 is - can be ques-
tioned. We have indeed a priori doubts on the applicability of random distance 
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theories that assume IP.3 to hold in tasks with this kind of sampling scheme. 
Finally, we are willing to sidestep the questionability of the independence 
assumption in multiple-judgment tasks (different ideals). Though this is 
becoming a point of debate in the literature, existing probabilistic unfolding 
theories provide no means of incorporating these structural relations in their 
conceptual framework. While waiting for more appropriate theories, we will 
pretend that choices from distinct paire by identifiable subjects are statistically 
independent. 

4 Evaluating properties of 
probabilistic choice behavior 
The customary approach to assess the applicability of a probabilistic choice 
theory is based on an appraisal of an index of the goodness-of-fit between a 
model of the theory and a model of data, such as the likelihood of the data as 
a function of the model. To compare (models of) two theories, one can tum to 
a statistical test - a likelihood ratio test, for example - if the model of one theory 
can be considered as a submodel of the model of a second theory. The latter 
applies if the first model's parameters are a subset of the second's. A second 
approach in comparing models is based on the goodness-of-fit index taking 
into account the number of parameters needed to achieve it. In probabilistic 
choice modeling, this comes down to a penalized likelihood function, as in 
Akaike's information criterion AIC (Akaike, 1973, 1974). 
These approaches are based on a more-or-less pragmatic conception of 
probabilistic choice theories and their representation techniques as "black 
boxes", exemplified in the global goodness-of-fit comparisons. Chapter 3 
contained a proposal for an alternative strategy. Compared to the conventional 
approach, the advocated examination of necessary properties of probabilistic 
choice structures may lead to a more fine-grained appraisal of the relation 
between observations on choices and theories on probabilistic choice. This 
alternative approach can be more fair, independent as it is from differences in 
estimation techniques between various model specifications, and more 
instructive, since it is able to pin-point critical differences in the validity of 
assumptions on probabilistic choice each theory is willing to make. Further-
more, the same statistical machinery that is used for making global 
goodness-of-fit assessments can be used for making evaluations on properties. 
Our aim then is to evaluate the goodness-of-fit relation between models 
incorporating these assumptions and models of data. We want to assess the 
validity of a probabilistic unfolding theory through properties of systems of 
binary choice probabilities, whenever these properties act as necessary con-
ditions for the existence of a model of a particular theory. 
This chapter contains a description of an evaluation scheme developed for 
this purpose. This scheme is based on maximum likelihood estimation of 
binomial probabilities under conditional partial order restrictions, a branch 
search strategy, and a generalized likelihood ratio test. 
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With one exception, the properties described in Chapter 3 were expressed in 
terms of conditional inequalities on choice probabilities. These inequalities can 
be regarded as conditional ordinal restrictions that have to be taken into account 
in obtaining estimates of choice probabilities for a model of data. Section 4.2 
contains a summary of these ordinal restrictions, and an analysis of their 
conditional nature. In general, the respective conditions can be expressed in 
terms of a ranking of the feasible alternatives. 
If this ranking is known a priori, obtaining maximum likelihood estimates is 
not difficult, since the characteristics of constrained maximum likelihood 
estimates of partially ordered binomial parameters are well known. Estimates 
can be found through the isotonic regression of the choice proportions, with 
the number of presentations as weights. Several algorithms to calculate the 
solution to the isotonic regression have been proposed in the literature. Section 
4.3 contains a description of anew, efficient algorithm. This algorithm is general 
enough to cover all but one of the partial orders, and sufficiently specific to 
allow efficient implementations. One additional algorithm, for moderate sto­
chastic rankings, is also presented. 
If the ranking for a specific property is unknown (the more common case) 
the restrained maximum of the likelihood function has to be found within the 
set of all feasible rankings. Estimates that accompany the ranking with the 
highest likelihood are maximum likelihood estimates. In section 4.4, a branch 
search strategy is offered for this purpose . 
The assertion that a property holds can be reformulated as an statement on 
the location of the vector of parameters in a well-defined subset of the parameter 
space, i.e. a statistical hypothesis. To evaluate the applicability of a condition, 
the generalized likelihood ratio test principle will be used. Section 4.5 describes 
this test and discusses the behavior of the test statistic under the null hypothesis. 
The sixth section contains some examples of this evaluation strategy, applied 
to models of data published in the literature. 
4.1 PRELIMINARIES 
As in the earlier sections, we assume we are dealing with a nonempty set X 
of κ
χ
 feasible decision alternatives. The general model of data is a system of 
binary choice frequencies Qi,K), with К a set of choice frequency functions к 
onXxX.To ease the exposition, К will be considered to be a singleton unless 
explicitly stated otherwise; k^ assigns the number of presentations of {x,y} 
after which χ has been chosen. 
Let η and q be functions on X xX, such that 
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«4, = *«, + *,. 
In words, п^ is the number of presentations of the couple {x, y}, and q
v
 is the 
choice proportion of лг in this couple. Because of the basic probabilistic choice 
assumption, choice frequencies k^ are considered to be values from independent 
binomial distributions with parameters Κ,,ρ^). 
The general model of a probabilistic choice theory is a binary choice prob­
ability (BCP) system (Χ, Ρ > with Ρ a set of Kp ВС? functions. S ince we are dealing 
with forced pairwise comparisons, so that pyi = 1-ρΙί holds, and since couples 
{χ,χ} are never presented, the parameter space θ for the BCP system (X,P) is a 
unit hypercube of dimensionality (κ
χ
(κ
χ
 - 1)κ
Ρ
)/2. 
The likelihood function lx(k;g) is defined as the joint probability of the 
structure of binary choice frequencies Q(,k), regarded as a function of an 
unknown BCP structure (X,p) 
χ U. 
n
w *> _** „ _ 4 < W (.<**>= 0 L" ipja-pj" "' [4-2] 
where the product runs over all pairs (x, y) in X. A real-valued function g on 
X xX assigns maximum likelihood estimates of the binary choice probabilities 
if l
x
(k;g) > l
x
(k[f) for any admissible function ƒ. 
We will use r(X) to denote a ranking of the alternatives in X, and ϋφί) to 
denote the set of all possible rankings of X . If χ is preceded by y in a ranking, 
the shorthand notation xy is used. 
4.2 ORDINAL RESTRICTIONS AND RANKINGS 
In our evaluation stratgey, the properties discussed in Chapter 2 will be used 
as conditional restrictions in obtaining estimates of the choice probabilities. 
Only one of these properties (IP.3) was expressed in terms of a conditional 
equality restriction; all other properties were formulated as conditional ordinal 
restrictions on choice probabilities. In general, the conditions generate partial 
orders on the binomial parameters. In this section, the conditionality of these 
ordinal restrictions will be reconsidered. Each condition will be expressed in 
terms of a particular ranking, or set of rankings, of the elements in X . 
76 
Table 4.1 
Restrictions corresponding to the three unidimensional unfolding properties. 
Condition Ranking Restrictions 
Ρ»τ Pwy Pwy Ржу Pw. PMW /V P,. 
»"У Р„^Р„, Ρ^^Ρ,, 
ñxyz Р^Р^ Р^^Ргу Рп^Рг« Ргу^Ру. 
™ЯУ Р^^Ржу Р„^Р*, 
w^z" P^-Pty Р«.-Р» Pty^Py* 
wzy P^^Pry Pn^Pr» 
wxyz' -, (ρ,, >p
vy*pwl< р^) 
Note • CM: charactenstic monotomcity, BM: bilateral monotomcity, BCM: bilateral/cha­
racteristic monotomcity; the ideal alternative is denoted as z. 
4.2.1 Ideal point conditions 
The conditional nature of the ordinal restrictions in the ideal point conditions 
IP. 1, and IP.2 is rather straightforward. The ordinal restrictions depend on which 
one of the alternatives (if any in X) is the ideal for a BCP structure. These 
restrictions represent subsets ΘΙΡ1, θ""2 of the parameter space. Similarly, the 
ordinal restrictions for the ideal point condition IP.4 represent a subset θ0"4. 
The unilaterally decreasing/increasing property [2.13-14], the bilateral 
property [2.15] and the symmetric property [2.16] are each conditional upon 
the ideal alternatives for the respective BCP structures and the unfolded order. 
The unfolded order was defined as a ranking of the alternatives that is monotonie 
with respect to the ordering of the corresponding coordinates, which is called 
a qualitative J scale in traditional unfolding terminology. 
4.2.2 Unidimensional unfolding 
The conditional nature of the properties in unidimensional unfolding -
characteristic monotomcity (CM), bilateral monotonicity (BM), and bilate­
ral/characteristic monotonicity (BCM) - is well defined. The inequalities are 
conditional on the unfolded order and, for bilateral and bilateral/characteristic 
monotonicity, on the relative location of the ideal in the underlying psycho­
logical space. These restrictions are summarized in Table 4.1. 
• CM 
BM 
BCM 
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Figure 4.1 - Inequalities for см (top left), SST (top right) and examples for вм 
(bottom left) and всм (bottom right) in a matrix of choice probabilities. Row and 
column indices are arranged m the unfolded order (см, вм, всм) or a strong 
stochastic ranking (SST). Each cell contains the probability of choosing the row 
element. Arrows point to the higher probability. For вм and всм, the cells in the 
rectangle correspond to the element closest to the ideal. Row minima have a 
darker shade. Patterns of row minima for см and всм are but examples. 
The ordinal restrictions of characteristic monotonicity are rather simple. 
These restrictions are conditional on the unfolded order only. If choice prob­
abilities satisfying characteristic monotonicity are organized in a matrix with 
the row and column indices in the unfolded order, the choice probabilities ρ0 
in a row do not increase from the left to the mam diagonal, and do not decrease 
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from the main diagonal to the right. The minima in each row are located either 
on the main diagonal, or in the cell immediately to the right or to the left of the 
main diagonal. Figure 4.1 (top left) contains an example of a pattern satisfying 
characteristic monotonicity. The arrows point to the higher probability, and the 
row minima have a darker shade. 
The restrictions of bilateral monotonicity are conditional on the unfolded 
order and on the location of the ideal alternative in the unfolded order. If choice 
probabilities satisfying bilateral monotonicity are organized in a matrix with 
the row and column indices in the unfolded order, the choice probabilities p^ 
in a row corresponding to the alternative χ reach a minimum that does not 
depend on x, but on whether or not y is identical to or closest to the ideal 
alternative. Figure 4.1 (bottom left) contains an example of a pattern satisfying 
bilateral monotonicity. The cells in the row and in the column that correspond 
to the element closest to the ideal are each enclosed in a rectangle. 
The conditional inequalities that make up bilateral/characteristic monoton­
icity are more complex than the two properties just mentioned. Speaking once 
again in terms of a matrix of choice probabilities with the row and column 
indices in the unfolded order, the probabilities in each row reach a minimum 
that depends on the location of the row index in the unfolded order. If the row 
index corresponds to the ideal alternative, or the alternative that is closest to 
the ideal, the minimum in the corresponding row is reached in the column with 
the same index (i.e. on the main diagonal), and is necessarily equal to one half. 
Otherwise, the minimum can be located within a range of columns, bounded 
by the column with the same index as the row index and the column with the 
index closest to the ideal, the latter column included. Yet this set of row minima 
is further restricted by the property that for any row index more removed from 
the ideal but located at the same side of one particular row index, the row 
minimum cannot be located in a column with an index closer to the ideal. 
Figure 4.1 (bottom right) contains an example of a pattern satisfying bilateral 
monotonicity. The cells in the row and in the column that correspond to the 
element closest to the ideal are each enclosed in a rectangle. The minimum in 
each row has a darker shade. One can see from this figure that the pattern of 
row minima is bounded by вм (all row minima in the rectangle) and CM (all 
row minima on or next to the main diagonal). If one connects the minima in 
the consecutive rows with a line, starting in the top row, the line should run 
from top to bottom, and from left to right, never making a left curve. 
4.2.3 Stochastic transitivity 
The premises in the expressions for stochastic acyclicity, and weak, moderate, 
strong and strict stochastic transitivity [2.1-2.5] were expressed in terms of 
79 
binary choice probabilities, not in terms of a ranking. These sets restrictions 
can be related to well-specified classes of rankings. Consider the binary pref­
erence relation induced by the BO» function ρ (cf. Chapter 2): 
yDx » P „ < P „ · [43] 
Next to this preference relation, we can define a binary equivalence relation, 
similarly induced by ρ : 
y Ex <=> p1x=pxì. [4.4] 
The relation D in [4.3] is necessarily asymmetric, and the relation E in [4.4] 
is necessarily symmetric. Other properties of these relations D and E depend 
on the level of stochastic transitivity satisfied in (X\p>. 
(a) The relation D onX is acyclic if and only if Qi, p) satisfies stochastic 
acyclicity; in that case D generates a suborder on X. 
(b) the relation D on X satisfies negative transitivity — if wDy then 
either wDx or xDy — if and only if Qi, ρ > satisfies weak stochastic 
transitivity; in that case D generates a weak order onX, and relation 
E onX satisfies transitivity. 
Take a ranking rof the elements inX. Call such a ranking isotonic with respect 
to D (o-isotonic) if, whenever y is preceded by χ in this ranking - denoted as 
yx - the pair (x, y) is not in D. Such a ranking exists if and only if the relation 
D is acyclic. 
In the remainder the subproblem will be considered of finding maximum 
likelihood estimates for the various stochastic transitivity conditions, condi­
tional on a ranking of the elements in X known to be D-isotonic. 
Call a ranking r(X) of the elements in X a weak stochastic (WS) ranking if the 
following holds for any two elements y,x e Χ: 
Call it a moderate stochastic (MS) ranking if the following holds for any three 
elements y,x,w e Χ: 
У™ =» Руш^Рт,
 л
 Pn^Pw, * (Pr^P,„vPy~^Pyi)· [4·6] 
and a strong stochastic (SS) ranking if the following holds 
во 
yxw => pyi<ply л р„<ршж л ρ ^ < ρ „ л р у , < р у ж . [4.7] 
A weak, moderate or strong stochastic ranking is in general not unique. In 
the extreme case where р
п
 = р
уж
 for all pairs (x, y) in X xX, all rankings satisfy 
D-isotonicity, and are weak, moderate, and strong stochastic rankings. 
Clearly, a weak stochastic ranking exists if and only if D is acyclic or, 
alternatively, if the BCP structure Q(,p) satisfies stochastic acyclicity (STA), and 
vice versa. Let efj} be the subset of the parameter subspace that corresponds 
to stochastic acyclicity, conditional on the ranking r(X) of the elements in X 
that is known to be D-isotonic. 
Since the inequalities of weak stochastic transitivity (WST) are a superset of 
those of STA, a weak stochastic ranking exists if a BCP structure satisfies WST. 
Yet the converse does not necessarily hold. The subset ^ corresponding to 
WST is but a subset of θ^*, obtained by removing some of the boundary planes 
of the [.5,1] hypercube corresponding to STA. For this reason, a vector of 
estimates for which the likelihood is maximized, conditional on a ranking 
known to be D-isotonic, does not necessarily exist. If the conditional maximum 
under STA is located in the parameter subspace ^ that corresponds to WST, 
this is the conditional maximum under WST. If it is not, the conditional maximum 
under WST does not exist. 
Take the set Л = {a,b,c}, the ranking т{А) with cba known to be D-isotonic, 
and suppose we have 
*
r t = 8 * . = 4 * f c =9 n - = i i . = n f c = 1 0 . 
The following function ƒ on A y. A assigns maximum likelihood estimates of 
the choice probabilities, under the condition that the ranking т(А ) with 7ba is 
a weak stochastic one: 
Λ» = .8 / . = .5 Л, = .9. [4.8] 
Clearly, this is not the conditional maximum under WST, which would require 
/и > .5. In fact, this set of values [4.8] results in the lowest upper bound of the 
likelihood function under WST. This holds in general: Restricted maximum 
likelihood estimates conditional on a ranking known to be weak stochastic result 
in the lowest upper bound of the likelihood function under weak stochastic 
transitivity. 
A similar problem holds for moderate stochastic transitivity (MST). If the BCP 
structure Q(.,p) satisfies MST, a moderate stochastic ranking exists, but the 
reverse does not generally hold. Take the following BCP structure (A.p), with 
A ={a,b,c} and 
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STST 
SST <Ξ=^> SS ranking 
\} \} 
MST = > MS ranking 
WST 
STA < Ξ = > WS ranking 
Figure 4.2 • Relations between the stodiastic transitivity conditions and classes 
of D-isotonic rankings. 
Α» = ·8 Ρ
Μ
 = ·5 д . = .5. [4.9] 
The ranking cba would be an MS ranking, but this structure fails to satisfy WST. 
To check this, consider the premises p^ = .5, p^ = .5, and the failure of the 
conclusion рь, = .2. 
Assume the ranking r(X)is known to be moderate stochastic, and let ^ be 
the subset of the parameter space in which the vector of estimates satisfies the 
corresponding restrictions [4.6]. The maximum of the likelihood function in 
this subset can always be found. The subset of the parameter space θ ' ^ that 
corresponds to moderate stochastic transitivity is equal to the intersection of 
^ and ^ . If the vector of maximum likelihood estimates conditional on a 
moderate stochastic ranking satisfies WST, the maximum under MST has been 
found. In general, the estimates for a moderate stochastic ranking result in the 
lowest upper bound of the likelihood function under MST. 
If the BCP structure (X, p) satisfies strong stochastic transitivity (SST), a strong 
stochastic ranking of the elements inX exists. The reverse also holds. The subset 
^ contains ^, = θ^[ as a proper subset. If choice probabilities satisfying 
SST are organized in a matrix with the row and column indices corresponding 
to the strong stochastic ranking, the probabilities in each row do not decrease 
from the left to the right (Figure 4.1). 
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If the BCP structure Qi,p) satisfies strict stochastic transitivity (STST), a strong 
stochastic ranking of the elements in X exists, but the reverse does not neces­
sarily hold. The subset ^ of the parameter space that corresponds to STST is 
a subset of ^ , but 9^f is closed nor convex. In general, the restricted 
estimates for a strong stochastic ranking result in the lowest upper bound under 
STST. 
All five levels of stochastic transitivity can be related to particular classes of 
rankings. Figure 4.2 illustrates these relations. The existence of a ranking of a 
particular class - say, a moderate stochastic one - is in general a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of the corresponding stochastic 
transitivity condition (moderate stochastic transitivity, in the example). The 
lowest upper bound of the likelihood function, conditional on such a transitivity 
condition, can always be determined; the conditional maximum of the likeli­
hood cannot always be found for the properties weak, moderate and strict 
stochastic transitivity. 
4.3 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF BINOMIAL 
PROBABILITIES UNDER ORDINAL RESTRICTIONS 
This section discusses the problem of obtaining maximum likelihood esti­
mates under ordinal restrictions. 
4.3.1 Basic principles 
Let У be a subset of ordered couples from X, in such a way that У is an 
asymmetric binary relation on X. In addition, define the asymmetric binary 
relation Yc on X through 
{x,y)eY**{y,x)eYc. [4.10] 
Read /,.(¿fc;g) as in [4.2], with the product restricted to elements of У. 
Let R be a reflexive, transitive binary relation on У. Such a relation R esta­
blishes a partial order on the set У. Later on, we will be dealing with relations 
R on У и I*7, but making the restriction to У eases the discussion without 
hindering the generalizability of its principles. 
Suppose estimates g^ of the BCP probabilities p^ forelements (x, y), (v, w) e У 
are known to satisfy the following restrictions: 
{x,y)R(v,w) => g^Sg, [4.11] 
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Given a structure of choice frequencies <X, £}, the problem of finding maximum 
likelihood estimates of the probabilities p^ in Y conditional on R consists of 
finding, within the set of all functions g on У that satisfy [4.11], the function ƒ 
for which Irik-J) is maximized. 
It is well known that when R is empty, the choice proportions are maximum 
likelihood estimators. Therefore, if the restrictions [4.11] are satisfied by the 
function q, maximum likelihood estimates of the p^ are equal to the respective 
choice proportions q
n
. If q fails to satisfy the restrictions, some other function 
has to be found. 
The special case of relations R that generate a linear order has been described 
first by Ayer, Brunk, Ewing, Reid and Silverman (1955). The more general 
partial order has been discused by Van Eeden (1956, 1957a, 1957b). The 
function we are looking for can be characterized in terms of the isotonic 
regression: Maximum likelihood estimates of the p
x1 under partial order 
restrictions are provided by the isotonic regression q' of the choice proportions 
q with weights η on the partial order (the reader may consult Robertson, Wright 
& Dykstra (1988) for a proof)· 
The calculation of the isotonic regression can be regarded as a quadratic 
programming problem, on which a vast literature exists. Due to its special 
nature, a series of more specific computation algorithms have been proposed. 
Most of these algorithms have been reviewed by Barlow, Bartholomew, 
Bremner and Brunk (1972, Chapter 2.3), whose review has been updated by 
Robertson, Wright and Dykstra (1988, Chapter 1.4). 
In general, the isotonic regression q ' induces a partition of Y into subsets in 
which q' is constant. These subsets are usually called solution blocks, or level 
sets, and the value of q* in such a solution block is equal to the weighted average 
of the choice proportions corresponding to the elements in this block. Com­
putation algorithms differ in their strategy to assign elements to solution blocks. 
Most algorithms deal with a particular class of relations R only. For example, 
Kruskal's (1964) "Up-and-down Blocks" algorithm - which has been developed 
for multidimensional scaling, and is rather easy to implement - can be used if 
R generates a simple order on Y. 
Unfortunately, the relations that follow from the properties discussed in 
section 4.2 do not generate simple orders of the choice probabilities, but less 
well-structured partial orders. As Robertson, Wright and Dykstra (1988) 
observed, algorithms to compute the isotonic regression for partial orders "(...) 
usually require complicated checking and branching logic and can be difficult 
to understand and to program". 
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Dissatisfied with the speed, the efficiency and the difficulties in implementing 
one of the existing algorithms, we developed a new, general algorithm, tailored 
to the restrictions on binomial probabilities we are dealing with, yet sufficiently 
general to cover all properties. The remainder of this section contains a 
description of the principles of this algorithm, which itself is described in the 
following section (4.3.2). 
To start, define two functions η and q on the power set of Y, such that rig, = 0 
and q0 = 0 , and for each nonempty subset В Q Y, 
С».7)«в 
Σ η^
Ζ} 
qB=b2ìlB _
 [ 4 Л 2 ] 
" β 
In words, Ид contains the sum of all presentations and qB the weighted average 
of the choice proportions in B, where В e У is a subset of the set of ordered 
couples from X. 
The basic principles of the algorithm are embodied in Lemma 4.1 and 
Lemma 4.2. 
LEMMA 4.1 
If, for the elements of an asymmetric binary relation Β οηΧ,Β QY, 
all estimates are equal to a constant, then the function lB is maximized 
Mb = qe, for all (x, y) in B. 
PROOF 
Let f^ = s for all elements of В. Obviously, this function satisfies the restrictions 
[4.11]. We can express lB as a function of s: 
№•,*)= Σ k„lns+k In(l-i) 
(».>)« в 
= [qBlns+(l-qB)\n(l-s))nB. [4.13] 
The likelihood lB(k-¿) as a function of s reaches a unique maximum als = qB. 
QED 
Some additional terminology is needed. A partition of a subset В с Y into 
к (1 < к) disjoint subsets В, will be called an R-consistent partition if for every 
two subsets B„ Bl with qB <qB, there are no elements (v, w) 6 B, and (*,y) e B¡ 
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for which (x,y)R(v,w) holds. Call such a partition of В into subsets fl, the 
maximal R-consistent partition if there does not exist an л-consistent partition 
of any of the subsets B,. 
LEMMA 4.2 
Let g^ = qB for all (x, y) € В с Υ· The following two statements are 
equivalent. 
(1 ) There exists an R-consistent partition of В. 
(2) There exists afunctionfon В that satisfies the restrictions [4.11] 
and increases the likelihood of the frequencies in B: 
laik\fl>l,(k;g). 
PROOF 
First we will show that (2) follows from (1). Because of 
к 
Σ nB¡qB¡ 
qB=— [4.14] 
" β 
and the convexity of lB(k;s) as a function of s, the result follows. To show that 
(1) follows from (2), create a partition of В by assigning any two elements 
(JC, y), (v, w) to the same subsets, if and only if/^  = f
m
. This partition will contain 
at least two elements, for otherwise ƒ = g and lB(k-J) = lB(,k\g). 
QED 
The following theorem now can be proven. 
THEOREM 4.1 
If, for α subset В e Y, either 
(1) there exists an R-consistent partition of Β, this partition is the 
maximal R-consistent partition of B, and for all {x,y) in each 
subset B¡ in this partition ftJ = qBi, or 
(2) there does not exist an R-consistent partition of Β, and f
xy = qB, 
then the function f maximizes the likelihood of the choice frequencies 
к in В conditional on R. 
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PROOF 
Suppose there exists a function g on В such that lB(k \g)>lB(k;f)· Through Lemma 
4.2, the latter implies that there exists an я-consistent partition of this subset 
В. Since this contradicts the assumptions, such a function g cannot exist. Hence, 
the likelihood is maximized for the function ƒ. 
QED 
4.3.2 The algorithm 
Obviously, to find maximum likelihood estimates, one could start by taking 
the function f^ = qY, and check whether an Л-consistent partition of Y exists. If 
there is one, recursively checking for the existence of л-consistent partitions in 
the resulting subsets B, would bring us to the maximal я-consistent partition. 
Though this algorithm will lead to the desired estimates, it is not a very eco­
nomical one. Inspired by an algorithm for isotonic regression with one or more 
independent variables, proposed by Gebhardt (1970), we developed a more 
efficient algorithm. It is also based on Theorem 4.1, but it handles the successive 
partitioning in a more prudent way. 
To get an intuitive grasp of the way the algorithm functions, the reader may 
think of Kruskal's (1964) "Up-and-down Blocks" algorithm, to which our 
algorithm reduces if the relation R generates a simple order on YKJYC. In the 
"Up-and-down Blocks" algorithm, the elements of YuYc are arranged in a 
ranking that is isotonic with respect to R (я-isotonic), i.e. arranged in accordance 
with the (simple) order restrictions. The algorithm then starts at one side of the 
ranking, and works its way through the ranked elements to the other side, 
pooling elements in solution blocks if restrictions are violated. If elements are 
pooled, the algorithm has to check whether the partition it has left behind is 
still л-consistent. 
If the relation R generates only a partial order on YKJYC, things are more 
complicated. In general, not one but several rankings are я-isotonic, and if we 
applied the "Up-and-down Blocks" algorithm to all of these rankings, it is very 
well possible that we would end with different partitions. As a corollary, the 
isotonic regressions on these linear orders need not all be equivalent in terms 
of likelihood. 
The non-uniqueness of the л-isotonic ranking is the main bother. If we have 
a relation R generating a partial order on a set, and a ranking that is consistent 
with this relation R, the partition into solution blocks generated by the "Up-
and-down Blocks" algorithm is not necessarily maximal, i.e. there is no 
guarantee that the resulting solution blocks cannot be further partitioned. We 
therefore need additional logic to examine each element of the partition for the 
existence of a further я-consistent partition. This is taken care of in step (4) of 
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the algorithm to be discussed below. 
The algorithm proceeds in two main steps, each divided in cycles. First we 
consider the subset of R that is totally contained in У. Then we will consider 
the remaining elements of R. Speaking in terms of a matrix of choice proba­
bilities, as for the properties represented in Figure 4.2, we will first deal with 
the restrictions in the lower (or upper) diagonal part of the matrix (first step), 
and then the restrictions between the upper and lower diagonal parts will be 
taken care of (second step). 
In both steps, the algorithm works on a subset T, which itself is partitioned 
into two subsets Τ = 7",<иТ
г
. Initially, Г, = 0, and Т
г
 is filled with the elements 
of У; all elements of the partition of T2 are singletons. Gradually, subsets will 
be transferred from T2 to 7Ί, and in each cycle of the algorithm, the maximal 
л-consistent partition of T, will be determined. If, finally, T2 is empty, we fill 
T2 with the elements of Y
c
 and the shifting of subsets to Г, continues until T2 is 
empty once again. 
At the beginning and at the end of each cycle in the algorithm, the elements 
of Τ will be arranged in a ranking that is Ä-isotonic and is also isotonic with 
respect to q (^-isotonic) in T^ This means that, overall, the elements of Γ are 
arranged according to the (partial) order generated by the model restrictions, 
and that, in addition, the elements of 7", are arranged isotonically with the 
weighted averages of the solution blocks they belong to, i.e. the elements of 
the maximal Λ-consistent partition of 7",. 
Furthermore, for any two members А, В of the current partition of either Tl 
or T2, the elements of A are located either all to the right or all to the left of all 
elements of θ . In other words, subsets are adjacent and for this reason predicates 
as "left", "right" and activities as "interchanging", "shifting", and "inserting" 
will also be used for subsets, in which case they will always be used in relation 
to the л-isotonic and ^ -isotonic ranking of the corresponding elements. In Figure 
4.3 a graphical illustration of the steps of the algorithm can be found. 
(0) Start 
We start with 7", = 0, T2 = Y, a partition of T2 into singletons, and an 
R-isotonic ranking of the elements in T. Any initial Ä-isotonic ranking 
will do. 
(1) Search for a restriction. 
Take the leftmost element F of the current partition of T2. Search all 
elements in 7", from right to left for an element that is л-constrained 
by an element of F, i.e. for an element (a,b) for which (a,b)R(x,y) 
holds for some element (x,y)e F. If such an element cannot be 
found, jump to (3). 
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Яді/re 4.3- An graphical illustration of the algorithm. 
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(2) Check whether the restriction is satisfied by the regressed data. 
Suppose {a,b)e E, where £ is an element of the maximal 
Л-consistent partition of Γ,. If the restriction is satisfied we do not 
need to modify this partition. If it fails, , i.e. if qE > qF holds, we 
transfer F from T2 to Γ,, and insert F immediately to the right of E 
in the current ranking. Take the union В = E u F , and jump to (4). 
(3) No violation of a restriction: Adjust the ranking. 
Transfer F from T2 to 7Ί, and insert this subset in the ranking based 
on the value of qF, in such a way that the ranking is ^-isotonic in 7",. 
Jump to (7). 
(4) Violation of a restriction: Pool and lookfor an R-consistent partition. 
Examine В to see whether an л-consistent partition can be found into 
subsets Βμ B2, with qB <qB , in such a way that there does not exist 
апл-consistent partition of Ö,. This task is described in detail below. 
If such Bb B2 cannot be found, step to (5); if they can be found, В
г 
is partitioned into singletons, and these singletons and all subsets to 
the right of them in 7", are shifted back to Г2. The ranking is not 
modified. Call the subset S, the set D. 
(5) Check whether the ranking is still q-isotonic in 7,. 
Check whether there is a subset С immediately to the left of D. If 
such а С does not exist, jump to (7). If such а С exists, examine 
q
c
 < qD. If true, jump to (7). If not, check whether С and D are 
independent, i.e. check if there are no elements (д:,>і) e C,(v,w)e D 
for which (x,y)R(v,w) holds. If both sets are not independent, take 
the union В = С uD, and go to step (4). 
(6) If С and D are independent, they are interchanged in the ranking; go 
to step (5). Otherwise, step to (7). 
(7) Take the next subset of Т
г
. 
ИТ2Ф0, jump back to (1). Step to (8) otherwise. 
(8) If Yc = 0, the algorithm stops. Step to (9) otherwise. 
(9) Mirror the partition and ranking of Y in Y0. 
Find an л-consistent partition of the elements in У0 by assigning the 
element (x, y) to the same subset as the element (w, v) if and only if 
(x, y) is in the same subset as (v, w) in the current/f-consistent partition 
of Г,. Set T2 = Y
c
. Arrange the elements in a ^-isotonic ranking by 
letting (.y,x) precede (w,v) in T2 if and only if ( .н») precedes (x,y) 
in the current ^-isotonic and л-isotonic ranking of the elements in 
Г,. Jump back to (1). 
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In this algorithm sets are examined for the existence of an «-consistent par­
tition in step (4) only. A more detailed discussion of this step follows. In step 
(4), we look for an л-consistent partition of В into subsets fl„ß2, that is with 
QB <QB holding, in such a way that there does not exist an «-consistent partition 
of Д,. If this step (4) is reached in a particular cycle of the algorithm, there has 
always been an initial union of the set F and a set £, in the sense of step (2), 
with^Xfr. 
We will now first show that an /f-consistent partition of В = ß, и B2 in step (4) 
exists if and only if F с S,. 
PROOF 
Since qF < qE, В =EuF it follows that qF<qB. If an Ä-consistent partition of В 
exists, then either F = S,, F =B2, F с ß, or F с ß2. 
The partition ß, = F, B2 = E cannot be л-consistent; it violates restrictions, for 
otherwise we would not have jumped to step (4), but to step (3). On the other 
hand, the partition ß, = E, В
г
 = F cannot be «-consistent either, since qE > qF. 
Suppose an «-consistent partition ofß exists with F (zBì,andqB <qB<qB .Since 
qF < qB, we have qF < qB and qB2 < qB ^. From the latter follows qB < qB ^, which 
means that an «-consistent partition of В \F = E has to exist. This contradicts 
the requirement that the maximal «-consistent partition of Г, had been found at 
the end of the previous cycle. Therefor, if an «-consistent partition of ß exists, 
F has to be a proper subset of ß,. 
QED 
This result provides the basic rationale for the search for a partition in step 
(4). A consequence of this result is that if В contains only two elements, there 
is no need to go through these steps, since an «-consistent partition will never 
be found. 
Because of the result just proven, a first candidate for 5, is the subset F, 
together with all elements that are «-constrained by an element of F. If this set 
forms a suitable ß,, we are done. If not, i.e. if qB >qB, we will gradually shift 
elements from ß2 to ß,, until we either find a ß, with qB <qB, or have exhausted 
all possible partitions of B, that is, no «-consistent partition ofß into ß, and ß2 
can be found, and we continue as described in step (4) above. 
This process is not entirely equivalent to a simple examination of all possible 
partitions ofß, due to the fact that we have to take into account the restrictions 
imposed by R. Furthermore, the sequence of transferring elements from ß2 to 
ß, is rather arbitrary. We have no clear-cut path to an appropriate set ß, that 
cannot be partitioned further. So if we find a ß, with qB <qB, we will have to 
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repeat the process with the elements of β,. A more formal description of this 
process follows. 
In step (4), the set В will be partitioned into five subsets : 
В =Л0иЛ1иЛ2иу4зиА4 [4.15] 
Α. ¿0 
A, 
Αι 
Ai 
A, 
kernel 
included elements 
enforced elements 
excluded elements 
prohibited elements 
The set Л0 contains F and all elements (x, y) e В for which (*, y)R{a,b) holds 
for some (а,Ь) e F. Initially, the remaining elements are allocated to A3; they 
are excluded, i.e. not in β,. All other subsets are empty. We set ßj = A0, В2=АЪ 
and see whether this constitutes and л-consistent partition. 
If this partition is not /i-consistent, we will shift elements from ß, to ß2 in 
order to make the partition an Ä-consistent one. More exactly, we will include 
into ß, formerly excluded elements from А
ъ
, by moving them to -4,. In order to 
satisfy the л-consistency of the partition, we have to shift all elements that are 
я-constrained by included elements to A2, the subset of enforced elements. We 
will successively set β, =Л0иЛ1иА2, ß2 = A3uA4and check whether this is an 
R-consistent partition. 
Within Л4 we will store elements to prevent the same partition of В from being 
examined twice, or to prevent useless evaluations. The elements in A4 are 
prohibited; as long as they are in A4, they cannot be shifted to ßp Elements that 
have been allocated to A0 will not be removed from it, but the contents of other 
subsets may change in this step. 
The shifting of elements corresponds to a systematic evaluation of all 
allowable partitions of Β, and examining whether they are R-consistent. To 
evaluate these partitions in a orderly way, we will take advantage of the current 
R- isotonic ranking of the elements of ß, by using a pointer and considering the 
elements to the left and to the right of it. The ranking itself is not modified. 
(4.a) The kernel A0 consists of F and all elements [x, y) e В for which 
(x,y)R(a,b) holds for some (a,b) e F. А
ъ
 contains the remaining 
(excluded) elements of ß, if any. If А^ = 0, an Ä-consistent par-
tition of ß cannot be found; go to (7). If A3 * 0, the pointer is 
attached to the leftmost element in An. 
(4.b) Evaluate 
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Чв
х
<Ч
в
<Чв
г
· [4.16] 
If [4.16] is true, an л-consistent partition has been found; jump 
to (4.e). Step to (4.c) if [4.16] is false. 
(4.c) Check the elements to the right of the pointer for an excluded 
element (a,b)& A
v
 for which there is at least one restriction 
(x,y) e Ao^^i with (·*» y)R(a,b). Step to (4.d) if such an element 
cannot be found. If such an {a,b) can be found, it is transferred 
to A
x
, and all elements (x,y)e A^ to the left of (a,b) for which 
{x,y)R{fl,b) holds become enforced elements of β,; they are 
moved to А
г
. Attach the pointer to the leftmost element that was 
transferred from A3 in this step (4.c). Go to (4.b). 
(4.d) Take the element (a, b) that was most recently added to A,. If there 
is none, we are finished. If there is one, all elements that have 
been transferred to either А
г
 or A4 after {a,b) was moved to A, are 
transferred back to A3. Push {a, b ) to A4, together with any elements 
{x,y) to the right of it for which (а,Ь)И{х,у) holds. Attach the 
pointer to (a,b). Go to (4.c). 
(4.e) The search for a further partitioning of the current ß, is prepared. 
If A, = 0, there is no such partition and we step to (4.f)· If A, * 0, 
all members of A3 become prohibited elements and are transferred 
to A4; after this transferral, they will remain prohibited for the rest 
of this cycle. All elements of A, are shifted back to A,, except the 
element (a,b) that was most recently added to A,. The elements 
currently in A2, if any, are moved to A3 as well. Scan A3 forelements 
(x, у ) for which {x, y)R(a,b) holds, and transfer these to A2. If, after 
these actions, A3 = 0, we know that anл-consistent partition of ß, 
does not exist and step to (4.f). If A] * 0, the pointer is attached 
to the leftmost element of А
х
иА
г
 and we go back to (4.b). 
(4.f) The elements of A3 and A4 are transferred as singletons back to 
Г2; step to (5). 
If, in this step, the subset В can be я-consistently partitioned, we have to break 
ß2 up into singletons, because we cannot guarantee that an «-consistent partition 
of ß2 itself does not exist. Transferring the singletons to 7"2, and adding them 
once again, one by one, to 7*,, is algorithmically the simplest solution to this 
problem. 
Depending on the characteristics of the relation R, the algorithm can be 
speeded up by using the following Lemmas, which we will present without 
proof. 
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LEMMA 4.3 
If there exists a partition Y = У1и...иУя, such that there are no ele­
ments (v,w) e Υ,, (χ, y) e У, (ι *j) with (ν, w)R(x, у), then the maximal 
R-consistent partition of Y is the union of the subsets У, or their 
maximal R-consistent partitions, whenever there exists one. 
LEMMA 4.4 
IfR ,S,R с 5, are binary relations that generate partial orders onY, 
then the following relation holds for the isotonic regressions q'R, q's of 
the choice proportions q with weights к on R,S respectively: 
l
r
(k;q;)<ly(k;q'R)<!Y(k;q) 
4.3.3 Gebhardt's algorithm 
The algorithm described in 4.3.2 is functionally equivalent to the second 
algorithm described by Gebhardt (1970), but by working on subsets rather than 
on single elements, our algorithm is faster. Furthermore, the new algorithm is 
more general, since Gebhardt's only accepts asymmetric binary relations Y 
onX. 
The major difference between Gebhardt's algorithm and ours however is to 
be found in step (4.c). Unlike Gebhardt's, our algorithm does not stop once an 
«-consistent partition of В is found, but tries to partition 5, further, since no 
guarantee can be given that an л-consistent partition of S, itself cannot be found. 
A counterexample will be given. Suppose we have the following elements 
іпГ: 
it,у) (u,y) (v,y) (w,y) (x,y) 
**=9 k^=5 k^ = 2 к^=5 ^ = 1 
(t,y)R(u,y) (t,y)R(y,y) (t,y)R(w,y) (t,ymx,y), [4.17] 
in an initial ^-isotonic ranking 
(',>)(«, у)(. ,у)Ь ,у)(х,у). [4.18] 
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Table 4.2 
History of the algorithm to compute the isotonic regression, applied to the data 
and restrictions in equation [4.17]. 
Cycle 
Τ
-
, 
2. 
ty 
.9 
ty 
ty 
ty 
ty 
ty 
ty 
ty 
.9 
uy 
.7 
uy 
uy 
vy 
vy 
vy 
uy 
.5 
uy 
.5 
vy 
.533 
vy 
xy 
.4 
xy 
.4 
xy 
.4 
vy 
.2 
vy 
.2 
vy 
.2 
wy 
.525 
uy 
.5 
uy 
.5 
wy 
•5 
wy 
.5 
wy 
.5 
wy 
.5 
uy 
•5 
wy 
.5 
xy 
.1 
xy 
.1 
xy 
.1 
xy 
.1 
xy 
•1 
wy 
.5 
wy 
.5 
The history of the algorithm, when applied to this problem, can be found in 
Table 4.2. 
At the start of the fifth cycle, F = {(χ, y)} is the next subset to be transferred 
to 7",. At that moment, the current partition of Γ, is not an /f-consistent one, since 
it is a singleton {C}, С = Г, with q
c
 = .525. Let В = С u F , as described. In step 
(4), A0 has as its elements {(t,y),(x,y)}· After transferring (u,y) and (v, у) to Д, 
we have 
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<7v^ = · 4 2 5 t 4 · 1 9 ! 
so an я-consistent partition has been found, with fl, =A<)KJAV At this moment, 
Gebhardt's algorithm would cut short the partitioning process. However, fl, 
itself can be partitioned further: 
which means the recursivity in step (4) is really needed. 
4.3.4 Application 
Within this section we will lay out the way in which the algorithm described 
earlier has to be applied if estimates have to satisfy one of the necessary 
properties in the sense of section 4.2, conditional on a specified ranking. 
(1 ) Ideal point conditions 
For the ideal point condition IP. 1, we have Y = {ζ} xX. We can partition Y 
into couples Y, = {(χ, ζ ), (ζ, дг)}, and use Lemma 4.3. For the ideal point condition 
IP. 2, we have YvYc =X xX, and the relation Λ based on the inequalities [2.9]. 
For the remaining properties related to the ideal point, the algorithm needs a 
minor modification since these properties involve restrictions on probabilities 
in a BCP system QC.K), consisting of the structures (X,k)(i = 1,κ
κ
). For this 
purpose, the relation Y will have to raised to a power, which is determined by 
the number of structures of binary choice frequencies to be dealt with, к^. Each 
element (x, y), e Y will refer to one such structure of binary choice frequency 
structures (ХД,}, and the functions q,, л, have to be redefined accordingly. 
(2) Unidimensional unfolding 
For characteristic monotonicity and a given permutation, the relation R is 
based on the restrictions defined earlier. Vor bilateral monotonicity and a given 
permutation, the situation depends on whether the location of the ideal in the 
unfolded order is known. If its location is unknown, we have a set of relations 
R,{i = 1,к
х
), with к
х
 the cardinality of the setX. This follows from the fact that 
the ideal may be closest to or identical with any of the elements of X. 
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For bilateral/characteristic monotonicity and a given permutation, the situ­
ation depends once again on whether the location of the ideal in the unfolded 
order is known. If it is known, we do not have just one but a multitude of 
relations /?;, whose number is determined by the number of permissible patterns 
of row minima. If the location of the ideal alternative is unknown, we even 
have a multitude of relations R4 (ι = 1,κχ) to examine. 
(3) Stochastic transitivity 
Lemma 4.3 comes in handy when estimates satisfying stochastic acyclicity 
have to be found conditional on a ranking known to be weak stochastic. Each 
Y, (/ = 1, (Κχ(κ
χ
 -1))/2) consists of one set of pairs {{x, y), (y,x)}. If y precedes χ 
in this permutation, then {y,x)R(x,y). Uq^uq^, we have found the maximal 
tf-consistent partition of this subset, which contains two singletons. If qyx > q^, 
there does not exist an л-consistent partition, and qY=qtj= qyK = .5. 
For the remaining cases of stochastic transitivity, Lemma 4.3 cannot be 
applied. For each couple of pairs (x,y),(y,x) assign {y,x) to Y and {x,y) to Yc 
if and only if the elements are sequenced as yx in the ranking. 
The restrictions for a moderate stochastic ranking present a problem. They 
were defined in terms of the location of triples of alternatives in a ranking [4.7]. 
For each triple, restricted maximum likelihood estimates can be found easily. 
One simply compares the isotonic regression q'R ofq on the relation Ä, 
(у,х)^(.х,у) {x,w)R¿w,x) (y,w)R¿x,w) [4.21] 
with the isotonic regression q^ of q on the relation R2 
(y,x)R2(x,y) (x,w)R2(w,x) (у,н>Щу,х) [4.22] 
and takes the isotonic regression that result in the higher likelihood. The 
problem is that we have to consider the intersection over all triples of the subsets 
of the parameter space that correspond to these restrictions. This implies that 
we have to consider a set of relations R, (ι = 1,2'), with 
Κχ(κ
χ
-1)(κ
χ
-2) 
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to find maximum likelihood estimates conditional on one MS ranking. Since 
this would lead to an incredibly time-consuming search even for a moderate 
number of elements in X, an alternative algorithm is used. Dykstra ( 1985) has 
proposed an iterative algorithm that can be modified for our purpose. 
This iterative MS-algorithm calculates maximum likelihood estimates of 
choice probabilities conditional on a moderate stochastic ranking. In each cycle 
η of this algorithm, for each triple j of f triples consecutively, a function ο„*_, is 
calculated. This computation is based on a comparison of two isotonic 
regressions of a function о,, with weights к on the relations /?„Rj as in 
[4.21 -4.22] respectively, corresponding to the triple j in the moderate stochastic 
ranking considered. The function o', receives its values from the isotonic 
regression with the higher likelihood: 
•f /,(*;<,,
Яі
)г:/х(*;<,„J 
otherwise. 
Define the functions 
^•'»-sï^ïi (''",· [4'231 
The functions о
ЯіІ
 are defined as follows 
0i.iCx'3')=i1, 
°».і(сХ>У) = °'.-і.і(.х>У)з
І
..і(Х'У) (η * !) 
ol.,M.y) = o;¡1_l(x,y)sl,:J(x,y) О"*!). [4.24] 
where q^ stands for the choice proportion, as before. 
Dykstra assumed that this iterative procedure, which he proposed within the 
more general context of /-projections, always converges correctly, but he did 
not provide rigorous proof for his conjecture. Our iterative MS-algorithm did 
converge for practically all sets of frequencies we tried it on so far. On very 
rare occasions, the algorithm starts to oscillate close to the solution. This can 
be monitored by observing the sum of the log(j. ). If the addition of this sum 
o.. = o. VI*! 
^ . ^ " « j l « , 
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on cycle η -1 to the sum on cycle η reaches zero, one has to resort to the general 
algorithm presented earlier, performing the extensive search over all possible 
relations. 
4.4 A BRANCH SEARCH STRATEGY 
In the previous section we discussed the problem of obtaining estimates 
conditional on a partial order on pairs in X. For most properties, this partial 
order itself was conditional on a ranking of the feasible alternatives in X. If this 
ranking is known, these estimates can be obtained by an isotonic regression of 
the choice proportions, with the number of presentations as weights. 
In order to find the estimates under, say, strong stochastic transitivity, without 
the D-isotonic ranking being known a priori, all possible strong stochastic 
rankings of the alternatives in X have to be considered. For each such ranking, 
we can obtain conditional maximum likelihood estimates, and the value of the 
likelihood function be computed. If these values are compared one by one, and 
the ranking(s) for which the likelihood is maximized is selected, the corre­
sponding estimates will be maximum likelihood estimates under strong sto­
chastic transitivity. 
The latter implies that the problem of finding maximum likelihood estimates 
can be reduced to a seriation problem for most properties, with the likelihood 
as the objective function. However, even for a small number of elements in X, 
an exhaustive search through all к !^ rankings in ЩХ) is a cumbersome, if not 
impossible task. 
One of the problems we are considering, finding maximum likelihood esti­
mates under stochastic acyclicity, has enjoyed a considerable amount of 
attention in the literature, where it is generally known as the problem of finding 
maximum likelihood paired comparison rankings. 
Flueck and Korsh (1975) have presented a proof for the equivalency of the 
ranking and the binary preference relation viewpoint in searching for a maxi­
mum likelihood weak stochastic ranking. They also focused on non-forced 
paired comparisons (where ties are allowed), and studied several other binary 
preference relations. Flueck and Korsh (1974) showed that an efficient branch 
search algorithm can be used to find a maximum likelihood preference relation. 
The algorithm we present later on is conceived in their line of thought. 
Hubert and Schultz (1975) have explicitly recognized the relation between 
the problem of finding a maximum likelihood paired comparisons ranking and 
the quadratic assignment problem developed in operations research. Since the 
former can be regarded as a special case of the latter, a solution can be found 
using any of the computational procedures developed for quadratic assignment 
problems. Among these procedures are branch and bound techniques, which 
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Figure 4.4 - Partial view of a ranking tree for a five-element seiX = {a,b,c,d,e}. 
generate optimal solutions, and methods generating suboptimal solutions, as 
the techniques based on the pairwise exchange heuristic. Yet Hubert and Schultz 
admit that routines that take into account the special characteristics of the 
likelihood as the objective function and the so-called structure matrix (as does 
the technique proposed by Flueck and Korsh (1974) may be more efficient. 
Other important contributions have been made by and Thompson and Remage 
(1964), Remage and Thompson (1966), Singh and Thompson (1968), DeCani 
(1969,1972), and Ranyard (1976). 
In the remainder, an algorithm will be presented that can be used for all 
properties, not just stochastic acyclicity. Its basic principle is the branch search 
technique, which will be described in the first section. The algorithm itself will 
be presented in the second. We will consider the application of this technique 
to the properties we are interested in the third section. 
4.4.1 The branch search principle 
Let ЩХ) be the set of all rankings r/X) of the elements in a set X (¿ = 1, κ
χ
!). 
The branch search algorithm performs a search in .^(X) by making moves in a 
ranking tree. An example of such a tree, for a set of five elements 
X = {a,b,c,d,e}, can be found in Figure 4.4. Let /•
пид
 = к
х
 be the number of 
elements in the required ranking. In the example in Figure 4.4, r
ma
 = 5. Each 
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path in this tree, from the root through consecutive nodes up to level r corre­
sponds to a subset of .^(X). This subset consists of the rankings in which the 
leftmost (r -1) elements are as specified by the labels on the branches between 
consecutive nodes. For example, a path along branch a at level 2, branch b at 
level 3, and branch с at level 4 in Figure 4.4 corresponds to the subset of all 
rankings in which ойс are the three leftmost elements: \abcde, abced}. Conse­
quently, the root (level 1) corresponds to ЩХ), and a path up to level /•„,,, 
corresponds to a singleton, one ranking only. 
We will be looking for maximum likelihood rankings. In doing so, it is 
functionally equivalent and computationally more efficient to minimize the 
generalized likelihood ratio test statistic. Therefore the following function 
m
x
(k;g) is used: 
m
x
(k;g)= Σ m 
= 1(111^-In &,)*„. [4.25] 
This function m
x
(k;g) is equal to minus the log of the generalized likelihood 
ratio test statistic 
-In 
b(*:g) 
lx(k;g)) [4.26] 
4.4.2 The algorithm 
The algorithm first generates an initial, suboptimal solution and evaluates the 
function m
x
(k;g). This suboptimal solution is added as the initial solution to the 
set of provisional solutions, empty at that time, and the corresponding value of 
m
x
(k;g) is stored as mCMi the cutting criterion. The path through the ranking tree 
that corresponds to this initial solution is discarded from the tree by eliminating 
one node at level r^,, to prevent the same ranking from being evaluated twice. 
The algorithm looks for improvements on the initial solution in the following 
way. Starting from the root (level 1) it consecutively tries to establish a path in 
the ranking tree, along branches between nodes up to level r^. From a node 
at level г branches to nodes at level r +1 are examined for feasibility one by 
one. The devices used for evaluating feasibility may differ, depending on the 
kind of ranking that is required and the corresponding restrictions on the esti­
mates. One device common to all branch search schemes is to calculate the 
highest lower bound of the function m
x
(k;g) in the subset of ІЦХ) that 
corresponds to the node at level r +1. Its value can be calculated using the 
restrictions on the estimates that are shared by all rankings in this subset. 
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If the highest lower bound of m
x
(k;g) exceeds m ,^, the branch to the corre­
sponding node is discarded. No element in this subset of rankings will lead to 
estimates that increase the likelihood, compared to the ranking(s) in the set of 
provisional solutions. The algorithm then continues to evaluate the remaining 
branches to the nodes at level г +1 in the same way. 
If the highest lower bound does not exceed m^, the algorithm moves along 
the branch to the node at level r +1 and the process repeats itself there. If, finally, 
the algorithm arrives at a node at level r
m
„, the corresponding subset contains 
one ranking only and the highest lower bound is the value of the function m
x
^k ;g ) 
for the conditionally estimated probabilities. If this value is equal to m^, the 
ranking is added to the set of provisional solutions. If the value of >n
x
(lc;g) is 
strictly smaller than m^, the set of provisional solutions is emptied, the ranking 
found is added to it and mM receives a new value accordingly. 
If all branches from a node at level r to the nodes at level r +1 have been 
evaluated, the algorithm backtracks along the path to the node at level r - 1 and 
checks whether all branches from this node to nodes at level r have been 
evaluated. If not, the next branch is examined. Otherwise, the algorithm 
backtracks to the node at levelr - 2. If, ultimately, the algorithm has backtracked 
to the root and all branches have been evaluated for feasibility, the current 
provisional solutions are maximum likelihood solutions, and the corresponding 
sets of estimates are maximum likelihood estimates. 
The branch search principle guarantees that the resulting solution is optimal 
because it evaluates all possible rankings at least implicitly. If the minimum of 
the objective function m
x
(k\g) in a subset of 'RSX.) is higher than the value of the 
objective function for a suboptimal solution, we can be sure that the optimal 
solution is not to be found in this subset. 
4.4.3 Implementation 
In the algorithm we propose, the sequence in which branches are evaluated 
depends on the initial, suboptimal solution. If two nodes at level r +1 correspond 
to χ and y, and χ precedes y in the initial solution, then the branch to дс is 
evaluated first. If our initial solution is reasonably close to the optimal one, this 
heuristic may lead to better provisional solutions in an early stage of the search 
process; lower values of m
ciu offer the possibility of cutting barren branches 
closer to the root, thereby reducing the time needed to search the tree. 
This strategy of evaluating branches is incorporated in the following algo­
rithm, which offers an easy way to implement the notion of branching and 
backtracking in a ranking tree. 
Generate counters r, (i = !,/•„„), where each r, refers to position / from the left 
in the ranking. Initially, set each r, = /. Each path through the ranking tree is 
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Table 4.3 
A possible sequence of counter values, reference rankings and implicitly 
evaluated subsets of rankings in a branch search procedure. 
subset 
Ί 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
counters 
'2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
4 
h 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
U 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
reference ranking 
abed 
abed 
acbd 
bacd 
chad 
cdba 
I 
4 
2 
2 
1 
4 
a... 
abed 
ac... 
ba... 
c... 
cdba 
represented by one reference ranking and a pointer r, whose value indicates 
that the subset of ЗЦХ) under consideration contains the rankings in which the 
r leftmost elements are as specified in this reference ranking. For example, if 
the reference ranking is abcde with r = 3, this corresponds to the subset 
{abcde, abced). Each counter f, indicates indirectly the number of branches left 
to be evaluated at level ι in the current path in the tree. If f, = r^, there are no 
more branches to be evaluated at level /. If t, = r
ma
 - 1 , there is one candidate 
left for the position at level ι. Table 4.3 contains an arbitrarily selected series 
of counter values for a set of four alternatives {a, b, c, d}. 
Start with the ranking that corresponds to the initial solution, with an empty 
set of initial solutions, лі
ш1 = <» and r = 1. 
(0) Setr = l. 
(1) Examine the subset of rankings with the r leftmost elements as 
specified for the presence of a better provisional solution, using the 
appropriate devices. If there is none, jump to (4). 
(2) Evaluate r = г^. If true, we have a provisional solution. Store it, 
adapt /Ящ accordingly, and jump to (4). 
(3) Increment r by one. Go to (1). 
(4) Evaluate t
r
 < r
mix. If true, increment tr by one, and insert the element 
currently at position t
r
 in the reference ranking at position r. Jump 
back to (1). 
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(5) Evaluate г = 1. If true, the algorithm stops, since all rankings have 
been evaluated. The current provisional solution(s) is (are) maxi­
mum likelihood solutions. 
(6) Evaluate r < г
П1М. If true, insert the element currently at position г in 
the reference ranking at the rightmost position r
mM. 
(7) Set ti = i and decrement r by one. Go to (4). 
We have mentioned earlier that, depending on the probabilities, several 
rankings can be £>-isotonic. This means that, from a ranking point of view, 
several rankings may lead to equivalent maximum likelihood estimates. The 
same observation holds for many other properties. If finding the constrained 
maximum of the likelihood function prevails over discovering optimal rank-
ings, the efficiency of the algorithm can be further improved. In that case the 
algorithm may be instructed to stop once a provisional solution with mx(k;g) - 0 
is found. Furthermore, the algorithm can be instructed to discard branches in 
the ranking tree even if the highest lower bound in the corresponding subset of 
rankings equals mm. In that case, not all optimal rankings are recovered by the 
algorithm itself, but they can be easily reconstructed by an examination of the 
maximum likelihood estimates. 
For example, in the extreme case where k^-k^ holds for all x, у e X, the 
branch search algorithm would go through an explicit, time-consuming and 
superfluous evaluation of all κ
χ
! rankings unless one requires strict inequality. 
With the latter option, all remaining branches can be timely discarded. 
For most properties, we have found the efficiency of the algorithm to be 
sensitive to the sequence in which branches are evaluated, and, even more, to 
the method used for finding the initial solution. The problem of finding the 
initial solution will be discussed for each condition separately in the following 
section. 
4.4.4 Application 
At three places the algorithm has to be welded for each condition separately: 
in the method for finding the initial ranking, in the restrictions to be used in 
finding the highest lower bound of the objective function, and in any supple­
mentary devices that can be applied to eliminate branches in the ranking tree. 
(1 ) Ideal point conditions 
The branch search algorithm will only be used for the unilaterally increa­
sing/decreasing condition [2.13-14] and the bilateral condition [2.15], since the 
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remaining ideal point properties are not conditional on the unfolded order. How 
to obtain an initial ranking is not self-evident, but the following heuristic can 
be used. 
Find the smallest choice proportion, say q^. Allocate χ to the leftmost position 
of the ranking. Assign the remaining y to positions in the ranking isotonically 
with the choice proportions q^. 
This heuristic has been described by Greenberg (1965), who refers to a 
suggestion from Coombs. It works best for binary choice frequency structures 
generated by a probability structure that satisfies characteristic monotonicity. 
For the unilaterally increasing/decreasing property, the bilateral condition 
and every other property that is conditional on the unfolded order, a second 
device can be used to eliminate branches. A branch can be discarded if all 
rankings in the corresponding subset have already been evaluated in their 
inverted order. This follows from the fact that an unfolded order is a ranking 
that is monotonie only, not isotonic, with the coordinate values. The inverted 
ranking leads to the same set of ordinal restrictions. In practice, we will examine 
a subset of rankings only if it contains at least one ranking that has not yet been 
evaluated in its inverted order. This can be checked easily, by keeping a record 
of the branches to nodes at level 2 that have already been examined for feasi­
bility. 
(2) Unidimensional unfolding 
For characteristic monotonicity, we also use the heuristic described by 
Greenberg (1965) to generate the initial provisional solution, and the same 
additional device to cut branches as described earlier for the ideal point con­
ditions. 
For bilateral monotonicity, a maximum likelihood weak stochastic ranking 
is adopted as the initial solution. For this condition, one ranking tree is not 
sufficient, because we have to consider the possibility that the ideal is closest 
to the 1,..., K
x
'th element in the unfolded order. We do not have to examine all 
κ
χ
 ranking trees, because an unfolded order is only monotonically, not iso­
tonically related to the values of the coordinates; if a ranking is an unfolded 
order, so is the inverted ranking. We will therefore examine 
η = (κ
χ
 + mod[K
x
, 2] yi ranking trees. We start with the ranking tree corre­
sponding to the n'th position for the ideal, since this involves the smallest 
number of restrictions. Overall, this strategy can reduce the number of 
examinations needed in the remaining ranking trees. 
For bilateral!characteristic monotonicity, we proceed in much the same way 
as for bilateral monotonicity. Similarly, a search will be performed in η ranking 
trees, to take into account the possible locations of the ideal alternative. For 
each subset of rankings in one such ranking tree, several patterns of restrictions 
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have to be examined, since, speaking in terms of matrices, the minima in each 
row can be located anywhere in between the main diagonal and the column 
corresponding to the position closest to the ideal. 
To speed up the search, we will first calculate the highest lower bound for 
the restrictions that are shared by all patterns of row minima (Lemma 4.4). If 
its value is higher than m^, we discard the branch. If not, we consecutively start 
to evaluate all possible patterns of row minima, until eventually a value for the 
highest lower bound is found that does not exceed m^. If there is none, the 
branch can be discarded. If we finally arrive at the bottom of the ranking tree, 
an exhaustive search through all possible patterns is performed. 
(3) Stochastic transitivity 
For stochastic acyclicity, the m
xy in [4.25] are either zero or, if 0 < k^, equal 
to 
miy = (In2 + ln<71,)^. [4.27] 
Though the branch search algorithm presented earlier was inspired by Flueck 
and Korsh's (1974) scheme to find maximum likelihood weak stochastic 
rankings, our method for STA differs from theirs. To find an initial solution, 
Flueck and Korsh (1974) calculated 
' , = Σ m 
ytX 
as in [4.27] and ranked elements isotonically with the values of the sz. If this 
ranking is not unique, they let χ precede y in this subset whenever qyz < q^. 
We propose an alternative procedure. As an initial step, evaluate whether 
there is an elements that can be assigned to the leftmost position in a D-isotonic 
ranking. This means that q^ < q^ has to hold for all the remaining y. If there is 
one, eliminate all branches from the root to the nodes corresponding to the 
remaining elements, and continue the search for the next to leftmost element. 
This search stops if one succeeds in arranging all elements, or if no element 
can be allocated this way to the next position in the ranking. In the latter case, 
a similar search is started for the rightmost element in the o-isotonic ranking. 
After having arranged as many elements as possible at the rightmost positions, 
similarly adapt the ranking tree to prevent needless examinations, i.e. cut all 
branches at the top of the tree that correspond to subsets with different elements 
at the rightmost positions. The elements between those fixed at the leftmost 
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and the rightmost positions can be arranged in any order to produce an initial 
solution. Usually, this initial cutting procedure results in a good suboptimal 
solution and a substantial reduction of the size of ranking tree. 
This algorithm is extremely fast. After the initial cutting process, the m^ have 
to calculated only once, and for a subset of X xX only. Only a series of simple 
comparisons and additions remains to be made. 
For a moderate stochastic ranking, a maximum likelihood weak stochastic 
ranking is used as the initial solution. For each subset of rankings, we first 
calculate the highest lower bound under the restrictions for a WS ranking [4.5] 
(cf. Lemma 4.4). Since the m^ [4.27] can be calculated before the actual branch 
search, this lower bound is obtained through a series of simple additions, which 
results in a much easier and fasterprocedure than an exclusive use of the iterative 
MS-algorithm presented earlier. If the value of the highest lower bound exceeds 
the currentvalue of m^, the branch is discarded, if not, the total set of restrictions 
is used to calculate the highest lower bound under the restrictions for an MS 
ranking. 
For a strong stochastic ranking (strong stochastic transitivity), a maximum 
likelihood weak stochastic ranking is also used as the initial solution. Here also, 
we first calculate the highest lower bound under D-isotonicity. 
4.4.5 Extensions 
The strategy for finding maximum likelihood weak, moderate, or strong 
stochastic rankings, or unfolded order under CM, BM or BCM can be a very 
efficient data-analytic tool itself. Elsewhere (Bossuyt & Roskam, 1987a, 
1989-a) we have presented an collection of probabilistic unfolding techniques 
that is based on the search for a maximum likelihood unfolded order under 
characteristic monotonicity or midpoint monotonicity (a superset of the 
restrictions of CM). 
The algorithms presented in this chapterhave been implemented in a FORTRAN 
program called PSTRIX. This program runs on an IBM-compatible PC under 
MS-DOS or PC-DOS (version 2.0 or higher), but it can be (and has been) easily 
ported to other systems. The time needed to find maximum likelihood rankings 
is acceptable, even with a modest CPU and without the help of a floating-point 
coprocessor. Appendix A contains listings of major subroutines of this program. 
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4.5 TESTING ORDINAL RESTRICTIONS ON 
BINOMIAL PARAMETERS 
The preceding subsections contain a description of a strategy to compute 
maximum likelihood estimates of binary choice probabilities under partial order 
restrictions. The ultimate aim of this strategy is the construction of statistical 
tests for properties of BCP structures and BCP systems. 
In the literature, only statistical tests of the stochastic transitivity conditions 
have been a topic of concern. If all pairs have been presented only once, the 
search for a maximum likelihood D-isotonic ranking and maximum likelihood 
estimates under stochastic acyclicity, coincides with the search for Slater's i. 
This statistic is based on the minimum number of inconsistencies for a structure 
of choices that can be achieved in the set of all rankings. The resulting rankings 
are called nearest adjoining orders. Slater (1962) proposed this statistic in a 
reaction against Kendall and Smith ' s statistic d, which was based on the number 
of circular triads (Kendall and Smith, 1939; cf. Kendall, 1955). Several methods 
for calculating Slater's i have been proposed (e.g. Phillips, 1967, 1969; Smith 
& Payne, 1974; Ranyard, 1976). 
Bezembinder (1981) called Slater's and Kendall's indices 'measures of 
internal consistency', and compared them with measures of external inconsis­
tency, which evaluate inconsistency with respect to a given linear order. He 
suggested that both forms of inconsistency should be clearly distinguished and 
measured independently. We do not entirely agree with this point of view. In 
general, it is not true that measures of internal inconsistency are not related to 
any particular linear order, since most measures can be regarded as the optimum 
with respect to the set of all possible linear orders, as has been described in the 
previous subsections. Our method, for example, is capable of calculating the 
likelihood for a particular ranking thought to be weak stochastic (in which case 
it becomes a measure of external inconsistency), but maximum likelihood 
estimates under stochastic acyclicity (internal consistency) can be found by 
performing a search in the set of all weak stochastic rankings. In that case, a 
likelihood ratio based test statistic serves as an index of internal consistency. 
4.5.1 A generalized likelihood ratio test 
In the algorithm we proposed, the function m
x
(k;g) was used as the objective 
function. It is based on minus the logarithm of the generalized likelihood ratio 
test statistic and its maximum can be used in a statistical test: The hypothesis 
#Ό that a particular property is satisfied by the structure of choice probabilities 
that generated the choices will be rejected in favor of the hypothesis #, that the 
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contrary is true, if m
x
(k\g) is sufficiently large. To build at test with a size a, 
we need to determine the critical region by specifying a value ζ,_0, based on 
the distribution function of m
x
{k;g) if ΛΌ is true. 
Among the main reasons for the likelihood ratio principle's popularity are 
the attractive asymptotic properties tests derived by this method possess. 
Unfortunately, it seems that we will not be able to profit from these properties 
in our problem. 
To our knowledge, testing partial order restrictions on binomial probabilities 
has not been a topic of interest in the statistical literature. Yet testing the equality 
of (simply) ordered parameters has been studied by a number of authors. 
Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner and Brunk (1972) and Robertson, Wright and 
Dykstra (1988) have summarized most of the results. The majority of the 
approaches they covered can be traced back to a test on the equality of ordered 
means of normal distributions. 
Suppose a set Y of к series of л, values yll each (/ = \,k,j = l.i,) from normal 
distributions with respective sample means y,, have been observed. Suppose 
that the variances of these normal distributions are known. Consider the 
hypothesis #J that all means are equal, versus the alternative hypothesis Л| that 
they are not, yet satisfy the (partial) order restrictions R. 
Define two functions η and у on the power set of Y, such that и0 = 0 and y0 = 0, 
and for each nonempty subset В с У, 
η
β
= Σ л, 
_Σ niy, 
Suppose that the maximal я-consistent partition of the set of sample means 
Y consists of elements Bi (i = 1, /) and consider the test statistic 
Х=І
П
-%{у
Ві
-Уу)г . [4.29] 
Let jÇ = 0 if an Л-consistent partition of Y does not exist. 
In this particular case, an asymptotic justification for the use of this statistic 
is also lacking, yet there exists a proof for the following theorem (Barlow, 
Bartholomew, Bremner & Brunk, 1972; Robertson, Wright and Dykstra, 1988). 
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THEOREM 4.2 
If tf0 is true, then 
Pr[xí>u] = Ì/>(/,A:)Pr[X?.1>a] 
Рг[х^ = о] =P(l,k) [4.30] 
where Р{1,к) (1 < /) tí the probability that an R-consistent partition 
of exactly I subsets exists, P(\,k)is the probability that such apartition 
cannot be found, and X¿ stands for a random variable having a 
chi-square distribution with ν degrees of freedom. 
Testing the equality of ordered parameters is of little interest for our purpose 
however. A more interesting test involves the hypothesis 9{Q that all means 
satisfy the order restrictions, versus the alternative hypothesis ^ that they do 
not, and the test statistic 
х4
2
=1 Σ ^(Зч-^Т. [«И 
. - ι τ , ί β , σ ί
4 J 
where the summation ranges over all solution blocks Bt, and all sample means 
yl in each such block. A proof exists for the following theorem (Barlow, 
Bartholomew, В remner & Brunk, 1972; Robertson, Wrightand Dykstra, 1988). 
THEOREM 4.3 
If ΛΌ ÍS true, then 
Рг[Х^>а] =tí1p(Z,A:)Pr[XÍ./>a] 
/ = 1 
Рг[Х*=0]=/ЧЛД) [4.32] 
where the Ρ (I, k) and Xj have the same interpretation as P{l,k) and 
Xj in Theorem 4.2. 
Both in Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, the density function of the test statistic 
is a weighted sum of well-known parametric densities. Attractive though this 
may seem, a problem resides in the determination of the probabilities P(l,k). 
Robertson, Wright and Dykstra (1988) summarized how the probabilities Ρ (/, к) 
can be calculated for some simple and small relations R, yet their expressions 
become frighteningly cumbersome as the complexity of R increases. 
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Figure 4.5- Sample cumulative distribution functions for the generalized likelihood 
ratio test statistic under SST. 
Even if we had found ways of circumventing the difficulties in computing 
probabilities P(l,k) for our properties, we would still have had to face the 
problem that we are dealing with non-normal distributions. The choice pro­
portions q^ will be approximately normal by the central limit theorem, but this 
is of little or no help if our observations involve extreme choice proportions 
and small samples sizes. 
4.5.2 A Monte Carlo approach 
Having taken into account these statistical obstacles, we decided to rely on 
a Monte Carlo approach for a non-parametric estimation of the distribution 
function of the test statistic under the null hypothesis. For a given property we 
randomly generate a structure of choice probabilities that satisfies the property. 
Taking each such probability as the second parameter of a binomial distribution, 
and taking the first parameter (the number of presentations) as a design con­
straint, we randomly and independently sample a structure of binomial deviates 
from these distributions. For each such structure we calculate maximum 
likelihood estimates under the condition studied, and compute the value of -2 
log likelihood ratio test statistic 2m. There is no justification in using 2m rather 
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than m except for a faint reference to the asymptotic properties of this test in 
other circumstances. We repeat this Monte Carlo simulation η times, in each 
simulation calculating the statistic 2^ 1, (/ = l,n). 
We define the critical region for a test of approximate size α by estimating 
the 1 - aquantile of the cumulative distribution function ζ1_αηοηραΓ3Γηείπϋ3ΐ^ 
using order statistics D,,.. .,D„ corresponding to the random sample 2ту,..., 2т
я
 : 
t =Dn 
= (l-A)D,+nD,
 + l 
a = int[(l-a)(n-l)+l]) 
( A = f n c [ ( l - o ) ( n - l ) + l ] ) l [4.331 
where int(;r) is a function truncating the decimal portion of the value of its 
argument, such that the integer portion of the value of χ remains, and frac(jc) is 
a function returning the decimal portion of the value of its argument, or the 
remainder of JC/1. 
This is the maximum likelihood estimator. It is consistent but biased. 
Asymptotically Di_
a
 is distributed as anormal distribution with mean ζ 1 . α and 
variance 
(1-α)α 
^
 ;
 [4.34] 
n[/K.-J2 
(Mood, Graybill & Boes, 1974). This may serve as a guide in determining the 
sample size needed. 
To generate a structure of probabilities that satisfies a particular property, we 
sample from a uniform distribution over the interval [0,1] ([0.5,1] for the sto­
chastic transitivity conditions) using a pseudo random number generator, and 
assign the sampled values isotonically to a ranking drawn at random from the 
set of all rankings of probabilities known to be isotonic with respect to the 
partial order that corresponds to this property. To calculate the binomial 
deviates, we use an algorithm proposed by Ahrens & Dieter (1974,1980). 
The sampling of a ranking is based on the construction of a random path in 
a ranking tree. This ranking tree corresponds to the set of all possible rankings 
of binomial probabilities. We delete all branches in this tree except those that 
are я-isotonic with respect to the property studied. We then build a random path 
in this mutilated tree, starting from the root, at each node making a random 
choice between the branches. 
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In Figure 4.5 sample cumulative distribution functions are shown for series 
of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations under strong stochastic transitivity. The 
simulations were run fora set of eight alternatives, and in each series a distinct 
first parameter of the binomial distributions (the number of trials) was used. 
The horizontal dashed line can be used to derive the value of £>„,. This value 
clearly decreases as the first parameter of the binomial distributions increases. 
Though this Monte Carlo test strategy has the advantage of a definition of 
the critical region that takes into account the number of couples and the number 
of presentations, we have to pay for this advantage in terms of computing time. 
Yet for a small to moderate number of alternatives, these calculations are easy 
to perfonm for most properties. The only property that presents a problem in 
this respect is bilateral/characteristic monotonicity. Calculation times for a set 
of 100 structures under BCM can quickly run up to several hours on a PC with 
a modest CPU. 
For the equality restrictions, we can perform exact a priori calculations of the 
cumulative distribution function of the generalized likelihood ratio test statistic. 
Assume we intend to sample values kvw, к^ from binomial distributions (nvw, р„) 
faxyPxy) respectively, with the first parameter in each distribution known, the 
second unknown, with a uniform prior distribution. Assume we know the 
equality р
т
 = р^ to hold. In that case the joint probability of a pair of frequencies 
к^, к^ can be computed: 
к \\к 
(k„ + k„)\(k
m
+U\ 
'nj ( lU + fL + 1)! 
[4.35] 
By computing this probability and the value of test statistic for all possible pairs 
of frequencies, we can arrive at an exact calculation of the cumulative distri­
bution function of the generalized likelihood ratio test statistic. A test based on 
this distribution is comparable to Rice's "conditional binomial exact test" 
(свет. Rice, 1988). Compared to Rice's test, ours is an unconditional test, since 
we want to compute the critical region a priori to the actual computation of the 
statistic. 
A similar exact approach can be utilized to calculate the distribution of the 
test statistic in the case of a small number of inequality restrictions. For an 
example, assume once more that values к^к^ from binomial distributions 
("„..Απ.) (nxyPr,) respectively are sampled, with in each distribution the first 
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parameter known, the second unknown, with a uniform prior distribution. 
Assume that the inequality pm > p¡y is known to hold. In that case the joint 
probability of a pair of frequencies £„, k^ is equal to: 
IM*,»,*,, I ««.«g = ƒ [Hp'-d -Pf" J [ Л i ^ 1 -^"dqdp . [4.36] 
The computation of the cumulative distribution function can proceed in the 
same way as for the hypothesis of equality. 
The exact calculation the distribution of the likelihood ratio test statistic under 
the unilaterally increasing (or decreasing condition) by using equation [4.36] 
is computationally laborious. However, we can use a Monte Carlo approach 
similar to the ones discussed earlier. 
On some occasions though we will be more interested in testing three 
hypotheses: The hypothesis that the decreasing condition is satisfied, the 
hypothesis that the increasing condition is satisfied, and the hypothesis that 
neither is satisfied. For this purpose, we will calculate maximum likelihood 
estimates under the unilaterally decreasing and increasing condition respec­
tively, and the likelihood ratio test statistic using the contributions 
% = On <7¿ ι UD - In ЧІ, | ш) k*, > [4·37] 
where 
stand for the isotonic regression under the unilaterally decreasing and increasing 
condition respectively. 
Using a related Monte Carlo strategy, we can sample binomial deviates from 
a set of structures of choice probabilities, with the probabilities for each 
structure drawn at random from a uniform distribution over the parameter space. 
We will reject the hypothesis that neither the increasing or decreasing condition 
is satisfied if the value of the test statistic lies in the lower or higher critical 
region of the sample cumulative distribution function. 
4.6 EXAMPLES 
In this section the evaluation strategy will be applied to some models of data 
published in the literature. 
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Table 4.4 
A comparison of test statistics and statistical decisions of the authors and as 
reported by Tversky (1969). 
Subject 1 
Subject 2 
Subject 3 
Subject 4 
Subject 5 
Subject 6 
Subject 7 
Subject 8 
Statistic 1 
11.82 
7.84 
6.02 
15.94 
5.18 
7.36 
.40 
.00 
Decision 1 
* t * 
** 
*· 
**» 
* 
*** 
-
-
Statistic 2 
9.33 
4.46 
6.02 
2.63 
3.86 
7.26 
.20 
.00 
Decision 2 
·** 
*** 
*** 
*· 
*** 
*#* 
-
-
Wofe - Statistic 1 = calculated by Tversky, Statistic 2 = calculated by the present author, 
Decision 1 = statistical decisions made by Tversky, Decision 2 = decisions made 
by the present author; 
*** = rejected in a test with size 01, " = rejected in a test with size 05, '=rejected 
in a test with size 10, - = not rejected m a test with size 10. 
4.6.1 Stochastic acyclicity 
In a paper which appeared some twenty years ago, Tversky (1969) presented 
a series of demonstrations in order to support his assertion that choices can be 
consistently intransitive under certain experimental conditions. This paper has 
become one of the most frequently quoted in the psychological literature on 
choice and decision making. 
In Tversky's first demonstration, eight subjects choose 20 times from all 
couples out of five gambles. Gambles differed both in the probability of winning 
- which was presented using shaded circle segments, not numerically - and in 
the payoff. The five gambles could be simply ordered isotonically with the 
expected values. 
The choice proportions obtained this way contained several stochastic cycli. 
Tversky presented a statistical test, for which he acknowledged the assistance 
of David H. Krantz, which is closely related to our approach of testing stochastic 
acyclicity. Tversky made a ranking of the gambles, isotonic with their expected 
values, and assumed this to be the underlying weak stochastic ranking. He then 
calculated the restricted maximum likelihood estimates under stochastic 
acyclicity, conditional on this ranking. Tversky presented these estimates as 
maximum likelihood estimates under weak stochastic transitivity, although this 
condition is unmistakably violated in several of his structures of estimates. 
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Table 4.5 
Choice proportions reported by Rumelhart & Greeno (1971) 
CY 
BB 
JU 
AJF 
CdG 
ET 
HW 
SL 
LBJ 
CY 
.500 
.594 
.752 
.671 
.671 
.692 
.735 
.739 
.782 
SS 
.406 
.500 
.530 
.573 
.598 
.714 
.667 
.795 
.739 
JU 
.248 
.470 
.500 
.509 
.620 
.632 
.701 
.739 
.748 
AJF 
.329 
.427 
.491 
.500 
.590 
.607 
.684 
.697 
.765 
CdG 
.329 
.402 
.380 
.410 
.500 
.479 
.590 
.487 
.697 
ET 
.308 
.286 
.368 
.393 
.521 
.500 
.521 
.628 
.684 
HIV 
.265 
.333 
.299 
.316 
.410 
.479 
.500 
.479 
.679 
SL 
.261 
.205 
.261 
.303 
.513 
.372 
.521 
.500 
.607 
LBJ 
.218 
.261 
.252 
.235 
.303 
.316 
.321 
.393 
.500 
Note • The row and column elements are ordered according to the maximum likelihood 
strong stochastic ranking. 
For a statistical test of the stochastic intransitivities, Tversky used the gen-
eralized likelihood ratio test statistic. Tversky assumed that this statistic has a 
chi-square distribution for a large sample size, with a number of degrees of 
freedom that equals the number of constrained parameters (the number of 
probabilities to be estimated minus the number of solution blocks). Tversky's 
values of the likelihood ratio test statistic, and the statistical decisions he made 
in tests with varying size, can be found in Table 4.4, where they are labelled 
Statistic 1 and Decision 1 respectively. 
Despite the provocative and valuable content of this paper on the subject of 
intransitivities in human choices, Tversky's testing procedure errs in three 
important ways. First, maximum likelihood estimates under weak stochastic 
transitivity do not always exist. Estimates Tversky presented as such clearly 
did not satisfy this condition. Second, to test stochastic intransitivities, one 
cannot simply examine the ranking that is isotonic with the expected values of 
the gambles. Even in 1969, there was ample evidence that expected value was 
not always the criterion individual choices were guided by. Instead, Tversky 
should have considered the set of all rankings of the five gambles. Third, the 
generalized likelihood ratio test statistic definitely does not have the distribution 
attributed to it by Tversky, even if the sample size had been considerably higher 
than 20. 
We used our evaluation strategy, including the branch search in the ranking 
tree, and calculated the generalized likelihood ratio test statistic. The values of 
the statistic for the eight subjects, and the outcomes of a statistical test of the 
hypothesis that the subjects' choice behavior satisfied stochastic acyclicity can 
also be found in Table 4.4. The critical region was defined using quantiles 
116 
Table 4.6 
Maximum likelihood estimates under strong stochastic transitivity, based on 
data in Table 4.5. 
CY 
BB 
JU 
AJF 
CdG 
ET 
HW 
SL 
LBJ 
CY 
.500 
.594 
.697 
.697 
.697 
.697 
.735 
.758 
.782 
SS 
.406 
.500 
.530 
.573 
.609 
.694 
.694 
.758 
.758 
JU 
.303 
.470 
.500 
.509 
.609 
.632 
.694 
.739 
.756 
AJF 
.329 
.427 
.491 
.500 
.590 
.607 
.684 
.697 
.756 
CdG 
.303 
.391 
.391 
.410 
.500 
.500 
.568 
.568 
.697 
ET 
.303 
.306 
.368 
.393 
.500 
.500 
.521 
.568 
.684 
HW 
.265 
.306 
.306 
.316 
.432 
.479 
.500 
.500 
.679 
SL 
.242 
.242 
.261 
.303 
.432 
.432 
.500 
.500 
.607 
LBJ 
.218 
.242 
.244 
.244 
.303 
.316 
.321 
.393 
.500 
Atofe - The row and column elements are ordered according to the maximum likelihood 
strong stochastic ranking. 
estimated in a series of lOOO Monte Carlo simulations. The relevant nonpara-
metrically estimated percentiles in tests with approximate size .01, .05, .10 were 
3.49, 1.83, and .81 respectively. 
Except for the data for subject 3, the proper values of the test statistic are 
lower than those obtained by Tversky, and the maximum likelihood weak 
stochastic rankings are not isotonic with the expected values. Depending on 
the size of the test, the statistical decision made would differ depending on 
whether Tversky's test was used or ours. Tversky rejects weak stochastic 
transitivity in a test with size .05 for five subjects, whereas we would reject 
stochastic acyclicity for six. 
4.6.2 Strong stochastic transitivity 
In a paper published in 1971, Rumelhart and Greeno (1971) reported on the 
results of a series of choices from a set of nine alternatives made by 234 college 
subjects. The set of alternatives contained three political figures (L.B. Johnson 
(LBJ), Harold Wilson (HW), Charles DeGaulle (CdG), three athletes (Johnny 
Unitas (JU), Carl Yastrzemski (CIO, A.J. Foyt (AJF), and three movie stars 
(Brigitte Bardot (BB), Elizabeth Taylor (ET), Sophia Loren (SL). Subjects were 
instructed to choose the person with whom they would rather spend an hour 
discussing a topic of their choosing. The choice proportions can be found in 
Table 4.5. 
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This set of alternatives was sampled by Rumelhart and Greeno with the 
intention to evaluate Restle's hypothesis on the influence of similarity between 
alternatives in choice behavior. Restie (1961) had presented a probabilistic 
choice theory in which similarity between alternatives was a key factor. In 
short, Restle's theory predicts that if two alternatives share valued properties, 
a choice from them will not be affected by these shared properties. 
Rumelhart and Greeno evaluated the applicability of Luce's (1959) and 
Restle's probabilistic choice theories. They defined a model specification of 
Restle's theory that is a generalization of Luce's model specification. Fur­
thermore, Rumelhart and Greeno effectively demonstrated that any such model 
would be equivalent with a model of Thurstone's (1927) more general theory 
on probabilistic choice behavior. 
Rumelhart and Greeno computed maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters of both Luce's model and of a constrained version of Greeno's (cf. 
Edgell, Geisler & Zinnes, 1973). Based on the likelihood ratio test statistics, 
they demonstrated a bad fit for the former and a reasonable fit for the second 
model. 
One difference between the probabilistic choice theories of Luce and Restie 
is that the former expects strong stochastic transitivity to hold in BCP structures, 
whereas Restle's only expects the moderate variety. This prediction can be 
evaluated with the strategy proposed in this chapter. 
We calculated maximum likelihood estimates under moderate stochastic 
transitivity, which were equal to the choice proportions. The test statistic was 
equal to zero and the maximum likelihood moderate stochastic ranking was: 
CY BB JU AJF ET SL CdG HW LBJ. 
Maximum likelihood estimates under strong stochastic transitivity can be 
found in Table 4.6. The maximum likelihood SS ranking was 
CY BB JU AJF CdG Π HW SL LBJ. 
This ranking differs from the maximum likelihood MS ranking, and also from 
the ranking that is isotonic with the values of the model parameters estimated 
by Rumelhart and Greeno for both the Luce and the Restie model: 
BB CY JU AJF ET CdG SL HW LBJ. 
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Table 4.7 
Choice proportions, based on data reported by Greenberg (1965) 
A 
В 
С 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
A 
.500 
.859 
.804 
.822 
.693 
.669 
.620 
.583 
.491 
В 
.141 
.500 
.798 
.730 
.626 
.Ь// 
.589 
.503 
.429 
С 
.196 
.202 
.500 
.663 
.577 
.521 
.466 
.436 
.374 
D 
.178 
.270 
.337 
.500 
.515 
.460 
.417 
.387 
.245 
E 
.307 
.374 
.423 
.485 
.500 
.350 
.350 
.227 
.209 
F 
.331 
.423 
.479 
.540 
.650 
.500 
.264 
.239 
.141 
G 
.380 
.411 
.534 
.583 
.650 
.736 
.500 
.215 
.153 
H 
.417 
.497 
.564 
.613 
.773 
.761 
.785 
.500 
.153 
I 
.509 
.571 
.626 
.755 
.791 
.859 
.847 
.847 
.500 
Note · The row and column elements are ordered according to the maximum likelihood 
unfolded order. 
The value of the test statistic we obtained was 20.36. The boundaries of the 
critical regions for α = .01, .05, .10, .25 estimated in a series of 1000 structures 
were 17.71,11.87,9.75, and 7.11 respectively. We would therefore reject strong 
stochastic transitivity in a test with size . 10. 
4.6.3 Characteristic monotonicity 
Greenberg (1965) has presented a unidimensional unfolding strategy for 
paired comparisons data, based on a monotonie relation between choice pro­
portions and interaltemative midpoints. Greenberg 's technique is not proba­
bilistic and suffers from the same implementation problems as Coombs' 
unfolding technique for choice rankings. Elsewhere (Bossuyt & Roskam, 
1987a), we have developed a nonparametric, probabilistic unfolding strategy 
that can be regarded as the probabilistic counterpart of Greenberg's proposal. 
The difficulties in implementing the strictly isotonic relation between choice 
proportions and midpoints emerged rather unfortunately in the data Greenberg 
collected for the purpose of illustration. Greenberg asked 163 housewifes to 
choose out of all pairs from nine phrases. Each phrase described a possible 
attitude to the Volkswagen automobile. The content of the phrases ranged from 
excellent (A), over indifferent (E), to terrible (I). Greenberg's attempt to find 
a ranking of the midpoints isotonic with the choice proportions was not com­
pletely successful. 
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Table 4.8 
Constrained maximum likelihood estimates of choice probabilities for data 
reported by Greenberg (1965). 
A 
В 
С 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
A 
.500 
.859 
.813 
.813 
.693 
.669 
.620 
.583 
.491 
В 
.141 
.500 
.798 
.730 
.626 
.583 
.583 
.503 
.429 
С 
.187 
.202 
.500 
.663 
.577 
.521 
.466 
.436 
.374 
D 
.187 
.270 
.337 
.500 
.515 
.460 
.417 
.387 
.245 
E 
.307 
.374 
.423 
.485 
.500 
.350 
.350 
.233 
.209 
F 
.331 
.417 
.479 
.540 
.650 
.500 
.264 
.233 
.149 
G 
.380 
.417 
.534 
.583 
.650 
.736 
.500 
.215 
.149 
H 
.417 
.497 
.564 
.613 
.767 
.767 
.785 
.500 
.149 
I 
.509 
.571 
.626 
.755 
.791 
.851 
.851 
.851 
.500 
Note - The row and column elements are ordered according to the maximum likelihood 
unfolded order. 
Our probabilistic technique based on Greenberg's relies on one property of 
probabilistic choice behavior called midpoint monotonicity. The restrictions 
that define this condition are a superset of the inequalities that define charac­
teristic monotonicity. We evaluated the latter condition using our evaluation 
strategy. We first reconstructed a structure of frequencies by multiplying the 
choice proportions reported in Greenberg (1965) by 163, and then recalculated 
the choice proportions. These can be found in Table 4.7. 
Maximum likelihood estimates under characteristic monotonicity are listed 
in Table 4.8, with the row and column indices in the maximum likelihood 
unfolded order. Not surprisingly, this ranking corresponds to the a priori ranking 
of the nine statements. 
The value of -2 log likelihood ratio test statistic we obtained was .43. We 
generated a series of 1000 9x9 matrices with binomial deviates from binary 
choice probability structures in which characteristic monotonicity was satisfied, 
with η = 163. The boundaries of the critical regions for a = .01, .05, .10, .25 
estimated in this series of 1000 structures were 16.13, 12.53, 10.15, and 7.58 
respectively. In a test with an approximate size of α = .05, characteristic 
monotonicity could not be rejected. A midpoint unfolding model may show a 
reasonable fit to this model of data. 

5 An experimental evaluation of 
probabilistic unfolding theories 
In this chapter we report on two experiments that were designed for a com-
parative evaluation of the applicability of existing theories on probabilistic 
unfolding, and in which the evaluation strategy unfolded in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 was used. Each experiment consisted of a collection of paired 
comparisons tasks. 
5.1 EXPERIMENT 1 
Some thirty years ago, Coombs (1958) published results on an experimental 
evaluation of his theory on probabilistic unfolding. The choice task he created 
for this purpose has become known as the "Amsterdam experiment". Coombs 
and his coworkers asked four subjects - two men and two women - to rank chips 
of varying shades of gray according to their idea of prototypical gray. 
Coombs had developed a probabilistic unfolding theory with a unidimen-
sional psychological unfolding space. Any potential multidimensionality of the 
psychological space would have seriously crippled the ability to draw sound 
conclusions from an experiment. A set of shades of gray therefore seemed to 
form a suitable collection of stimuli, since increasing luminance is likely to 
yield a unidimensional space. 
The four subjects who participated in Coombs' Amsterdam experiment were 
each asked to rank subsets of four stimuli from the collection of shades of gray. 
Based upon the subjects' rankings, Coombs calculated four structures of binary 
choice frequencies. After examining the number of violations of strong sto-
chastic transitivity in the structures of choice proportions. Coombs concluded 
that his random coordinate assumptions were well supported. 
Coombs' experiment has become something of a standard; the Amsterdam 
experiment has become one of the experiments most frequently referred to in 
the literature on probabilistic choice behavior. For this reason, a replication of 
his task with paired comparisons seemed a right start for our evaluation strategy. 
By asking subjects similar questions, and applying our evaluation strategy, we 
could compare our conclusions with Coombs', at the same time creating an 
opportunity to evaluate all theories on probabilistic unfolding that have been 
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proposed after Coombs' initial approach. Furthermore, like Coombs' theory, 
many if not most of the more recent theories are restricted to unidimensional 
applications. 
To eliminate the inconveniences inherent to repeated presentations, we 
preferred to estimate choice probabilities in a group of subjects. One of the 
tasks had to be a replication of Coombs' procedure. Yet in such a task we would 
never be able to test properties involving the ideal point, since we see no way 
to determine with sufficient certainty the location of each individual's ideal. 
Deciding on the location of a "group" ideal would be an even harder task. It is 
not self-evident to use the model of the data to decide which alternative was 
the ideal. The first element in the maximum likelihood weak stochastic ranking 
is not necessarily the ideal, or not even the element closest to the ideal. 
To test the ideal point conditions, we therefore decided to include two tasks 
of paired comparisons with a reference stimulus. Each reference stimulus would 
be one of the shades of gray used. Within each task, we could evaluate the ideal 
point conditions IP.l to IP.3. With the system of choice frequencies from both 
tasks, condition IP.4 could be put on test as well, as the symmetry condition 
and, upon a proper selection of the reference stimuli, the unilaterally decrea-
sing/increasing condition. 
5.1.1 Method 
(1) Subjects 
Subjects were recruited by placing notices in the departments of psychology 
and sociology of the Catholic University of Nijmegen. Each notice contained 
the announcement that the experiment would involve an evaluation of the 
perception of shades of gray, and that subjects would receive 8 guilders for 
their participation; 43 subjects participated. 
(2) Stimuli 
By exposing photographic film for different periods we obtained sets of sheets 
with luminance values .5, .7 2.3. When projected against a screen, these 
sheets produced ten shades of gray, which will be referred to as stimuli gl gl0 
respectively. In three sets of 45 slides each, a piece of carbon paper was framed. 
Each piece had two 5 mm circularperforations, separated by 3 mm, horizontally 
aligned and centered. By placing pieces of the exposed photographic film 
behind these perforations, we obtained three sets of all 45 pairs of the ten sheets. 
Each set of slides was arranged in a tray. In each tray, the pairs of stimuli 
were arranged in a distinct spaced order, which is a presentation order for 
completely balanced designs that maintains the greatest possible separation 
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between pairs having a stimulus in common (Ross, 1934). We made two 
additional slides with one perforation only, and pieces of exposed film with 
luminance values 1.1 and 1.3 respectively. These slides would act as reference 
stimuli. The shades of gray produced by these slides were identical to the stimuli 
gi and g, respectively. 
(3) Procedure 
Subjects were run individually. They were placed behind a table at 2.5 meter 
from a projection screen, and had to perform at least three tasks. Each task 
consisted of 45 sequences, preceded by 10 trial sequences. 
In two tasks subjects had to make paired comparisons with a reference 
stimulus. Each sequence in this task started with a 5 sec presentation of a single 
shade of gray, the reference stimulus, followed by a 1.5 sec presentation of a 
pair of stimuli. After this pair had disappeared, a new sequence was started, 
with the same reference stimulus but followed by the next pair in the spaced 
order. Subjects were instructed to choose from each pair the stimulus most 
similar in grayness to the reference stimulus. In one triadic comparisons task 
(TR4), we used stimulus g4 as the reference stimulus, in the other (TR5) stimulus 
g5 was used. After the 45th sequence the reference stimulus was displayed once 
more. 
In the simple paired comparisons task (STG) each sequence started with a 
5 sec interval in which nothing was projected, and a 2 sec presentation of a pair 
of stimuli. Subjects were instructed to choose from each pair the stimulus that 
resembled best what they personally considered to be prototypical gray. 
Subjects expressed their choices after the presentation of a pair of stimuli by 
pressing one of two keys, which were connected to a small thermal printing 
unit. Subjects were mstructed to make a choice, even when in doubt. Each 
subject performed two tasks once, and one task twice. The experiment started 
with the task that had to be repeated, and ended with the second presentation 
of this task. For each subject, the three spaced orders were randomly assigned 
to the three tasks. For the task to be repeated, one of the three spaced orders 
was selected at random, and reversed. Approximately 40 minutes were needed 
for each run of four tasks, instructions included. 
5.1.2 Results 
Since 43 subjects participated and several of them made two tasks, we finally 
obtained two times 59 individual structures of choices for tasks TR4 and TR5 
respectively, and 67 structures of choices for the simple paired comparisons 
task STG. For each task, structures of binary choice frequencies were computed. 
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The corresponding choice proportions can be found in Appendix B. The 
structures were used to evaluate properties of probabilistic choice behavior with 
the evaluation strategy discussed earlier. 
For all tests, an approximate size of .10 was a priori selected. Whenever the 
distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis could not be computed 
nor estimated, a series of 250 Monte Carlo simulations was used to produce a 
nonparametric estimate of the relevant quantile(s), using order statistics. Sta-
tistics of these Monte Carlo series can be found in Appendix C. For condition 
IP.4, the unilaterally decreasing/increasing and the bilateral condition, series 
of 1000 simulations were used. For the symmetry condition, equation [4.35] 
was used to compute the test criterion. Test statistics and decisions based on 
them are summarized in Table 5.1. 
(1) Stochastic transitivity 
For each task one maximum likelihood weak stochastic ranking was found. 
All three rankings are perfectly consistent with the a priori luminosity ranking. 
This means that the weak stochastic rankings can be regarded as "folded" 
luminosity rankings, with the "fold" at the reference stimulus in TR4 and TR5, 
and at stimulus gs in STG. 
Forali three tasks, stochastic acyclicity was satisfied in the structure of choice 
proportions. This means that maximum likelihood estimates of the choice 
probabilities were equal to the choice proportions, and the values of the test 
statistic for stochastic acyclicity and weak stochastic transitivity were zero. 
The moderate stochastic rankings were nearly identical to the weak stochastic 
rankings. Yet moderate stochastic transitivity had to be rejected in TR4. Strong 
stochastic transitivity had to be rejected in all three tasks. 
(2) Ideal point 
As we explained in the introduction, the ideal point conditions could not be 
evaluated in the paired comparisons task STG. We computed maximum like-
lihood weak stochastic rankings for each subject separately, based on the 
choices made in task STG. This resulted in a heterogeneous collection of 
rankings, which supported our a priori belief on the low likelihood of a unan-
imous choice on what shade of gray resembled best "true gray". 
We evaluated the ideal point condition in TR4 and TR5. Condition IP. 1 could 
be rejected in neither of the tasks. Maximum likelihood estimates of the choice 
probabilities were equal to the choice proportions, and the test statistics were 
zero. Condition IP.2 had to be rejected. Discrimination was not necessarily 
sharpest when one of the alternatives was identical to the reference stimulus. 
Condition IP.3 had to be rejected as well. The reference stimulus was not always 
correctly identified when presented. 
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Table 5.1 
Test statistics and decisions in Experiment 1. 
Test Statistics 
Task STA MS SST IP.1 \P2 IP.3 CM BM BCM 
TR4 .00 12.75* 196.03* .00 58.71* rej. 38.08' 45.19* 24.34* 
TR5 .00 3.51 113.38* .00 7.20* rej. 16.22 14.59* 9.19 
STG .00 9.25 65.83* n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.42 26.43* 14.37* 
Nofe - An asterisk denotes that the property had to be rejected in the corresponding structure, using 
a test with an approximate size of .10; rej.: rejected; n.a.: property not applicable. 
Condition IP.4 could be tested with the choice frequencies in TR4 and TR5 for 
all pairs {g4,g;} and {£5,g,} with ; = 1,2,.., 10 (excluding {g^g,} and {g^gj), 
involving 17 pairs of probabilities. This condition had to be rejected (Test 
statistic: 47.48; Test criterion: 1.98). Discrimination in a pair of stimuli was 
not necessarily easier when one of the alternatives was physically identical to 
the reference stimulus. 
The symmetry condition could be tested with the pair {£4, g5} and the choice 
frequencies for TR4 and TR5. the choice proportions were .576 for {£4, gs} in TR4 
and .746 for {g5, g¿ in TR5. The hypothesis of equality had to be rejected. The 
value of -2 log likelihood ratio test statistic was 3.81. The test criterion in a test 
with size .10, computed using the probabilities computed through equation 
[4.35] was 2.81. 
The bilateral condition could be tested with the choice frequencies for all 
pairs {gi.gj} 0' = 1,2,3, j = 6,7,... 10) in TR4 and TR5 . This condition could not 
be rejected (Test statistic: .33; Test criterion: 1.85). 
The unilaterally decreasing/increasing condition was tested using the choice 
frequencies for all pairs in the subsets {5,, g2, g j and all pairs in {g6, g-,, g&, g9, gia}, 
in TR4 and TR5. We looked for the maximum likelihood estimates of the cor-
responding choice probabilities in the subdomains of the parameter space 
satisfying the unilaterally decreasing/increasing condition respectively. 
The generalized likelihood ratio test statistics were 9.51 and 10.36 for the 
increasing and decreasing condition respectively, which made the data look 
more likely under a set of probabilities satisfying the unilaterally increasing 
condition. The estimated .90 quantile of the distribution of the statistic under 
each condition was 1.44, so none of the two conditions could be rejected. 
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(3) Unfolded order 
In all three tasks, the maximum likelihood unfolded orders under charac-
teristic monotonicity were identical to the underlymg luminosity rankings, 
except for an inversion of stimuli [gs,gA) in TR4 and (g^g^ in TR5. Characteristic 
monotonicity had to be rejected in TR4 however. 
The maximum likelihood unfolded orders under bilateral monotonicity were 
identical to the underlying luminosity rankings in tasks TR4 and TR5, except for 
the same inversion of adjacent stimuli {gs, g4) in TR4. The maximum likelihood 
order in STG deviated severely from the luminosity ranking. Bilateral mono-
tonicity had to be rejected in all three tasks. 
The inversion of stimuli CSj.g,,) reappeared in the maximum likelihood 
unfolded order under bilateral/characteristic monotonicity in TR5. Both in TR4 
and STG, the solution ranking equalled the luminosity ranking, yet bilate-
ral/characteristic monotonicity had to be rejected. 
5.1.3 Discussion 
If Coombs' assumptions for this kind of choices had been valid, we would 
expect all properties necessarily implied by the random coordinate theory (with 
single sampling of the ideal coordinate) to hold. These are 
(1) no violations of moderate stochastic transitivity, but very likely 
violations of strong stochastic transitivity, 
(2) no violation of the ideal point conditions IP.l, but very likely 
violations of IP.2, IP.3 and IP.4, 
(3) no violation of the symmetry condition, no violation of the bilateral 
condition 
(4) the unilaterally increasing condition, 
(5) either bilateral/characteristic or simple characteristic monotonicity, 
and a recovery of the physical luminosity ranking in the search for 
the maximum likelihood unfolded order under these conditions. 
We feel that these predictions were rather well supported. 
(1) The first set of predictions was well supported in tasks TR5 and STG. Though 
a majority of probabilistic unfolding theories expects at least strict sto-
chastic transitivity in probabilistic choice behavior, even strong stochastic 
transitivity seemed to be clearly violated in both sets of paired 
comparisons. Despite the similarity between tasks TR4 and TR5, moderate 
stochastic transitivity seemed plausible in the second, but not in the first. 
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(2) With respect to the ideal point conditions, there were no violations of IP. 1. 
In TR4 as well as in TR5, a majority of the subjects correctly identified the 
reference stimulus when it was presented. There was less support for the 
other ideal point conditions. As could be expected from results in similar 
experiments with nontrivial comparisons (for an example, see Krantz, 
1967), the reference stimulus was not always correctly identified, so IP.3 
had to be rejected. Similarly, though conditions IP.2 to IP.4 seem to have 
an intuitive appeal, they were unlikely in the comparisons we observed. 
(3) It is not entirely clear how the rejection of the symmetry condition in 
TR4-TR5 has to be interpreted. This rejection may indicate that the metric 
of the psychological spaces in the tasks TR4 and TR5 differed, contrary to 
what we intended to achieve. In both tasks we used similar stimuli, only 
the reference stimulus was different, and the same subjects made judg-
ments in TR4 and TR5. Perhaps there is a substantial functional difference 
between a similarity comparison of {g4,g¿ with g^  and a comparison of 
{g4, gj} with gi, which is not reflected in the functional identity of two pairs 
of distances. On the other hand, if the space had been really dissimilar, we 
would have expected a rejection of the bilateral condition. 
(4) If the subjective metric was not the same in both tasks, the test of the 
unilaterally decreasing/increasing condition is either biased or of little 
power. The data were more plausible under the increasing condition, yet 
both the increasing condition and the decreasing condition had to be 
rejected. 
(5) Rather surprisingly, we had to reject all three unfolded order conditions 
in TR4, which contrasts with the rejection of bilateral monotonicity only 
in TR5, despite the fact that for both tasks the underlying luminosity ranking 
reappeared in all solutions. In the simple paired comparisons task STG, we 
could not reject characteristic monotonicity, but had to reject bilate-
ral/characteristic monotonicity. Since the restrictions of CM are a subset 
of those of BCM, these results are hard to explain. 
Concluding, we may say that within TR5, the predictions from Coombs ' theory 
could not refuted, despite a lack of support in TR4, and the set of the comparisons 
with a reference stimulus taken as a whole. At the same time these results lead 
to the related conclusion that almost all competing theories seemed ill suited 
for data collected in these tasks. Strong stochastic transitivity was very unlikely, 
and this rules out all strong unfolding models, random distance models and the 
double sampling models of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs random coordinate 
theory. 
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The only plausible models left are models of the Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs 
theory (single sampling - Case II), possibly one with the coordinate of the ideal 
as the single random variable (Case Ш), or (functionally equivalent) midpoint 
unfolding models. We are tempted to conclude that a Case II random coordinate 
model seems more acceptable in task TR5, whereas a Case ΠΙ random coordinate 
model (or midpoint unfolding model) seems more suited for the data of STG. 
We find some support for this preference in the test statistics, but we can also 
explain it in terms of sizes of variances in the corresponding models. 
In the comparisons with a reference stimulus both the ideal and the alternatives 
were physically presented to the subjects, and in much the same way. Since 
there hardly could have been any additional intersubjective variability in the 
location of the ideal and the alternatives, the variances of the corresponding 
distributions were probably approximately equal. Intersubjective variability 
was, however, very likely to appear in the simple paired comparisons task, since 
in this task the ideal - each subject's conception on prototypical gray - had to 
be subjective. This subjectivity was supported by the wide assortment of ws 
rankings that emanated from the analysis of the individual choice structures. 
Due to a fusion of intrasubjective and intersubjective variability, the overall 
variance of the ideal coordinate distribution was very likely to exceed the 
variances of the distributions for the alternatives. With an increasing ratio of 
variances, one ultimately moves from a Case II to a Case ΙΠ random coordinate 
model. 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 2 
In designing Experiment 2 we had two goals in mind. We wanted to gain 
more experience with our evaluation strategy, and we hoped to be able to elicit 
choice behavior for which a distinct class of theories might turn out to be 
appropriate. 
First we designed a task, in which subjects were asked through paired com­
parisons what they thought to be the maximum penalty in the Criminal Code 
for a number of well-defined crimes. As in Experiment 1, we wanted to 
minimize the confounding impact of a multidimensional psychological space. 
A set of alternative imprisonment terms of increasing duration is likely to be 
located unequivocally on a unidimensional continuum. Furthermore, the 
unambiguous nature of the imprisonment terms may minimize the uncertainty 
regarding their location in the psychological space, which is one potential source 
of choice variability. 
In a second choice task we wanted to ask subjects for their preferences in a 
set of eleven political parties of the Netherlands. Political preferences have 
always been a favorite territory of probabilistic choice modelers (e.g. Van 
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Schuur, 1984), which explains this choice. We also wanted to ask subjects what 
party they intended to vote for if elections were to be held the other day. Though 
an answer to this question may not necessarily reveal a subject's ideal party in 
terms of its location on the left-right spectrum, it may serve as an external 
indication. By aggregating choices for subjects with identical vote intentions, 
we would be able to create a choice frequency system in which the ideal point 
conditions could be tested. 
Next to its popularity as a field for unfolding applications, we had a second 
consideration in mind when incorporating preferences for political parties in 
this experiment. It seemed not implausible to us that we would find support for 
the unilaterally decreasing condition in a model of data generated in such a 
task. We suspected subjects with similar vote intentions to have less articulate 
preferences for parties located further away from their favorite area of the 
political left-right spectrum, and more pronounced, or more homogeneous 
opinions for parties close to this preferred region. 
The third choice task grew out of a series of discussions on the applicability 
and interpretability of random coordinate theories in Experiment 1. If the choice 
variability is attributed to a random variability in the location of the alternatives 
and the ideal, was it then due to physical processes only, or (also) related to the 
way we defined the tasks with paired comparisons with a reference stimulus? 
More specifically, we wondered whether we could create a choice situation 
that would lead to conclusions similar to the ones made in the first experiment, 
even if we increased the identifiability of stimuli. This led us to a set of tasks 
involving comparisons with a reference stimulus, functionally similar to tasks 
TR4 and TR5 of Experiment 1, but with two-digit numbers replacing shades of 
gray-
5.2.1 Method 
(1) Subjects 
Subjects were recruited by placing notices in all departments of the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen and in the local University newspaper. Each notice 
contained the announcement that choice behavior was the subject of the 
experiment, and that participants would receive 8 guilders for their cooperation. 
Within three weeks 85 subjects volunteered and participated. 
(2) Stimuli 
In a first set of tasks the alternatives were seven different imprisonment terms: 
2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 years. The reference stimuli were what each subject 
thought to be the maximum penalty for the following six crimes: petty extortion 
130 
(с,), counterfeiting (cj, intentional endangering of public transport or traffic 
(c,), robbery (c4), bribery of a judicial officer (c5), and rape (c6). The actual 
maximum penalty in the Criminal Code of the Netherlands is 9 years of 
imprisonment for C! to c„ and 12 years for с6. 
In each task one crime was the reference stimulus. Each task cci was labelled 
by the crime c, used in it. Task CC4, for example, had c4, robbery, as the reference 
stimulus. 
In a second set of tasks the alternatives were eleven political parties of the 
Netherlands, presented by their acronyms: CDA (christian-democrats), CPN 
(communists), D66 (left-wing liberals), Е Р (left-wing Christians), PVDA (so­
cialists), PPR (socialist ecologists), PSP (pacifist socialists), VVD (right-wing 
liberals), RPF, SGP, GPV, (small right-wing Christian parties). 
In a third set of tasks the alternatives were ten two digit numbers: 08,14,27, 
31,46, 59,62,70, 85 and 93. The selection criteria had been the following: 
(1) the absolute difference of the two digits in a number exceeds 2, 
(2) no two numbers are composed of the same two digits, 
(3) all numbers can be ranked without ties according to their absolute 
difference with number at a central position in the simple magnitude 
ordering. 
In the present set, the latter two rankings are: 46,59,31,62,27,70,14,08, 85, 
93 for stimulus 46, and 59, 62,70,46, 85,31,27, 93, 14,08 for stimulus 59. 
(3) Procedure 
Subjects were run individually, and had to perform all ten tasks. They were 
seated in front of a monitor with a black and white screen, on which the 
instructions and the alternatives for each task were displayed. To read a new 
screen of instructions, to start a new task or to make a choice, they pressed one 
of two keys (left or right). 
(1) The instructions for the first set of tasks included a general introduction 
on the principals of the Criminal Code, and the implicit seriousness ranking 
in the maximum penalties in the Criminal Code. Then subjects received 
the Criminal Code description of each of the six crimes, from which, for 
obvious reasons, the maximum penalty was omitted. 
The set of all pairs of seven imprisonment terms led to six series of 21 
presentations, one series for each crime. Each presentation started by a 
1200 msec clearing of the screen. The label of a crime (say, "robbery") 
and two numbers expressing years of imprisonment were presented next. 
Subjects were instructed to choose the number which came closest to what 
they expected to be the maximum penalty for the crime displayed. Each 
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presentation was followed by the next one 300 msec after the subject had 
made a choice. 
The presentations for all six tasks were intertwined into a single series of 
126 presentations, preceded by 6 trial presentations. These 126 presen-
tations were organized as follows. For each crime the 21 pairs of impris-
onment terms were arranged in a distinct spaced order. The first 6 of the 
126 presentations included the first pair in each of these 6 orders, in a 
random order. The 7th to the 12th presentation contained the second pair 
in each spaced order, again randomly ordered, and in such a way that the 
7th presentation did not have the same reference stimulus as the 6th. 
Continuing this way we obtained an intertwined presentation order for the 
6 sets of 21 presentations. 
(2) In the first task (PPl) of the second set of tasks (political parties) simple 
paired comparisons had to be made. Subjects were instructed to choose 
the political party they sympathized with, or, if they felt a preference for 
neither, the party they resented less. All 55 pairs of the 11 alternatives 
were presented in a series of 55 presentations, preceded by 6 trial pre-
sentations. As in all other tasks, these 6 trial presentations were randomly 
sampled from the actual series. Each presentation started with a 1200 msec 
blanking of the screen, followed by a presentation of a pair of political 
party acronyms. This presentation was followed by the next, 300 msec 
after the subject had made a choice. The 55 presentations contained all 
pairs of political parties in a spaced order. For each subject, a spaced order 
was randomly selected. 
In the second task (PP2) of this set subjects were asked to pick the party 
they would vote for if elections were to be held the other day. A list of the 
11 parties, names and acronyms, used in the first task PPl was displayed 
on the screen, in a sequencing randomly reselected for each subject. Two 
options were added to this list: "would vote for a party not on this list" and 
"would not vote". Subjects expressed their vote intention by using a key 
to move a pointer through the list until the desired option was indicated. 
The second key could be used to confirm the selection made. 
(3) The third set of tasks was based on comparisons with a reference stimulus, 
involving simple arithmetic. Three numbers (the reference stimulus and 
two alternatives) were displayed, and subjects were asked to pick the 
alternative for which the absolute difference with the reference stimulus 
was smaller. Due to the selection of the alternatives, an arithmetically 
correct choice could always be made. 
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In one task, 46 was the reference stimulus, in the other 59. and the tasks 
were labelled by the reference stimulus used in it: N46 and N59. Each task 
consisted of 45 presentations, preceded by 6 trial presentations. Each 
presentation started by a 5 sec presentation of the reference stimulus, 
followed by a 250 msec presentation of a pair of numbers. The 45 pre-
sentations contained all 45 pairs of the stimuli in a spaced order. 
Each run through all tasks started with the instructions for the first set 
(CC1-CC6), followed by the 6 trial presentations and presentations 1 to 42 of 
this set. Next the subject received the instructions for the first task of the third 
set (either N46 or N59, selected at random), 6 trial presentations and all 45 
presentations of this task. Next the instructions for task PPl were displayed, 
followed by 6 trial presentations and the first 27 presentations of this task. This 
was followed by: presentations 43 to 84 of the "crime" tasks, instructions and 
45 presentations of the remaming "numbers" task, presentations 28 to 55 of the 
"political parties" task PPl, presentations 85 to 126 of the "crimes" set, and task 
PP2. 
All tasks were monitored by a minicomputer. All random selections, including 
the random assignment to the spaced orders, were made for each subject 
individually, by the custom made presentation package running on this mini. 
On average, subjects took app. 50 minutes to complete all tasks. 
5.2.2 Results 
For the tasks CCI to CC6, N46, N59 and PPl the 85 sets of choices were used to 
compute nine sets of binary choice frequencies. This way three systems of 
choice frequencies were obtained, one for each set of tasks. Furthermore, the 
answers in task PP2 were used to distribute the sets of choices for PPl over nine 
subsets, collecting the choices of subjects with identical vote intentions. This 
way a fourth system, with nine sets of choice frequencies, could be created. 
The latter system was only used to evaluate the ideal point conditions. Structures 
of choice proportions can be found in Appendix B. 
All tests used had an approximate size of .10. Whenever the distribution of 
the test statistic was unknown, a series of 250 Monte Carlo simulations was 
used to estimate relevant quantiles of the distribution nonparametrically, using 
order statistics. Statistics of these Monte Carlo series can be found in Appendix 
C. For condition IP.4, the unilaterally decreasing/increasing and the bilateral 
condition, series of 1000 simulations were used. Test statistics and decisions 
based on them are summarized in Table 5.2. 
133 
(1) Stochastic transitivity 
The results on the probabilistic transitivity conditions were very similar in 
all tasks. All structures of binary choice proportions satisfied weak stochastic 
transitivity. Moderate stochastic transitivity could not be rejected, but strong 
stochastic transitivity was very unlikely. In the first set of tasks, all solutions 
under weak, moderate and strong stochastic transitivity were consistent with 
the underlying duration dimension. A majority of subjects expressed left-wing 
sympathies in task PPI, making the social-democrats (PVDA) the first party in 
the maximum likelihood weak stochastic ranking, with the right-wing Christian 
parties at the end positions. 
In the third set of tasks, involving arithmetic subtractions, the solutions for 
the stochastic transitivity conditions did not differ much from one another both 
within N46 and N59. All solutions were consistent with the underlying magnitude 
ordering, yet they showed impressive deviations from the arithmetic differ-
ences. In the maximum likelihood weak stochastic ranking in N46, only the first 
two stimuli ended up in their correct position (i.e. based on the arithmetic 
differences): 46,59,62,31,70,27,14, 85,08,93. In N59 only the first two and 
the last three stimuli were positioned correctly: 59, 62, 46, 70, 31, 27, 85, 93, 
14, 08. 
(2) The ideal point 
The ideal point conditions IP.l to IP.4, and the symmetry condition, could 
not be tested in the first set of tasks, CCI to CC6. This was due to the impossibility 
of predicting whether or not a subject's opinion on the maximum penalty (the 
ideal in this situation) was one of the available alternatives. 
Upon an inspection of the maximum likelihood weak stochastic rankings, we 
decided to treat all pairs in the subset {9,12,15,18} and the pair {2,4} as located 
unilaterally to the common opinion on the severity of the maximum penalty. 
Next we looked for the permutation of the 6 crimes that maximized the like-
lihood under the bilateral condition [2.14] (which is supposed to hold for all 
known probabilistic unfolding theories) and either the unilaterally decreasing 
or increasing condition. 
The maximum likelihood permutation turned out to be the one satisfying the 
unilaterally increasing condition: ciclcic2ctcs. This condition could not be 
rejected (Test statistic: 1.65; Test criterion: 4.77). 
As described earlier, the answers on the vote intention question in PP2 were 
used to redistribute the individual sets of choices in PPl, grouping subjects with 
similar vote intentions. In the sets of choice frequencies created this way the 
ideal point conditions were tested. Condition IP. 1 and IP.2 could not be rejected. 
The values of the test statistic for both hypotheses were zero, except for the 
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Table 5.2 
Test statistics and decisions in Experiment 2. 
Test Statistics 
Task STA MS SST IP.1 IP.2 IP.3 CM BM BCM 
CCI 
CC2 
CC3 
CC4 
CC5 
CC6 
PP 
N46 
N59 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
1.04 
.00 
1.15 
.07 
.00 
.36 
.00 
.95 
3.95 
88.80* 
64.75' 
63.23' 
66.14* 
43.64* 
81.30* 
61.10* 
265.63* 
273.68' 
п.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
.00 
.00 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
109.28* 
32.69* 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
rej. 
rej. 
1.46 
.00 
3.95 
.35 
.00 
.40 
174.21* 
9.30 
16.98 
38.42' 
26.99' 
20.91* 
23.48* 
19.70* 
38.55' 
13.08 
39.85* 
39.21* 
1.46 
.00 
1.28 
.35 
.00 
.40 
2.94 
6.45 
8.74 
Note- An asterisk denotes that the property had to be rejected in the corresponding structure, using 
a test with an approximate size of .10; re). : rejected; n.a.: property not applicable. 
data from the subjects who answered they intended to vote for the party VVD. 
In these data condition IP.2 seemed to be violated. Condition IP.3 was violated 
in all substructures, except in the sample corresponding to the party CDA. Only 
subjects who expressed a vote intention for the christian-democrats did choose 
their preferred party whenever it was presented in paired comparisons task PPI. 
We also tested the unilateral condition, by estimating choice probabilities in 
the subsystem containing choice frequencies for all subjects with vote intentions 
for the parties CPN, PSP, PPR, PVDA or D66. The test statistic was based on all 
choice probabilities for the pairs out of the subset (CDA, W D , EVP, GPV, SGP, 
RPF}. Though the data slightly favored the increasing condition, both the 
decreasing and increasing condition had to be rejected. 
In tasks N46 and N59, the reference stimulus was also an element of the set of 
alternatives, so all ideal point conditions could be evaluated. In both tasks 
condition IP Л could not be rejected; test statistics were zero. Condition IP.3 
had to be rejected. The number of correct identifications of the reference 
stimulus was lower than the number of presentations when the ideal was 
presented together with one of the alternatives (27,31,59,62,70,93) in N46 or 
the alternatives {14,27,31,46,62,70} in N59. For example, only 60% of the 
subjects correctly identified 46 when presented with 59, and only 62% identified 
59 when presented with 46. 
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Condition IP.2 had to be rejected as well. Discrimination in pairs containing 
the reference stimulus not only lacked perfection, it was not necessarily 
sharpest. In task N46 for example, only 68% of the subjects correctly chose the 
reference stimulus in the pair {46,62}, whereas 99% picked 59 out of {59,62}. 
The ideal point condition IP.4 had to be rejected (Test statistic: .97; Test 
criterion: .74). 
The test statistic for the unilaterally increasing/decreasing conditions were 
1.98 and 1.59 respectively. Both conditions had to be rejected (Test 
criterion: .92). 
The bilateral condition could be tested with the choice frequencies of N46 and 
N59 and the set of all pairs {x.y} with* e {08,14,27,31} and y G {62,70,85,93}. 
This condition could not be rejected (Test statistic: .00; Test criterion: 1.36). 
The symmetry condition could not be rejected either. The value of -2 log 
likelihood ratio test statistic was .049. The test criterion in a test with size . 10, 
computed using the probabilities computed through equation [4.35] was 2.782. 
(3) The unfolded order 
In each task of the first set, CCI to CC6, the maximum likelihood unfolded 
order under bilateral/characteristic and characteristic monotonicity corre-
sponded to the underlying severity ranking of the imprisonment terms. Both 
conditions could not be rejected. Bilateral monotonicity had to be rejected in 
all tasks. Except for CCI and CC3, all solutions under bilateral monotonicity 
were identical to the underlying duration ranking. 
In the political parties task PPI we had to reject characteristic monotonicity. 
Bilateral nor bilateral/characteristic monotonicity could be rejected. Unlike the 
solution under bilateral monotonicity, the maximum likelihood unfolded order 
under bilateral/characteristic monotonicity parallelled a left wing - right wing 
ordering of the eleven political parties: 
EVP CPN PPR PSP PVDA D66 CDA WD RPF GPV SGP. 
The only anomaly is the extreme left position of the (moderate) left-wing 
christian party EVP. In the unfolded order that resulted in the next-to-highest 
value of the likelihood, the parties were arranged identically to the maximum 
likelihood unfolded order, except for the EVP party, which ended up between 
the liberals W D and the right-wing christian parties. 
For the arithmetical tasks, N46 and N59, a single permutation emerged as the 
maximum likelihood solution both under characteristic, bilateral, and bilate-
ral/characteristic monotonicity. This permutation corresponded to the under-
lying magnitude ordering. We had to reject bilateral monotonicity. 
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5.2.3 Discussion 
(1) Criminal Code 
The set of "crimes" tasks was included in the experiment in order to obtain 
a choice situation that would lend itself easily to unidimensional unfolding, 
with the attractive feature that the number of tasks would allow a more refined 
test of the unilateral condition. Furthermore we hypothesized that all variability 
in the choices had to be attributed to an intra- and intersubjective variability in 
the location of the "ideal" (the subject's guess at the maximum penalty) on the 
underlying psychological continuum, due to the unambiguous presentation of 
the alternatives (imprisonment terms of varying length). Therefore a random 
ideal coordinate model, or a model functionally similar in properties, as a 
midpoint model, might well be suited for the data. 
This hypothesis was well supported. In every way the tests indicated the 
appropriateness of a unidimensional random coordinate model, single sampling 
of the ideal coordinate, or a data-equivalent midpoint model, rejecting the 
majority of the competing theories. The highest level of stochastic transitivity 
fulfilled (moderate) corresponded exactly to the predictions. All models of 
theories presupposing stronger transitivity conditions had to be ruled out. To 
the latter category belong all random distance models, and all strong unfolding 
models. 
In all six substructures characteristic monotonicity could not be rejected. 
Deviations from characteristic monotonicity in the choice proportions were 
either small or absent, and the maximum likelihood unfolded orders under this 
condition were equal to the underlying magnitude ordering. 
A remarkable result was produced by the procedure used to evaluate the 
unilateral condition. After a partition of the set of pairs into bilateral and uni-
lateral pairs, the permutation maximizing the likelihood under either the 
decreasing or increasing condition turned out to satisfy the latter. The 
unilaterally increasing condition is required in a random ideal coordinate model, 
single sampling. 
The solution permutation under the unilateral condition turned out to be 
almost consistent with the unfolded order of these crimes, based on the max-
imum likelihood weak stochastic rankings in each task. Using Coombs ' original 
terminology, the series of six maximum likelihood rankings forms a set of / 
scales that can be unidimensionally unfolded. By ordering this set of ws 
rankings according to the maximum likelihood permutation under the 
increasing condition, each ranking can be derived from the ranking to its left 
or right by reversing adjacent alternatives. 
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2 
2 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
2 
2 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
2 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
(ССЗ) 
(CCI) 
(СС6) 
(СС2) 
(СС5) 
(СС4) 
In deterministic unidimensional unfolding, reversing adjacent alternatives in 
sets of / scales corresponds to crossing the corresponding interaltemative 
midpoint on the underlying psychological continuum. 
(2) Political parties 
By including a paired comparisons task with political parties as stimuli we 
hoped to elicit a kind of probabilistic choice behavior that would fulfil a distinct 
pattern of properties. For example, we a priori considered it to be plausible that 
the unilateral decreasing condition would be satisfied, and the increasing 
condition violated, contrary to our predictions for the first experiment. We 
hypothesized that subjects with leftist sympathies would discriminate sharper 
between left-wing parties than between right-wing parties, and vice versa. This 
property of probabilistic choice behavior corresponds to the unilaterally 
decreasing condition. Because of their political sympathies, these subjects were 
assumed to be more aware of subtle ideological differences on the left side of 
the political spectrum, and comparable less aware of ideological idiosyncrasies 
of the small right-wing parties. 
The test of this unilateral condition was handicapped because a majority of 
the participating subjects expressed a vote intention for one of the left-wing 
parties. Based on the test we used, both the increasing and decreasing condition 
had to be rejected. 
For the ideal point conditions we expected fulfilment of the stronger condi­
tions IP.2 and IP.3. Condition IP.2 was rather well supported, but condition 
IP.3 was not satisfied. Except for the subjects with an expressed vote intention 
for the christian-democratic party (CDA) all participating subjects did not always 
choose the party they said they would vote for. Since the presentation of the 
parties was unambiguous, and the choices could be made without a time limit, 
the latter result is somewhat puzzling. A possible explanation could be that the 
choice frequencies were computed under the somewhat optimistic assumption 
that all subjects prepared to vote would have done so for their "ideal" party. 
This assumption could have been violated, since poll results indicated that a 
fraction of the electorate had made "strategic" vote decisions in the Parliament 
elections which were to be held shortly after the experiment. Maybe citizens 
do not always vote for the party they sympathize with most. Some vote hoping 
to support, or to break, a ruling coalition. 
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The maximum likelihood unfolded order under bilateral/characteristic 
monotony mirrorred a widely accepted left-right ordering of the political par-
ties, except for the strange position of the leftist Christians EVP. If we let our-
selves be seduced to a posteriori reasoning, we might say that this position is 
due either to an the subjects' unfamiliarity with the party - which generally 
keeps a low profile - or to its inherent ambiguity of the party: a mixture of 
left-wing ideas based on Christian principles. 
Our data-analytic procedure only looks for the maximum likelihood esti-
mates, and the accompanying value of the test-statistic. A more general pro-
cedure might want to look at the five (or more) rankings that result in the highest 
values of the likelihood. Such an overview might give a better impression of 
the stability of the solution. 
(3) Arithmetic 
In the tradition of Thurstone (1927), stimuli in probabilistic choice are thought 
of as giving rise to a "discriminal process" on a subjective continuum. This 
discriminal dispersion is usually invoked to explain inconsistencies in choice 
behavior. The shades of gray of Experiment 1 clearly fell into this category of 
stimuli. We may very well attribute the choice variability over and within 
subjects in tasks TR4 and TR5 to a variability in the location of the stimuli on 
the underlying subjective luminosity or "grayness" continuum. 
By designing the arithmetical tasks N46 and N59 we wanted to create a situation 
similar to the one in tasks TR4 and TR5, except that all perceptual sources of 
ambiguity had been eliminated. Because stimuli were abstract numbers, the 
eventual ambiguity could only be attributed to the process of making the simple 
arithmetical calculations itself. 
In general the estimated choice probabilities for tasks N46 and N59 were more 
extreme than the ones in the first experiment, as could be expected. There was 
less variability, and there were less mistakes. Yet the folded maximum likeli-
hood weak stochastic rankings deviated severely from the true arithmetic dif-
ferences. 
To our surprise, the results of the tests were remarkably similar to the out-
comes for tasks TR4 and TR5 of Experiment 1. Moderate stochastic transitivity 
could not be rejected, but all higher levels of transitivity had to be discarded. 
The data corresponded closely to a pattern satisfying bilateral/characteristic 
monotonicity, though characteristic monotonicity had to be rejected in task N59 
only. Within the ideal point conditions, IP.l was satisfied, but IP.2, IP.3 and 
IP.4 had to be rejected. 
139 
Contrary to what was found in Experiment 1, the bilateral increasing condition 
and the symmetry condition could not be rejected for tasks N46 and N59. This 
seems to indicate that, unlike the tasks with the shades of gray, the two sets of 
arithmetic comparisons were more alike in terms of an common underlying 
psychological continua. 
We wonder by which mechanisms patterns of choices in tasks as divergent 
as TR4-TR5 and N46-N59 were made so similar. One more puzzling result remains 
to be pomted at. From a sample of university students we would expect that 
they are able to compute quickly the arithmetical comparisons needed in the 
tasks. Yet the large amount of arithmetical blunders makes one wonder by 
which transformations subjects rendered the integers comparable. 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The demands on a model of data that are put by the original, deterministic 
unfolding theory are rather austere; most sets of data fail to satisfy the conditions 
that are necessary for an unfolding representation. The attractiveness of the 
unfolding paradigm has stimulated choice modellers to look for modifications 
of the unfolding strategy that would enlarge the number of possible and 
interesting applications. 
These numerous attempts can be localized in a no-man's land bordered by 
lines of trenches and ideological barricades. Discussions over barricades are 
seldom easy and the way in which they proceed tends to obscure the nature of 
the conflict itself. In our view, conflicting opinions on the value of less austere 
unfolding techniques can be traced back to diverging opinion on the presumed 
origins of these techniques. 
From one line of trenches, an unfolding representation is looked upon as 
nothing more than an idealized structure with compeletely known properties. 
Givena set of choices, one can use a variety of techniques to find a representation 
that comes as close as possible to the ideal structure. From this "scaling" 
approach, any such technique is just a "black box" that can be studied; one can 
see if and how any alternative arrives at a representation, and how reliable these 
solutions are (Heiser, 1981). 
The trenches on the other side of the field are manned by supporters of what 
we might call the "theoretical" approach, without willing to accuse the opposite 
side of being entirely a-theoretical. There is a long-standing psychological 
tradition of linking representation techniques to theorizing on behavior. This 
tradition goes back to Fechner and Thurstone, and is exemplified in works from 
authors as Thurstone (1927,1959), Luce (1959), Restie (1961) and Tversky 
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(1972a, 1972b). For the scholars in this set of trenches, the value of a repre­
sentational technique is closely related to the empirical plausibility of its 
theoretical assumptions and their corrolaries. 
The numerous collection of proposals for a probabilistic unfolding theory 
follows the latter tradition, at least in majority. We feel that these origins should 
guide us in making a selection from this diversity of approaches. We could 
study them as "black boxes", evaluating global goodness-of-fit indexes, like­
lihoods and penalized likelihoods, but this would not do justice to their theo­
retical background. A closer look at the basic assumptions of the underlying 
theory, and their implications for probabilistic choice behavior may be more 
warranted. Furthermore, such a closer look can be totally independent from 
distributional assumptions and peculariades in maximization procedures. Both 
are of minor or no relevance for a theory's basic validity, yet they can sub­
stantially influence the goodness-of-fit between a model of the data and a model 
of the theory. 
Such an examination of necessary properties in probabilistic choice behavior 
is what we have attempted in this dissertation. To the necessary properties 
known from the literature on probabilistic choice, we added some others, more 
closely related to unfolding. Some of these properties were based on alternative 
probabilistic translations of Coombs' definition of the ideal alternative, others 
were related to a unidimensional unfolding space. 
We did not claim that this approach is original. Yet a major limitation for any 
evaluation procedure based on these properties has been the absence of tech­
niques to evaluate their validity in a statistically acceptable way. By formulating 
the properties as conditional ordinal restrictions in the estimation of choice 
probabilities, adding a branch search strategy, and using a generalized likeli­
hood ratio test, we think we have succeeded in defining a legitimate statistical 
strategy. 
The data-analytic strategy described in this dissertation can alternatively be 
used as a data-analytic procedure of its own, to find the maximum likelihood 
preference ranking under a variety of probabilistic preference relations for 
example. or to find the maximum likelihood unfolded order under characteristic 
monotonicity. The algorithm presented for this purpose (Bossuyt & Roskam, 
1987a, 1989a) will be elaborated in the future. It is not all too difficult to adapt 
it for data from other choice tasks, such as pick χ out of n, or ranking tasks. 
The same strategy can also be used to compare other probabilistic choice 
theories, unrelated to unfolding, or any other probabilistic modelling problem. 
Work is already in progress on anew variety of probabilistic unfolding theories, 
based on the features of feasible alternatives rather than on global dissimilarity 
comparisons (Candel, 1989). 
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We want to finish this set of reflections with a second view at the results of 
our experiments. From the assortment of theories on probabilistic unfolding 
that can be found in the literature after 1959, the year of Coombs' first proposal, 
only a minority seemed applicable to our models of data. This minority is 
functionally similar to Coombs' original random coordinate theory. Despite 
the factthat amajonty of theories on probabilistic unfolding, both in and outside 
the unfoldmg paradigm, expect strong or even strict stochastic transitivity in 
probabilistic choice behavior, we found little evidence for this kind of con-
sistency. This can be related to our experimental multiple-judgment design but, 
as such, it should serve as a warning to future choice modelers. 
One probabilistic choice model - the random coordinate model with single 
sampling of the ideal coordinate - seemed an apt description of all structures 
of binary choice frequencies we collected in these two experiments. Depending 
on the task, the variance of the ideal coordinate distribution can largely exceed 
all other variances, ultimately making the model functionally equivalent to a 
midpoint unfolding model. The fact that this random coordinate model is a 
model of the theory of unfolding's founding father, Clyde Coombs, is apleasant 
observation to end this dissertation. 
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Appendix A 
PSTRIX 
This appendix contains a selection of FORTRAN routines from the PSTRIX 
package. PSTRix was written as an implementation of the evaluation strategy 
described in Chapter 4. The complete package is available from the author. 
[PSTRIX.DOC) 
*# t# 
## 
##### ####• #### ##### ## ##### ##### 
## ## ## ## ## *# *# ## ## 
## ## ## ##### ## #* ## ## ##### 
## ## ## ## ## ## #t ## 
#*»## #***# ## ** «t #*#** *#*## 
ft 
## 
Solves senation problems 
with ordinal restrictions 
on binomial prooabilities 
(C) PMM Bossuyt Version v3.57 
Center for Clinical Decision Analysis January 7, 1990 
Erasmus University 
PO BOX 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Summary 
Conditions supported 
1 weak stochastic ranking 
2 moderate stochastic ranking 
3 strong stochastic transitivity 
5 characteristic monotomcity 
7 bilateral monotomcity 
8 bilateral/characteristic monotomcity 
9 Ideal Point condition IP.2 
These conditions will be implemented in future versions : 
4 quadruple condition 
6 midpoint monotomcity 
Requires : 
IBM PC or compatible with at least 200Kb free RAM, 
ANSI screen driver, MS/PC-DOS 2.0 or higher. 
A 80x87 floating-point coprocessor is not required 
but is used when present. 
VAX/VMS and UNIX versions are also available. 
Usage : 
PSTRIX [infile] [outfile] 
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Program flow 
The main program is called PSTRIX. Apart from calls to entries in 
UTILS, this program first calls GTDATA. This routine opens, reads and 
checks the infile specified on the command line, and opens the data 
and output files if necessary. PSTRIX then calls INIT. This routine 
formulates the restrictions, in terms of the indices of the ranking, 
and generates initial rankings for the isotonic regression algorithm, 
also in terms of the indices of the ranking. GTDATA reads the input 
frequencies, calculates the unconditional estimates and does some 
housework. PSTRIX then passes control to a specific subroutine, con­
ditional on the condition studied (CHWST, CHMST, . . . ) . 
The majority of these subroutines are highly similar. They 
initialize the solution storage, and the branching subroutine 
(BRANCH), look for an initial solution and then wander through the 
ranking tree, calculating the lower bound of the ob]ective function 
for the corresponding subset of rankings. This is done by passing the 
vector that translates the ranking indices to the original indices 
(i.e. the indices of the data file). The routines calls CHSOL to 
check, store and write the solutions. 
Porting PSTRIX 
Porting the program to other systems should not prove to be too dif­
ficult. The program does not use strict FORTRAN 77 syntax, but makes 
only moderate use of extensions, mostly in the declarations (e.g 
REAL*8, INTEGER*2) All device-specific routines are grouped under 
UTILS.FOR, except for some code in GTPARS.FOR to parse the command 
line. In the code included in this package, there is no mixing of 
languages, and ANSI escape sequences are used to control screen col­
ors and cursor positioning. These routines can be replaced by others 
(MASM, C, ...) for improved efficiency and speed. 
PROGRAM PSTRIX 
С Description 
С 
С 
С PSTRIX is the main program of the PSTRIX package, a program 
С that finds a maximum likelihood ranking (and maximum likelihood 
С estimates of probabilities) under a variety of generic ordinal 
С restrictions on the probabilities. See PSTRIX.DOC for details. 
С 
С Variables 
С 
С 
С LEV level in permutation tree 
С LEVEL condition indicator 
С MRA number of alternatives 
С NRP number of pairs in NRA 
С NRQ number of pairs in NRP 
С NRRUNS requested number of analyses 
С 
С: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : 
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (P,X) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER (I-N,R) 
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (Q) 
c 
С write title screen, read parameters 
c 
CALL TITPRT 
CALL GTPARS (NRA, LEVEL, NRRUNS, QERROR) 
IF (QERROR) STOP 
CALL LEVPRT (LEVEL) 
c 
С initialize restrictions 
c 
NRA2- NRA*NRA 
153 
NRP - (NBA* (NRA-l))/2 
NRQ - (NRP* (NRP-1) )/2 
CALL INIT (MRA, NRP, NRQ, LEVEL) 
SSTART- SECNDS(0.) 
С start major loop for NRRUNS analyses 
c 
DO 99 IRUN-1,NRRUNS 
CALL GTDATA (NRA.QERROR) 
IF (QERROR) STOP 
CALL NRRPRT (IRUN) 
IF (LEVEL.EQ.l) THEN 
CALL CHWST (NRA, .FALSE.) 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.2) THEN 
CALL CHMST (NRA,NRP) 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.3) THEN 
CALL CHSST (NRA, NRP) 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.5) THEN 
CALL CHCHMO (NRA, NRP) 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.7) THEN 
CALL CHBBMO (NRA, NRP,NRQ) 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.S) THEN 
CALL CHBCMO (NRA, NRP,NRQ) 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ 9) THEN 
CALL CHIP2 (NRA,MRP,NRQ) 
ELSE 
CALL ERRMSG 
+ ('This condition is not implemented yet. Sorry.') 
STOP 
END IF 
99 CONTINUE 
SSTOP- SECNDS (SSTART) 
CALL ENDPRT(SSTOP) 
STOP 
END 
BLOCK DATA PBLOCK 
С Function 
С 
С 
С D e f i n e s t h e Common Blocks u s e d i n t h e s u b r o u t i n e s 
С c a l l e d by PSTRIX and i n i t i a l i z e s them 
С 
С CHECK 
С contains the ordinal restrictions 
С QCHECK true if restricted 
С QCHBCM true if restricted (extra BCM set) 
С IRL ranking left els on input to PSHUFL 
С IRR ranking right els on input to PSHUFL 
С IRDIM dim of IRL IRR 
С 
С ENVIR 
С various LUN's and I/O flags 
С XFIX initial cutting criterion 
С XCON convergence criterion 
С XCON convergence criterion 
С FMT input format 
С U N IOUT IHIS LLJN input data output history (obsolete) 
С QPRINT extensive listing flag 
С QSCRN screen log flag 
С IFIX fixed ranking indicator 
С I0RO 1 or more optimal solutions 
С 
С LEVNAM 
С names of conditions in LNAME 
С 
С OBSERV 
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С i n p u t o b s e r v a t i o n s 
С PROP p r o p o r t i o n s ( u n c o n d i t i o n a l e s t i m a t e s ) 
С LNP l o g PROP 
С IFR input frequencies 
С XX potential contributions ob] function WS ranking 
С 
С PSHARG 
С arguments to PSHUFL 
С RL left indices 
С RR right indices 
С 
С RELEAS 
С version information 
С VERS version number 
С VDATE date 
С COMPIL compiler / OS used 
С 
С SYM 
С lookup table MM for matrix->vector function 
С 
С TREE 
С position vector KA for permutation tree (BRANCH) 
С 
С: : : : : : : : ¡ : : • : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : · : : : : : : : 
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (Ρ,Χ) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER (I-N,R) 
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (Q) 
PARAMETER (MXA-13, MXA2=MXA**2, 
+ MXP-(MXA* (MXA-1) ) /2, MXQ= (MXP* (MXP-1) ) 12, 
+ MXP2 » MXP**2/ MXQA - MXQ-MXA, MXPA- MXP*MXA) 
LOGICAL* 1 QCHECK (MXQ, MXA) , QCHBCM (MXQ, MXA) 
INTEGER IRL (MXP, MXA), IRR (MXP, MXA) , IRDIM(MXA) 
COMMON /CHECK/ IRDIM, IRL, IRR, QCHECK, QCHBCM 
CHARACTER*20 FMT 
COMMON /ENVIR / XFIX, XCON, RFIX (MXA) , FMT, 
+ UN, IOOT,IHIS,QPRINT,QSCRN, IFIX, IORD 
CHARACTER*38 LNAME(9) 
COMMON /LEVNAM/ LNAME 
REAL* 8 PROP (MXA, MXA) , LNP (MXA, MXA) , XX (MXP) 
INTEGER IFR (MXA, MXA) 
COMMON /OBSERV/ PROP , LNP, XX, IFR 
COMMON /PSHARG/ RL (MXP) ,RR (MXP) 
CHARACTER*18 VERS, VDATE,COMPIL 
COMMON /RELEAS/ VERS, VDATE, COMP IL 
COMMON /SYM / MM (MXP,MXP) 
COMMON /TABLE / Ρ (MXA, MXA) , RA (MXA) , QXX (MXP) 
COMMON /TREE / KA(MXP) 
CHECK 
DATA 
DATA 
ENVIR 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
LEVNAM 
DATA 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
OBSERV 
DATA 
DATA 
DATA 
RELEAS 
IRDIM 
I R L , Ι Ρ Λ 
/ MXA*0 / 
/ MXP A* 0, MXPA* 0 / 
XFIX,XCON / . 1 D + 6 0 , 1D-06 / 
RFIX / MXA*0 / 
U N , IOUT, I H I S / 9, 10, 11 / 
LNAME / ' Weak s t o c h a s t i c r a n k i n g ' , 
' M o d e r a t e s t o c h a s t i c r a n k i n g ' , 
' S t r o n g s t o c h a s t i c t r a n s i t i v i t y ' , 
' Q u a d r u p l e c o n d i t i o n ' , 
' C h a r a c t e r i s t i c m o n o t o n i c i t y ' , 
' M i d p o i n t m o n o t o n i c i t y ' , 
' B i l a t e r a l m o n o t o n i c i t y ' , 
' B i l a t e r a l / C h a r a c t e r i s t i c m o n o t o n i c i t y ' , 
' I d e a l P o i n t C o n d i t i o n I P . 2 ' / 
PROP,LNP / MXA2*O.D0, MXA2*0.D0 / 
XX / MXP*0 DO / 
IFR / MXA2*0 / 
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DATA VERS / 'MS-DOS v3.57' / 
DATA VDATE / 'January 7, 1989' / 
DATA COMPIL / 'MS-Fortran 4.1' / 
С SYM 
DATA MM / MXP2*0 / 
С TREE 
DATA KA / MXP*0 / 
С TABLE 
DATA Ρ / MXA2*0.D0 / 
DATA RA / MXA*0 / 
DATA QXX / MXP*.FALSE. / 
END 
SUBROUTINE INIT (NRA,NRP,NRQ, LEVEL) 
С Function 
С 
С 
С Performs some preliminary calculations, to save time while 
С examining the permutation tree later on. 
С First, the look up table for the function MM is initialized. 
С MM(i,]) returns the entry in a vector in which the upper 
С diagonal cell (1,3) of a matrix is stored. 
С For SST and CM, the program generates a ranking of all (1,3) 
С entries in the matrix of probs that is known to be isotonic wrt 
С all restrictions of SST CM. 
С 
С INBBMO 
С Generate restrictions & rankings for subtrees of bilateral 
С (Bilateral/characteristic) monotonicity 
С 
С Calls none 
С 
С 
С Parameters 
С 
С 
С LEVEL condition indicator 
С MRA number of alternatives 
С NRP number of pairs in NRA 
С NRQ number of pairs in NRP 
С QBM true if called from CHBBMO (INBBMO) 
С 
С::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : 
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (P,X) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER (I-N,R) 
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (Q) 
PARAMETER (MXA-13, MXA2-MXA**2, 
+ MXP-(MXA*(MXA-1) )/2, MXQ-(MXP* (MXP-1) )/2) 
INTEGER MM (MXP,MXP) 
COMMON /SYM /MM 
LOGICAL*! QCHECK(MXQ,MXA) , QCHBCM (MXQ, MXA) 
INTEGER IRL(MXP,MXA) , IRR (MXP,MXA) , IRDIM (MXA) 
COMMON /CHECK / IRDIM, IRL, IRR, QCHECK, QCHBCM 
INTEGER*2 MKEEP(MXP) 
LOGICAL*! QBM 
C - . - — — — — — — — — — . — — — — — — — . — — — — — » 
c 
С 0. Initialize look-up table (all routines) 
c 
К- о 
DO 02 I- 2,NRP 
II- 1-1 
K- K+II-1 
DO 02 J- 1,II 
MM (I, J ) - K+J 
MM(J,I)- K+J 
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02 CONTINUE 
IF (LEVEL.GT.6) RETURN 
С 
С 1.1 Generate a first set of restrictions (SST CM) 
c 
IF (LEVEL. EQ.3. OR. LEVEL. EQ. 5) THEN 
DO 10 I- 1,NRQ 
10 QCHECK(I,1)- .FALSE. 
NRAD - NRA-1 
NRADD- NRA-2 
DO 16 LEV- 2,NRA 
LEVI - LEV+1 
LEVII- LEV+2 
LEVD - LEV-1 
DO 12 I- 1,NRQ 
12 QCHECK(I,LEV)- QCHECK (I, LEVD) 
DO 14 I- LEVITRA 
QCHECK( MM(MM(LEV,I) , MM(LEVD,I)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
DO 14 J- 1,LEVD 
QCHECKf MM(MM(J,LEV) ,MM(J, I) ) , LEV)- .TRUE. 
14 CONTINUE 
16 CONTINUE 
END IF 
С 
С 1.2.1 Find the initial ranking (MST (2nd procedure) - SST) 
c 
IF ( LEVEL. EQ. 2. OR. LEVEL. EQ.3) THEN 
DO 24 LEV= 1,NRA 
13= 0 
DO 22 11= LEV,1,-1 
J2- 11+1 
DO 22 12- J2,NRA 
13- 13+1 
IRL( 13, LEV)- II 
IRR( 13, LEV)- 12 
22 CONTINUE 
IRDIM(LEV)- 13 
24 CONTINUE 
IF (LEVEL.EQ.2) RETURN 
ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.5) THEN 
c 
С 1.2.2 Find the initial ranking (CM) 
c 
DO 34 LEV- 1,NRA 
13= 0 
DO 32 II- 1,LEV 
J2- 11+1 
DO 32 12- J2,NRA 
13- 13+1 
IRL( 13, LEV)- II 
IRR( 13, LEV)- 12 
32 CONTINUE 
IRDIM(LEV)- 13 
34 CONTINUE 
END IF 
GOTO 70 
c
 + 
С 2. ENTRY FOR BILATERAL & CHARACTERISTIC MONOTONY | 
c
 + 
ENTRY INBBMO (INDEX, NRA,NRQ, QBM) 
NRAD - NRA-1 
NRADD- NRA-2 
INDEXI-INDEX+1 
INDEXD-INDEX-1 
c 
С 2.1 Generate a first set of restrictions (BM BCM) 
c 
DO 41 I- 1,NRQ 
QCHBCMd,!)- .FALSE. 
41 QCHECK(I,1)- .FALSE. 
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DO 47 LEV- 2,MRA 
LEVI - LEV+1 
LEVD - LEV-1 
LEVDD- LEV-2 
DO 42 I- l/NRQ 
42 QCHECK(I,LEV)- QCHECK(I, LEVD) 
DO 43 I- 1,LEVDD 
43 QCHECK( MM (MM (I, LEVD), MM(I,LEV)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
IF (LEV.LT. INDEX) THEN 
DO 44 J- 1,LEVD 
DO 44 I- LEVI,NRA 
44 QCHECK( MM(MM(J,I). MMfLEV,!)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
ELSE 
DO 45 I- LEVI,NRA 
45 QCHECK( MM (MM (LEVD, I) » MMfLEV,!)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
IF (QBM) THEN 
11= LEVD 
ELSE 
II- MIN(INDEX, LEVD) 
END IF 
DO 46 I- 1,11 
DO 46 J- LEVI,NRA 
46 QCHECK( MM (MM ( I, LEV) , MM(I,J)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
END IF 
47 CONTINUE 
c 
С Find the subset of restrictions for BCM 
c 
IF (.NOT.QBM) THEN 
DO 58 LEV=2,NRA 
LEVD - LEV-1 
LEVI - LEV+1 
DO 52 1= 1,NRQ 
52 QCHBCM (I, LEV) - QCHBCM (I, LEVD) 
IF (LEV.LE.INDEX) THEN 
DO 54 J-1,LEVD 
DO 54 I- LEVI, NBA 
54 QCHBCM( MM(MM(J,I), MM(LEV,I)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
END IF 
IF ( LEV. GE. INDEX) THEN 
DO 56 1=1,LEVD 
DO 56 J-LEVI,NRA 
56 QCHBCM( MM(MM(I,LEV) , MM(I,J)), LEV)- .TRUE. 
END IF 
58 CONTINUE 
END IF 
c 
С 2.2 Find the initial ranking 
c 
60 DO 69 LEV= 2,NRA 
Jl- MIN (LEV, INDEXD) 
13- 0 
DO 64 II- 1,J1 
J2= 11+1 
DO 63 12- INDEX, J2,-l 
13- 13+1 
IRL(I3, LEV)- II 
63 IRR(I3, LEV)- 12 
DO 65 12- INDEXI/NRA 
13- 13+1 
IRL(I3, LEV)- II 
65 IRR(I3, LEV)- 12 
64 CONTINUE 
DO 66 II- LEV,INDEX,-1 
J2- 11+1 
DO 66 12- J2,NRA 
13- 13+1 
IRL(I3, LEV)- II 
66 IRR(I3, LEV)- 12 
IRDIM(LEV)- 13 
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69 CONTINUE 
IF (.NOT.QBM) GOTO θО 
с 
С 3. perform a transitive closure on the restrictions (SST CM BM) 
c 
7 0 DO 78 LEV- 2 , NRA 
BÜL - IRDIM(LEV) 
RDLDD« IRDIM(LEV)-2 
DO 7 6 I I - 1,RDLDD 
M l - MM( I R L ( I 1 , L E V ) , IRR(I1 ,LEV) ) 
К - 0 
I I - 1 1 + 1 
DO 76 1 2 - I I , R D L 
M2- MM( I R L ( I 2 , L E V ) , IRR(I2 # LEV) ) 
IF ( QCHECK( MM(M1,M2), LEV) ) GOTO 74 
DO 72 I- 1,K 
IF ( QCHECKI MM(MKEEP(I) ,M2) , LEV) ) THEN 
QCHECK( MM(M1,M2), LEV)- .TRUE. 
GOTO 74 
END IF 
72 CONTINUE 
GOTO 7 6 
74 К- K+l 
MKEEP (K) - M2 
7 6 CONTINUE 
78 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
c 
С 3.b perform a transitive closure on the restrictions (BCM) 
c 
80 DO 88 LEV= 2, NRA 
RDL - IRDIM(LEV) 
RDLDD- IRDIM(LEV)-2 
DO 8 6 I I - 1,RDLDD 
M l - MM( I R L ( I 1 , L E V ) , IRR(I1,LEV) ) 
К = 0 
I I - 1 1 + 1 
DO 86 1 2 - I I , R D L 
M2- MM( I R L ( I 2 , L E V ) , IRR(I2,LEV) ) 
IF ( QCHBCM( MM(M1,M2), LEV) ) GOTO 84 
DO 82 I- 1,K 
IF ( QCHBCM( MM (MKEEP (I) ,M2) , LEV) ) THEN 
QCHBCM( MM(M1,M2), LEV)- .TRUE. 
GOTO 84 
END IF 
82 CONTINUE 
GOTO 86 
84 K- K+l 
MKEEP (K) - M2 
86 CONTINUE 
88 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE CHSST (NRA/NRP) 
С Function 
С 
С 
С Finds maximum likelihood estimates of probabilities under 
С strong stochastic transitivity / ml strong stochastic ranking 
С 
С Calls 
С 
С 
С clrprt, chwst , solfi!, inibra, inisol, raprt, enter, 
С chsol, stpsol, branch, wrpsol, wrsol 
С 
Parameters 
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С 
С NRA number of alternatives 
С NRP number of pairs in NRA 
С 
С Local variables 
С 
С 
С LEV level in permutation tree 
С Q50 check > .5 flag (PSHUFL) 
С RDIM length of RL RR (passed to PSHUFL) 
С XPERM value Of ob] function 
С XDIFF convergence criterion 
С XSOL current solution value ob] function 
С 
С: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : 
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (P,X) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER (I-N,R) 
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (Q) 
PARAMETER (MXA-13, MXA2-MXA«*2, 
+ MXP-(MXA*(MXA-1) )/2, MXQ-(MXP*(MXP-1))/2) 
PARAMETER (MXTR- (MXA* (MXA-1) * (MXA-2) ) / 6, MXITER- 500) 
CHARACTER* 20 FMT 
COMMON /ENVIR / XFIX,XCON,RFIX(MXA) ,FMT, 
+ UN, IOUT, IHIS,QPRINT,QSCRN, IFIX, IORD 
REAL*8 PROP (MXA, MXA) , LNP (MXA, MXA) , XX (MXP) 
INTEGER IFR (MXA, MXA) 
COMMON /OBSERV/ PROP, LNP, XX, IFR 
COMMON /SYM / MM (MXP,MXP) 
LOGICAL*! QCHECK(MXQ,MXA) , QCHBCM (MXQ, MXA) 
INTEGER IRL(MXP,MXA) , IRR (MXP, MXA) , IRDIM(MXA) 
COMMON /CHECK / IRDIM, IRL, IRR, QCHECK, QCHBCM 
COMMON /TABLE / Ρ (MXA,MXA) , RA (MXA) , QXX (MXP) 
COMMON /PSHARG/ RL (MXP) , RR (MXP) 
С () Prepare 
NRAD- NRA-1 
Q50 - .TRUE. 
IF (QSCRN) CALL CLRPRT 
c 
С determine the initial permutation; find the ML dominance ranking 
С if no initial permutation is specified 
c 
IF (IFIX.EQ.O) THEN 
CALL CHWST (NRA,.TRUE.) 
CALL SOLFIL (NRA) 
ELSE 
DO 10 1-1, NRA 
10 RA(I)- RFIX(I) 
END IF 
c 
С initialize the branching subroutine, initialize solution storage, 
c 
CALL INIBRA (NRA) 
CALL INI SOL (NRA) 
XSOL- XFIX 
С () Start search through permutation tree (loop between 30 and 40) 
IF (XFIX.LT.l.D+30) THEN 
LEV- 2 
ELSE 
LEV- NRAD 
END IF 
c 
С Initialize estimates, pool indicator, increment level if necessary 
c 
30 IF (LEV.EQ.l) LEV- LEV+1 
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IF (QSCRN) CALL RAPRT (RA, LEV) 
c 
С Calculate objective function for first set of restrictions 
c 
XPERM- 0.D0 
DO 42 I-1,LEV 
II-I+l 
DO 42 J-II,NRA 
IF ( IFR(RA(I) ,RA(J) ) .LT. IFR (RA ( J) ,RA (I) ) ) 
+ XPERM- XPERM + XX (MM (RA(I) ,RA ( J) ) ) 
42 CONTINUE 
IF (XPERM. GT.XSOL) THEN 
GOTO 80 
ELSE IF (IORD.NE.0.AND.XPERM.EQ.XSOL) THEN 
GOTO Θ0 
END IF 
c 
С find the ml estimates for the complete set of restrictions.. 
c 
DO 52 I- 1,NRA 
DO 52 J- 1,NRA 
52 Ρ (I, J)- PROP (I, J) 
DO 54 1= 1,NRP 
54 QXX(I)- .FALSE. 
RDIM= IRDIM(LEV) 
DO 56 I=-1,RDIM 
RL(I)= IRLCLEV) 
56 RR(I)- IRR(I,LEV) 
CALL PSHUFL (RDIM, LEV, Q50) 
c 
С now compute the upper bound, and find out if we have to cut this 
С branch, if this is a new temp, solution.. 
c 
60 CALL CRITER (NRA,XPERM) 
IF (XPERM.GT.XSOL) THEN 
CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (IORD.NE.0.AND.XPERM.EQ.XSOL) THEN 
CONTINUE 
ELSE 
LEV- LEV+1 
IF (LEV.LT.NRA) THEN 
GOTO 30 
ELSE 
CALL CHSOL (NRA, XPERM,XSOL, *90, *80) 
IF (QPRINT) CALL STPSOL (NRA) 
END IF 
END IF 
c 
С make the next move in the permutation tree 
c 
80 IF (IFIX.LT.2) THEN 
CALL BRANCH (NRA, LEV, RA, *90) 
GOTO 30 
END IF 
c 
С write out the solution if we want to 
c 
90 IF (.NOT.QPRINT) THEN 
WRITE (IOUT,*) XSOL 
RETURN 
ELSE IF (XSOL.EQ.0.D0) THEN 
CALL WRPSOL (MRA, XSOL) 
RETURN 
ELSE 
CALL WRSOL (NRA,XSOL) 
RETURN 
END IF 
END 
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SUBROUTINE PSHUFL (RDIM, LEV, Q50) 
С 
С Function 
С 
С 
С Finds the maximum likelihood estimates of the binomial 
С probabilities under ordinal restrictions. 
С 
С These restrictions are conditional on a ranking of the 
С alternatives. RA(i) returns the element currently at position ι 
С in this ranking. Whether or not an ordinal restriction exists 
С can be determined by examining QCHECK. Entries in QCHECK 
С contain matrix-to-vector translations MM, based on the 
С position indices 
С 
С QCHECK[ MM( MM(i,]),MM(i,k)) ] - .TRUE. 
С 
С means that a restriction exists between 
С 
С P[RA(i) ,RA(:) ] 5 P[RA(i) ,RA(k) ] 
С 
С The observed frequencies are in the common block DATA: 
С IFR(i,3). The unconditional estimates are also in the common 
С block DATA: PROPd,]). Initially, all pairs (i,]) are organized 
С in a QCHECK-isotonic ranking, indicated by the vectors 
С RL (left) and RR (right). 
С 
С QCHECK[ MM( MM(RL(i) ,RR(i) ) ,MM(RL(k) ,RR(k) ) ) ] = .TRUE. 
С -> ι < к 
С 
С The pair of vectors RL(i),RR(]) return the left, right element 
С resp. at position at position ι in the ranking. These are not 
С the original indices, but positions in the ranking of the 
С alternatives. The original indices are returned by RL(RA(i)). 
С The algorithm will modify the ranking, but it has to remain 
С QCHECK-consistent. 
С 
С The set Y of pairs is always partitioned into Tl and T2. All 
С elements 1-INP are in Tl, the remaining in T2. Within Tl, the 
С ml estimates, conditional on the subset of restrictions for Tl 
С only, have been found; furthermore, the ranking of the couples 
С is isotonically related to a ranking of the corresponding 
С (conditional) estimates. Thes estimates are stored in P. 
С 
С The subset Tl of all ordered couples [RL(i),RR(i)] is 
С partitioned in a number of solution blocks. In a solution 
С block, the estimates for all couples are equal to the weighted 
С average of the unconditional estimates (weighted by the number 
С of frequencies). The algorithm tries to partition the solution 
С blocks as far as possible, without violating the ordinal 
С restrictions. 
С 
С The QPOOL flags for the solution blocks work as follows : 
С QPOOL(ι) is true if the couples at positions i-l and ι are xn 
С the same solution block. 
С Example: assume that {1,2,3) {4,5) {6) {7,8,9,10) (11,12) are 
С the solution blocks 
С 
С 1 - 2 - 3 4 - 5 6 7 - 8 - 9 -10 11 -12 
С F T T F T F F T T T F T 
С 
С C a l l s 
С 
С 
С попе 
С 
С P a r a m e t e r s 
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С 
С 
С LEV level in permutation tree 
С Q50 check > .5 flag (PSHUFL) 
С RDIM length of RL RR (passed to PSHUFL) 
С 
С Local variables 
С 
С 
С IBOTX lowest index block L to active one 
С QPOOL block flags 
С INOMX nominator average L to active one 
С IX subset indicator step 4 
С IN4 vector of indices Bl m step 4 
С ITOPX highest index block L to active one 
С ITOPKP memory for ITOP 
С IDEN denominator active block 
С INOM nominator active block 
С IPTR pointer in step 4 
С INP lowest index T2 
С NRIN4 number of els in Bl (step 4) 
С IBOT lowest index active block 
С 1RES restricting element 
С IDENX denominator average L to active one 
С ITOP . . . highest index active block 
С 
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (Ο,Ρ,Χ) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER (I-N.R) 
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (Q) 
PARAMETER (MXA-13, MXA2=MXA**2, MXP-= (MXA* (MXA-1) ) /2, 
+ MXQ-(MXP* (MXP-1) )/2 ,MXP2= MXP*2) 
REAL* 8 PROP (MXA,MXA),LNP (MXA, MXA) ,ΧΧ(ΜΧΡ) 
INTEGER IFR (MXA,MXA) 
COMMON /OBSERV/ PROP,LNP, XX, IFR 
COMMON /SYM / ΜΜ(ΜΧΡ,ΜΧΡ) 
LOGICAL*! QCHECK(MXQ,MXA) , QCHBCM (MXQ, MXA) 
INTEGER IRL(MXP,MXA) , IRR (MXP, MXA) , IFDIM(MXA) 
COMMON /CHECK / IRDIM,IRL, IRR, QCHECK, QCHBCM 
COMMON /TABLE / Ρ (MXA, MXA) , RA (MXA) , QXX (MXP) 
COMMON /PSHARG / RL (MXP) ,RR (MXP) 
INTEGERM INOM, IDEN, INOMX, IDENX 
LOGICAL*! QPOOL(MXP) 
INTEGER IN4 (MXP) , IX (MXP) 
A * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* (0) Make the necessary preparations (pool flags) 
* Initially, Tl contains the couple [(RL(1),RR(1)] 
********************************************************************* 
DO 02 I- 1,RDIM 
02 QPOOL(I)- FALSE. 
INP- 2 
********************************************************************* 
* (1) Examine the restrictions between the couples in Tl and the 
* active couple [RL(INP),RR(INP) ] 
********************************************************************* 
10 INPD- INP-1 
c 
С Check whether there exists a restriction between [RL(INP),RR(INP)] 
С and one the couples currently in Tl, 
С - if there is none, insert [RL (INP),RR(INP)] based on the value of 
С its unconditional estimate (12) 
С - if there is one, insert [RL (INP),RR(INP)] to the right of the 
С solution block with the restricting element [RL(1RES),RR(1RES)] 
С (20) 
С 
Ml- MM( RL(INP),RR(INP) ) 
DO 11 1= INPD,1,-1 
IF ( .NOT.QCHECK( MM (MM (RL (I ) , RR (I) ) ,M1) , LEV ) ) GOTO 11 
1RES - I 
IRESI- 1+1 
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IF (P(RA(RL(I)) ,RA(RR(I))) .GT. 
+ P(RA(RL(INP) ) ,RA(RR(INP) ) ) ) THEN 
GOTO 20 
ELSE 
GOTO 12 
END IF 
11 CONTINUE 
IRESI- 1 
12 DO 13 I- INPD,IRESI,-1 
IF (P(RA(RL(I)) ,RA(RR(I)) ) .GT. 
+ P(RA(RL(INP) ),RA(RR(INP) ) ) ) GOTO 13 
Jl- 1+1 
GOTO 14 
13 CONTINUE 
Jl- IRESI 
14 IF (Jl.NE.INP) THEN 
RSET1- RL(INP) 
RSET2- RR(INP) 
QSET - QPOOL(INP) 
J2- Jl+l 
DO 15 I- INP,J2,-1 
RL(I) - RL(I-l) 
RR(I) - RR(I-l) 
15 QPOOL(I) - QPOOL(I-l) 
RL(J1)- RSET1 
RR(J1)- RSET2 
QPOOL(Jl)- QSET 
END IF 
GOTO 70 
********************************************************************* 
* (2) Add t h e a c t i v e couple to i t s s o l u t i o n block 
********************************************************************* 
c 
С Determine the position ITOP in the permutation, immediately to the 
С right of the solution block to which the restricting element 
С [RL(IRES) ,RR(IRES)] belongs - use the QPOOL flags. 
С Insert [RL(INP),RR(INP)] at position ITOP in Tl. 
c 
20 DO 21 I- IRESI,INPD 
IF (QPOOL (I) ) GOTO 21 
ITOP- I 
GOTO 22 
21 CONTINUE 
ITOP- INP 
GOTO 24 
22 RSET1- RL(INP) 
RSET2- RR(INP) 
J2- ITOP+1 
DO 23 I- INP,J2,-1 
QPOOL (I)- QPOOL (1-1) 
RL(I)= RL(I-l) 
23 RR(I)= RR(I-l) 
RL(ITOP)- RSET1 
RR(ITOP)» RSET2 
24 QPOOL(ITOP)- .TRUE. 
c 
С Determine the position IBOT in the permutation, immediately to the 
С left of the solution block to which the restricting element 
С [RL(1RES),RR(1RES)] belongs - use the QPOOL flags 
c 
DO 25 I- 1RES,1,-1 
IF (QPOOL(I)) GOTO 25 
IBOT- I 
GOTO 2 6 
25 CONTINUE 
26 CONTINUE 
********************************************************************* 
* (3) Calculated the weighted average of the unconditional estimates 
* in the solution block IBOT-ITOP 
********************************************************************* 
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30 INOM- 0 
IDEN- О 
DO 31 1= ΙΒΟΤ,ΙΤΟΡ 
INOM- INOM+ IFR(RA(RL(I) l.RAfRRd) ) ) 
31 IDEN- IDEN+ IFR(RA(RR (I)),RA (RL(I))) 
IDEN- IDEN+ INOM 
С Remember the position of the rightmost element of this 
С solution block 
c 
ITOPKP - ITOP 
********************************************************************* 
* (4) Try to find an R-consistent partition of the current solution 
* block into subsets B1-B2 
* 
* IN4 : a history stack 
* NRIN4: number of els in IN4 
* IX : subset index 0: kernel (АО) 
* 1: included (Al) 
* 2: enforced (A2) 
* 3: excluded (A3) 
* 4: prohibited (A4) 
* IPTR : pointer 
********************************************************************* 
c 
С (4.a) Form Bl, with the element at itop and the restricting els 
c 
402 IF ((ITOP-IBOT).EQ.l) GOTOSO 
ITOPD- ITOP-1 
IX(ITOP)- 0 
NRIN4 = 1 
IN4 (1) - ITOP 
Ml- MM(RL(ITOP) ,RR(ITOP) ) 
DO 404 I- ITOPD, IBOT, -1 
IF (QCHECK (MM (MM(RL(I),RR(I) ) , Ml), LEV)) THEN 
IPTR - I 
IX(I) = 0 
NRIN4 - NRIN4 + 1 
IN4(NRIN4)- I 
ELSE 
IX(I) - 3 
END IF 
404 CONTINUE 
IF (NRIN4.EQ. (ITOP + 1-IBOT) ) GOTOSO 
c 
С (4.b) Calculate the weighted average of A0, Al and A2 els in Bl 
С If lower, we have an R-consistent partition 
c 
412 INOMX- 0 
IDENX- 0 
DO 414 Ι- ΙΒΟΤ,ΙΤΟΡ 
IF (IX(I).GT.2) GOTO 414 
INOMX- INOMX+ IFR(RA(RL(I) ) ,RA(RR(I) ) ) 
IDENX- IDENX+ IFR (RA (RR(I) ) , RA (RL (I) ) ) 
414 CONTINUE 
IDENX- IDENX+ INOMX 
IF ( (INOMX*IDEN) .GE. (INOM*IDENX) ) GOTO 432 
c 
С (4.e) Push the els of B2 to the right of B, recursively look for a 
С partition of Bl. 
c 
INOM- INOMX 
IDEN- IDENX 
Jl- ITOP 
DO 428 I- IBOT, Jl 
IF (IX(I).LT.3) GOTO 428 
J2- 1+1 
DO 4 22 J3- J2,ITOP 
422 IF (IX(J3) .LT.3) GOTO 424 
ITOP- 1-1 
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GOTO 429 
424 RSETl- RL(J3) 
RSET2- RR(J3) 
ISET - IX<J3) 
DO 426 J- J3,J2,-1 
IX(J)- IX(J-l) 
RL(J)- RL(J-l) 
426 RR(J)- RR(J-l) 
RL(I)- RSETl 
RR (I)- RSET2 
IX (I)- ISET 
428 CONTINUE 
429 GOTO 402 
С (4.с) Check iptr+1, itopd for the first excluded element lact with 
С a restriction 
c 
432 Jl- IPTR+1 
DO 436 I- Jl, ITOPD 
IF (IX(I).NE.3) GOTO 436 
Ml- MM(RL(I) ,RR(I) ) 
J2=- 1-1 
DO 434 J- IBOT,J2 
IF (IX(J).GT.2) GOTO 434 
IF (.NOT.QCHECK(MM(MM(RL(J) ,RR(J) ) ,M1) , LEV)) GOTO 434 
IPTR-= I 
GOTO 438 
4 34 CONTINUE 
436 CONTINUE 
GOTO 440 
c 
С iptr-iact, iact a free el add enforced els to A2 
c 
438 IX(IPTR)- 1 
NRIN4 - NRIN4 + 1 
IN4(NRIN4)- IPTR 
Jl- IPTR-1 
DO 439 I- Jl, IBOT, -1 
IF (.NOT.QCHECK(MM(MM(RL(I) ,RR(I) ) ,M1) , LEV) ) GOTO 439 
IF (IX(I) .EQ.3) THEN 
NRIN4- NRIN4+1 
IN4 (NRIN4)- I 
END IF 
IX(I)- 2 
IPTR- I 
439 CONTINUE 
GOTO 412 
c 
С (4.d) Check Bl for the last (free) el added to Al, make it 
С prohibited, as with all restricted els; move els added later 
С to A2 A4 to A3 
С go on checking if no els were freed from A4 to A3 
c 
440 DO 449 I- NRIN4, 2, -1 
L- IN4 ( I ) 
IF (IX(L).NE.l) GOTO 449 
IPTR- L 
IX (L)- 4 
Jl- 1+1 
DO 442 J- J1,NRIN4 
442 IF (IX(IN4 (J) ) .EQ.4) GOTO 444 
GOTO 449 
444 DO 446 J- NRIN4, Jl, -1 
446 IX(IN4 (I) )- 3 
NRIN4- NRIN4-I 
Ml- MM(RL(L) ,RR(L) ) 
Jl- L+l 
DO 44 8 J- Jl, ITOPD 
IF ( .NOT.QCHECK(MM(MM(RL(J) ,RR(J) ) ,ΜΙ) , LEV) ) GOTO 448 
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IF (IX(I).EQ.3) THEN 
NRIN4- NRIN4+1 
IN4 (NRIN4)- J 
END IF 
IX(J)- 4 
44Θ CONTINUE 
GOTO 432 
44 9 CONTINUE 
********************************************************************* 
* (5) Assign new estimates in the current solution block, give all 
* els moved to T2 their unconditional estimates 
********************************************************************* 
50 XDUM - DFLOAT(INOM) /DFLOAT (IDEN) 
XDUMC- 1.D0-XDUM 
DO 52 I- IBOT,ITOP 
P( RA(RL(I)), RA(RR(I)) ) - XDUM 
P( RA(RR(I)), RA(RL(I)) )- XDUMC 
QXX(MM(RA(RL(I) ) , RA(RR(I))))- .TRUE. 
52 CONTINUE 
IF (ITOPKP.NE.ITOP) THEN 
Jl- ITOP+1 
DO 54 1= J1,IT0PKP 
QPOOL(I)» .FALSE. 
P( RA(RL(I)), RA(RR(I)) )- PROP ( RA(RL(I)), RA(RR(I)) ) 
P( RA(RR(I)), RA(RL(I)) )- PROP ( RA(RR(I)), RA(RL(I)) ) 
QXX(MM(RA(RL(I) ) , RA (RR(I) ) ) ) - .FALSE. 
54 CONTINUE 
INP= ITOP 
END IF 
********************************************************************* 
* (6) Check the isotonicity of the permutation and the estimates in 
С Tl 
********************************************************************* 
c 
С if there is only one block, everything is OK 
С if the isotonicity is satisfied, everything is OK 
c 
60 IF (IBOT.EQ.l) GOTO 70 
ITOPX- IBOT-1 
IF (P (RA (RL( ITOPX) ), RA (RR (ITOPX) ) ) .LE. 
+ Ρ (RA(RL(IBOT) ) ,RA(RR(IBOT) )) ) GOTO 70 
c 
С if not, determine the rightmost position of the block to the left 
С and check if the blocks are independent 
С - if they are not, join the blocks by resetting IBOT 
c 
DO 62 IBOTX- ITOPX,1,-1 
62 IF (.NOT.QPOOL(IBOTX)) GOTO 63 
63 DO 64 I- IBOTX,ITOPX 
Ml- MM(RL(I) ,RR(I) ) 
DO 64 J- IBOT,ITOP 
IF (.NOT.QCHECKf MM (MM(RL (J) , RR( J) ) , Ml) , LEV) ) GOTO 64 
QPOOL(IBOT)- .TRUE. 
IBOT- IBOTX 
GOTO 30 
64 CONTINUE 
c 
С - if they are independent, interchange the blocks.. 
c 
Jl- IBOT-IBOTX 
J2- ITOP-1 
DO 66 J- 1,J1 
RSET1- RL(IBOTX) 
RSET2- RR(IBOTX) 
QSET- QPOOL(IBOTX) 
DO 65 I- IBOTX,J2 
RL(I)- RL(I + 1) 
RR(I)- RR(I + 1) 
65 QPOOL(I)- QPOOL(I + l) 
RL(ITOP)- RSET1 
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RR(ITOP)- RSET2 
QPOOL(ITOP)- QSET 
66 CONTINUE 
c 
С ..and go on checking 
c 
IBOT- IBOTX 
ITOP- ITOP-J1 
GOTO 60 
* (7) Check if there any elements left in T2, make the leftmost 
* active 
A * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
70 IF (INP.LT.RDIM) THEN 
INP- INP+1 
GOTO 10 
END IF 
IF (Q50) THEN 
IF ( P(RA(RL(1) ) ,RA(RR(1) )) .LT.O.S) THEN 
DO 72 I- 1,RDIM 
IF (P(RA(RL(I) ) ,RA(RR(I) ) ) .GE.0.5) GOTO 74 
P( RA(RL(I) ) ,RA(RR(I) ) ) - .5 
P( RA(RR(I) ) ,RA(RL(I) ) ) - .5 
QXX(MM(RA(RL(I) ) ,RA(RR(I) ) ))- .TRUE. 
72 CONTINUE 
74 CONTINUE 
END IF 
END IF 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE BRANCH (NRA, LEV, RA, *) 
С Function 
С 
С 
С Branching routine - generates all branches of permutation tree 
С This subroutine is called to branch to the next node at level 
С LEV, thereby generating a new subset of the set of all 
С permuations of the NRA elements. 
С 
С What happens depends on the circumstances. The algorithm 
С backtracks to the node LEV-1. If there is a branch left that 
С has not been previously explored, the algorithm advances along 
С this branch to a new node at level LEV. The new subset of 
С permutations share the LEV-1 leftmost elements with the 
С previous one. If all branches to level LEV from this node have 
С been examined, the algorithm backtracks along the path to the 
С node at level LEV-2, and checks if all branches have been 
С examined. If, finally, the algorithm backtracks to level 1 and 
С all branches have been examined, the search is finished 
С (RETURN 1) . 
С 
С At all times, the vector RA contains a permutation of the NRA 
С elements, where RA(i) contains the index of the element at the 
С i'th position in the permutation. 
С 
С Before a permutation tree can be explored, the vector KA has to 
С hold the number of branches from each node. Actually KA(i) 
С contains the value (NRA+1 - number of branches from each node 
С at level i). This is achived by making a initial call to 
С INIBRA. 
С When a call to BRANCH is made, the algorithm examines the value 
С of KA(ind). If this value doesn't equals NRA, the next branch 
С is examined. This is achieved by incrementing KA(ind), and 
С reversing the elements RA(ind) and RA(KA(ind)). If the value of 
С KA(ind) equals NRA 
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С (1) and LEV-1, the search is finished, 
С (2) and LEV<NRA the indices in LEV-(NRA-l) are shifted to the 
С left and the index in RA(LEV) is put in RA(NRA); that way, 
С the contents of RA(LEV) to RA(NRA) are the same as if the 
С first branch from LEV-1 to at node at level LEV had to be 
С examined, actally, KA(ind) is reset to LEV 
С (3) and LEV-NRA, the shift of (2) is not necessary 
С 
С Calls none 
С 
С 
С Parameters 
С 
С 
С LEV current level in permutation tree 
С NRA number of alternatives in tree 
С RA vector with current ranking 
С 
С Local variables 
С 
С 
С RSETl dummy used in interchanging 
С 
С: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (P,X) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER (I-N,R) 
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (Q) 
PARAMETER (MXA=13,MXP= (МХА* (MXA-1) )/2) 
INTEGER RA(МХА) 
COMMON /TREE / KA(MXP) 
c 
10 IF (KA(LEV).LT.NRA) THEN 
KA(LEV) = KA(LEV) + 1 
RSETl - RA (LEV) 
RA(LEV) -RA(KA(LEV)) 
RA(KA(LEV) )- RSETl 
RETURN 
ELSE IF (LEV.EQ.l) THEN 
RETURN 1 
ELSE IF (LEV.LT.NRA) THEN 
RSETl- RA(LEV) 
J- NRA-1 
DO 20 I- LEV,J 
20 RA(I)- RA(I + 1) 
RA (NRA)- RSETl 
END IF 
KA(LEV)- LEV 
LEV - LEV-1 
GO TO 10 
O — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — . — — . - » — » - — . -
ENTRY INIBRA (NRA) 
DO 50 I-1,NRA 
50 KA(I) - I 
RETURN 
END 
Appendix В 
Choice proportions 
Table B.I 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 1, task TR4. 
01 9i 9i 9» ft ft 07 9» ft Sm 
g, .500 .068 .052 .119 .068 .407 .276 .328 .508 .576 
д
г
 .932 .500 .000 .456 .241 .305 .475 .458 .593 .690 
g, .948 1.000 .500 .190 .237 .305 .724 .661 .746 .814 
ft .881 .544 .810 .500 .576 .793 .814 .966 .949 .948 
gs .932 .759 .763 .424 .500 .797 .898 .932 .983 1.000 
ft .593 .695 .695 .207 .203 .500 .931 .949 .949 .966 
g, .724 .525 .276 .186 .102 .069 .500 .915 .949 1.000 
g, .672 .542 .339 .034 .068 .051 .085 .500 .948 .915 
ft .492 .407 .254 .051 .017 .051 .051 .052 .500 .915 
Qn .424 .310 .186 .052 .000 .034 .000 .085 .085 .500 
Table B.2 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 1, task TR5. 
ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 010 
g, .500 .119 .034 .103 .085 .068 .288 .224 .407 .322 
ft .881 .500 .086 .034 .085 .069 .259 .390 .362 .491 
ft .966 .914 .500 .085 .155 .169 .390 .458 .789 .729 
ft .897 .966 .915 .500 .254 .339 .500 .672 .831 .847 
ft .915 .915 .845 .746 .500 .707 .966 .864 .897 .931 
ft .932 .931 .831 .661 .293 .500 .847 .914 .914 .947 
ft .712 .741 .610 .500 .034 .153 .500 .862 .949 .931 
ft .776 .610 .542 .328 .136 .086 .138 .500 .949 .966 
ft .593 .638 .211 .169 .103 .086 .051 .051 .500 .915 
ft, .678 .509 .271 .153 .069 .053 .069 .034 .085 .500 
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Table B.3 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task STG. 
& 
97 
(h 
9* 
9ь 
9e 
97 
9» 
ft 
010 
0I 
.500 
.910 
.906 
.896 
.881 
.940 
.818 
.836 
.806 
.803 
92 
.090 
.500 
.909 
.712 
.891 
.818 
.806 
.776 
.833 
.766 
A 
.094 
.091 
.500 
.896 
.866 
.851 
.731 
.754 
.677 
.621 
di 
.104 
.288 
.104 
.500 
.788 
.716 
.727 
.657 
.627 
.591 
ft 
.119 
.109 
.134 
.212 
.500 
.769 
.731 
.731 
.556 
.545 
ft 
.060 
.182 
.149 
.284 
.231 
.500 
.687 
.600 
.582 
.485 
ft 
.182 
.194 
.269 
.273 
.269 
.313 
.500 
.537 
.493 
.358 
ft 
.164 
.224 
.246 
,343 
.269 
.400 
.463 
.500 
.400 
.358 
ft 
.194 
.167 
.323 
.373 
.444 
.418 
.507 
.600 
.500 
.433 
fto 
.197 
.234 
.379 
.409 
.455 
.515 
.642 
.642 
.567 
.500 
Table B.4 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task N46. 
08 14 27 31 46 59 62 70 85 93 
08 
14 
27 
31 
46 
59 
62 
70 
85 
93 
.500 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
.976 
.988 
.867 
.659 
.500 
.000 
.500 
1.000 
.988 
1.000 
.976 
.964 
.798 
.452 
.386 
.000 
.000 
.500 
.988 
.988 
.906 
.795 
.524 
.310 
.183 
.000 
.012 
.012 
.500 
.988 
.855 
.530 
.458 
.313 
.098 
.000 
.000 
.012 
.013 
.500 
.398 
.402 
.325 
.000 
.012 
.024 
.024 
.094 
.145 
.602 
.500 
.000 
.012 
.025 
.000 
.012 
.036 
.205 
.470 
.598 
1.000 
.500 
.012 
.012 
.012 
.133 
.202 
.476 
.542 
.675 
.988 
.988 
.500 
.012 
.012 
.341 
.548 
.690 
.687 
1.000 
.975 
.988 
.988 
.500 
.024 
.500 
.614 
.817 
.902 
.988 
1.000 
.988 
.988 
.976 
.500 
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Table B.5 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task N59. 
08 
14 
27 
31 
46 
59 
62 
70 
85 
93 
08 
.500 
1.000 
.988 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
.929 
.783 
.675 
14 
.000 
.500 
1.000 
.976 
1.000 
.976 
.976 
.859 
.702 
.554 
27 
.012 
.000 
.500 
.988 
1.000 
.917 
.807 
.634 
.447 
.247 
31 
.000 
.024 
.012 
.500 
.988 
.841 
.667 
.651 
.366 
.159 
46 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.012 
.500 
.619 
.583 
.500 
.024 
.012 
59 
.000 
.024 
.083 
.159 
.381 
.500 
.012 
.024 
.000 
.000 
62 
.000 
.024 
.193 
.333 
.417 
.988 
.500 
.000 
.035 
.012 
70 
.071 
.141 
.366 
.349 
.500 
.976 
1.000 
.500 
.024 
.000 
85 
.217 
.298 
.553 
.634 
.976 
1.000 
.965 
.976 
.500 
.000 
93 
.325 
.446 
.753 
.841 
.988 
1.000 
.988 
1.000 
1.000 
.500 
Table B.6 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task PP. 
EVP CPN PSP PPR PvdA D66 CDA VVD RPF GPV SGP 
EVP .500 .376 .224 .200 .153 .176 .400 .482 .659 .682 .679 
CPN .624 .500 .165 .259 .271 .459 .612 .682 .753 .765 .741 
PSP .776 .835 .500 .529 .447 .576 .706 .788 .882 .882 .894 
РРЯ .800 .741 .471 .500 .435 .619 .694 .765 .859 .882 .882 
PvdA .847 .729 .553 .565 .500 .635 .812 .824 .918 .918 .941 
066 .824 .541 .424 .381 .365 .500 .800 .800 .976 .988 .976 
CDA .600 .388 .294 .306 .188 .200 .500 .682 .929 .918 .953 
WD .518 .318 .212 .235 .176 .200 .318 .500 .835 .859 .859 
ЯРР .341 .247 .118 .141 .082 .024 .071 .165 .500 .512 .518 
GPV .318 .235 .118 .118 .082 .012 .082 .141 .488 .500 .494 
SGP .321 .259 .106 .118 .059 .024 .047 .141 .482 .506 .500 
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Table B.7 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task CCI (petty extortion). 
2 
4 
6 
9 
12 
15 
18 
2 
.500 
.894 
.706 
.588 
.412 
.353 
.282 
4 
.106 
.500 
.576 
.459 
.353 
.247 
.129 
6 
.294 
.424 
.500 
.341 
.200 
.131 
.188 
9 
.412 
.541 
.659 
.500 
.141 
.129 
.059 
12 
.588 
.647 
.800 
.859 
.500 
.082 
.012 
15 
.647 
.753 
.869 
.871 
.918 
.500 
.012 
18 
.718 
.871 
.812 
.941 
.988 
.988 
.500 
Table B.8 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task CC2 (counterfeiting). 
2 
4 
6 
9 
12 
15 
18 
2 
.500 
.882 
.788 
.624 
.529 
.459 
.341 
4 
.118 
.500 
.671 
.494 
.435 
.282 
.235 
6 
.212 
.329 
.500 
.388 
.318 
.282 
.200 
9 
.376 
.506 
.612 
.500 
.212 
.129 
.129 
12 
.471 
.565 
.682 
.788 
.500 
.118 
.106 
15 
.541 
.718 
.718 
.871 
.882 
.500 
.035 
18 
.659 
.765 
.800 
.871 
.894 
.965 
.500 
Table B.9 
Choice proportions obtained in experiment 2, task CC3 
(intentional endangering of traffic). 
2 
4 
6 
9 
12 
15 
18 
2 
.500 
.647 
.518 
.306 
.259 
.188 
.118 
4 
.353 
.500 
.353 
.212 
.106 
.141 
.082 
6 
.482 
.647 
.500 
.165 
.071 
.106 
.024 
9 
.694 
.788 
.835 
.500 
.035 
.035 
.000 
12 
.741 
.894 
.929 
.965 
.500 
.024 
.012 
15 
.812 
.859 
.894 
.965 
.976 
.500 
.024 
18 
.882 
.918 
.976 
1.000 
.988 
.976 
.500 
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Appendix С 
Distributions 
Each table contains estimates of quantiles of the distributions of the test statistic 
minus 2 log likelihood ratio if the respective condition is satisfied, for 
combinations of number of alternatives (к
х
) and number of presentations (niy). 
Each set of quantiles was estimated nonparametrically in a series of 250 Monte 
Carlo simulations, using order statistics. 
In Experiment 1, there were 59 presentations (n^) of all pairs out of 10 
alternatives (к
х
) in tasks TR4 and TR5, and 67 presentations of all pairs out of 
10 alternatives in tasks STG. In Experiment 2, there were 85 presentations of 
all pairs out of 7 alternatives in the Criminal Code tasks CC1-CC6, of all pairs 
out of 10 alternatives in the "numbers" tasks N46 and N59, and of all pairs out 
of 11 alternatives in the "political parties" task PP. 
Table C.1 
Weak stochasüc ranking (STA). 
к
х
 n^ estimated quantiles 
85 
59 
67 
85 
85 
.50 
.00 
.42 
.39 
.31 
.58 
.75 
.29 
1.41 
1.59 
1.43 
1.55 
.90 
1.44 
2.91 
2.97 
2.70 
3.55 
.95 
2.67 
3.86 
4.38 
4.21 
4.91 
.99 
5.83 
6.79 
9.54 
7.83 
6.78 
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Table C.5 
Bilateral monotonicity (BM) 
κ
χ
 η estimated quantiles 
.50 .75 .90 .95 .99 
65 
59 
67 
85 
85 
.83 
6.44 
6.08 
5.43 
8.78 
2.01 
8.54 
9.52 
8.44 
11.88 
3.45 
11.20 
12.50 
11.33 
16.29 
5.04 
13.64 
15.31 
12.90 
17.93 
8.20 
21.49 
21.99 
18.59 
21.78 
Table C.6 
Bilateral/charateristic monotonicity (BCM) 
κ
χ
 nxy estimated quantiles 
.50 .75 .90 .95 .99 
85 
59 
67 
85 
85 
.94 
7.75 
6.48 
6.33 
9.25 
1.88 
10.51 
9.54 
10.17 
12.63 
3.75 
12.96 
12.89 
11.99 
16.97 
4.65 
14.26 
16.63 
13.41 
19.36 
5.71 
17.05 
23.40 
15.84 
20.94 
Table C.7 
Ideal point condition IP.2 
κ
χ
 η estimated quantiles 
.50 .75 .90 .95 .99 
85 
59 
67 
85 
85 
.55 
2.29 
1.90 
1.89 
2.67 
1.51 
4.23 
3.62 
3.52 
4.81 
2.84 
6.35 
6.26 
5.76 
7.19 
4.21 
7.69 
8.16 
7.09 
9.08 
6.78 
11.45 
12.47 
12.03 
11.08 

List of Symbols 
c, b inary choice function for subject / 
c ^ binary choice out of {дг, у} b y subject / 
С set of binary choices functions c, (i = 1, к,.) 
d d is tance between points χ a n d у 
D d is tance between points χ and у ( r a n d o m variable) 
yDx (y ,*) is a m e m b e r of D (a b inary relation o n X) 
frac(.x) returns frcational part 
tf (.) cumulat ive distribution function 
¡nt(;t) truncates to integer 
к f requency of choices χ out of {дг, y} 
Кц f requency of choices χ out of {x, y) ( r a n d o m variable) 
κ
χ
 n u m b e r of e lements in set X 
lK{k\p) likelihood function; likelihood of К assuming values к in set 
Xas a function of ρ 
X level of decisiveness; point in the half-open real interval 
[•5,1) 
m
x
{k;g) log likelihood ratio test statistic; -\n{l
x
{k\q)ll
x
{k;g)) 
mod(x, y) returns the remainder when the quotient of* divided by у is 
calculated 
n^ number of presentations of the pair of alternatives {x, y] 
nB s u m of the л,, for all x , у e В 
ρ binary choice probability function 
Ρ set of binary choice probability functions ρ 
р^ probability of choosing χ out of {x, y} 
p ^ est imate of p . , 
p ^ probability for subject ι of choosing χ out of {x, y} 
Pr [£] probability of event E 
q binary choice proportion function 
q^ proport ion of choices χ out of {x, y) 
qB weighted average of the q^ for all x , у e В 
q ' isotonic regression of q 
q' isotonic regression of q on R 
<t>(.) cumulat ive distribution function of a standard normal ran­
d o m variable 
180 
r(X) ranking of the e l e m e n t s in X 
з^(Х) set of all poss ible rankings of the e l e m e n t s in X 
pT T corre la t ion coefficient of r a n d o m variables 7"„ and T„ 
и ТУ 
r? variance of the random variable X 
с?- variance of the random variable Ζ 
г difference between values of the coordinates of ζ and χ 
tl 
Τ difference between values of the coordinates of ζ and χ 
(random variable) 
θ(.) function, returns -1 if argument is negative, 1 if argument is 
positive, 0 otherwise 
parameter space, set of possibles value oip 
@IP4 subset of θ in which the values satisfy condi t ion IP.4 
etSJA subset of θ in which STA is satisfied, condi t iona l on t h e 
ranking t(X) k n o w n to b e £>-isotonic 
и
г
(х) preference (utility) of alternative χ for a subject with ζ as 
ideal alternative (in Fechnerian strong utility model) 
wry' χ precedes w and is preceded by у in a ranking 
X set of alternatives 
x alternative (coordinate of the alternative x) 
x coordinate vector of the alternative χ 
X coordinate vector of the alternative χ (random variable) 
у alternative (coordinate of the alternative y) 
ζ ideal alternative (coordinate of the ideal alternative) 
Ζ coordinate of the ideal alternative (random variable) 
Z, coordinate of the ideal alternative used in calculating the 
distance to the first alternative (random variable) 
Zj coordinate of the ideal alternative used in calculating the 
distance to the second alternative (random variable) 
ζ coordinate vector of the ideal alternative ζ 
Ζ coordinate vector of the ideal alternative ζ (random variable) 
ζ <7th quantile of the distribution of a random variable 
-i (.) logical not 
л logical and 
ν logical or 
у logical exclusive or 
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Patrick Bossuyt 
Een vergelijking van 
probabilistische ontvouwingsmodellen voor 
data uit paarsgewijze vergelijkingen 
Het ontvouwingsparadigma (Coombs, 1950,1964) is in de voorbije veertig 
jaar een bron van inspiratie gebleken, zowel voor theorieën over keuze-
gedrag als voor technieken om latente structuren in data te representeren. 
Die populariteit neemt niet weg dat een staaltje "zuiver" ontvouwen zelden 
wordt gedemonstreerd; de eisen die de oorspronkelijke methode aan data 
stelt blijken meestal te hoog. In 1958 deed Coombs een voorstel voor een 
probabilistische variant van zijn ontvouwingstheorie. Na dat eerste ontwerp 
hebben andere auteurs in totaal nog enkele tientallen alternatieve theorieën 
voorgesteld. 
Dit proefschrift biedt een samenvatting van deze probabilistische ont-
vouwingstheorieën. De samenvatting blijft beperkt tot de theorieën die 
werden ontworpen voor data verkregen in experimenten met paarsgewijze 
vergelijkingen en deze data willen afbeelden in een Euclidische ruimte. 
Verder bevat dit proefschrift een evaluatiestrategie die kan worden gebruikt 
om de validiteit van een probabilistische keuzetheorie in een keuzetaak te 
beoordelen. Deze strategie werd ook toegepast op een aantal datamodellen. 
Deze data werden verzameld in vier keuzeëxperimenten, die speciaal waren 
ontworpen om de toepasbaarheid van de voorgestelde probabilistische 
ontvouwingstheorieën te vergelijken. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 worden de in de literatuur gepresenteerde voorstellen voor 
een probabilistische ontvouwingstheorie ondergebracht in een classificatie. 
Deze indeling is geïnspireerd door een bestaande en meer algemene 
classificatie van probabilistische keuzetheorieën, voorgesteld door Luce en 
Suppes (1965). Er wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen random confi-
guratie theorieën en random response theorieën. Eerstgenoemde theorieën 
beschouwen centrale onderdelen in de ontvouwingsrcpresentatie als 
toevalsveranderlijken. Dat kunnen de coördinaten van de ideale alterna-
tieven zijn, de coördinaten van de overige alternatieven, of de afstand van 
een alternatief tot het ideale. 
Random response theorieën zijn niet gebouwd op veronderstelde toe-
valsveranderlijken, maar op functionele verbanden tussen centrale ele-
menten van een ontvouwingsrepresentatie - coördinaten of afstanden - en 
keuzewaarschijnlijkheden. Tot deze klasse van theorieën behoren de 
Fechneriaanse variant van probabilistisch ontvouwen en afleidingen van 
het keuzeaxioma van Luce (1959). Modellen van deze theorieën worden 
om hun structurele gelijkenis samen strong unfolding models genoemd. 
Daarnaast bevat de categorie van random response theorieën ook de 
midpoint unfolding theory. In deze theorie is de afstand van het ideale 
alternatief lot het punt van onverschilligheid tussen twee alternatieven (het 
middelpunt tussen beide) de belangrijkste grootheid. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt nagegaan wat voor eigenschappen deze theorieën 
van probabilistisch keuzegedrag verwachten. Tot deze eigenschappen 
behoren de probabilistische varianten van acycliciteit en iransitiviteit in 
keuzen, maar ook alternatieve vertalingen van het ideale alternatief in 
probabilistisch keuzegedrag en enkele ordinale patronen tussen keuze-
waarschijnlijkheden in een unidimensionele ruimte. 
De verantwoording voor deze exploratie van eigenschappen wordt 
geboden in Hoofdstuk 3, waar ook het gehanteerde onderscheid tussen 
theorie, data en model wordt toegelicht. Hier wordt uiteengezet dat de 
aanwezigheid van een aantal van deze eigenschappen voor sommige 
theorieën een noodzakelijke of zelfs voldoende voorwaarde is voor het 
bestaan van een model van de theorie. Nagaan welke eigenschappen van 
probabilistisch keuzegedrag plausibel lijken bij een bepaald datamodel stelt 
een onderzoeker dus in staat een duidelijker keuze te maken tussen 
alternatieve theorieën. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt ook aandacht besteed aan 
onderzoeksdesigns bij taken met paarsgewijze keuzen. 
De meeste eigenschappen van probabilistisch keuzegedrag kunnen 
worden omschreven als conditionele ordinale relaties voor keuzewaar-
schijnlijkheden. Deze relaties kunnen worden beschouwd als conditionele 
ordinale restricties bij het schatten van keuzewaarschijnlijkheden voor een 
datamodel. In de meeste gevallen komt de conditie van deze ordinale relaties 
neer op een rangorde van de keuzeallematieven. Als deze orde bekend is, 
kunnen schattingen van de waarschijnlijkheden volgens het principe van 
de grootste aannemelijkheid worden berekend door een isotone regressie 
van de keuzeproporties, met het aantal aanbiedingen van elk paar als 
gewicht. In Hoofdstuk 4, waar deze relaties worden beschreven, wordt een 
efficiënt algoritme beschreven om de isotone regressie te berekenen. 
Als de rangorde niet bekend is, kan worden gezocht naar de meest 
aannemelijke ordening van de alternatieven. Daar is een zoekactie voor 
nodig binnen de verzameling van alle mogelijke rangordeningen. Voor een 
vlot verloop van een dergelijke zoekactie wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 een 
algoritme aangeboden dat op een zuinige manier een permutatieboom 
doorzoekt. Tot slot wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 ook aandacht besteed aan het 
probleem van de statistische toets. Hoewel de generalized likelihood ratio 
test statistic een voor de hand liggende toetsingsgrootheid lijkt, is het voor 
de meeste condities niet mogelijk te bepalen wat de verdeling van deze 
grootheid is als aan de conditie voldaan is. Daarom wordt een Monte Carlo 
strategie voorgesteld: relevante kwantielen van de bestudeerde verdeling 
worden nonparametrisch bepaald. De hele toetsingsstrategie wordt toege-
past op enkele in de literatuur gepresenteerde datamodellen. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt verslag uitgebracht over enkele experimenten die 
speciaal werden opgezet om de validiteit van de alternatieve probabilisti-
sche onlvou wingstheorieën te beoordelen, met de in de vorige hoofdstukken 
voorgestelde strategie. De conclusies die uit deze experimenten kunnen 
worden gelrokken wijzen in éénzelfde richting. Sterk stochastische tran-
sitiviteit bleek weinig aannemelijk, wat een groot aantal theorieën onge-
schikt maakt. De modellen van de Coombs-Zinnes-Griggs benadering 
blijven als de meest plausibele over. Dit zijn de modellen die het dichtst 
aansluiten bij Coombs' (1958) oorspronkelijke voorstel voor een theorie 
over probabilistisch ontvouwen. 
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Stellingen 
bij het proefschrift 
A comparison of 
probabilistic unfolding theories 
for paired comparisons data 
Patrick Bossuyt 
1. Of aan door keuzetheorieën aanwezig veronderstelde eigenschappen 
van probabilistisch keuzegedrag voldaan is, kan worden geformuleerd 
als een statistische hypothese; deze hypothese kan worden getoetst met 
behulp van de veralgemeende aannemelijkheidsverhouding. 
2. Het valt te betwijfelen of aan probabilistische ontvouwingstheorieën 
die sterke stochastische transitiviteit, de unilateraal dalende conditie, of 
perfecte discriminatie van het ideaal veronderstellen enige validiteit 
mag worden toegekend. 
3. Het unfolding probleem kan worden geformuleerd als een dubbel 
seriatieprobleem: als de gelijktijdige ordening van ideaalpunten en 
alternatieven op een onderliggende psychologische dimensie. 
4. Het door Gebhardt voorgestelde algoritme voor het vinden van de 
isotone regressie op een partiële orde is suboptimaal. 
Gebhardt, F. (1970). An algorithm for monotone regression with one or 
more dependent variables. Biometrika, 57, 263-271. 
5. Wat niet bestaat kan niet zinvol worden gemeten; het bepalen van 
utiliteiten (getalsmatig uitdrukkingen van relatieve verschillen in 
waardering) in de klinische besliskunde is in eerste instantie geen 
meetprobleem. 
6. Een prosehtische nadruk op het normatieve status van de theorie van 
de maximalisatie van het subjectief verwachte nut is niet bevorderlijk 
gebleken voor de introductie van een oordeelkundig prescriptief gebruik 
van er van afgeleide besliskundige technieken. 
7. Waarschijnlijk ontbreekt het ons aan cognitieve schemata om op een 
adequate manier met probabilistische informatie om te gaan. 
8. De enige consequente interpretatie voor waarschijnlijkheden is een 
epistemische: als een aan voorwaarden gebonden getalsmatige uit-
drukking van de mate waarin de spreker verwacht dat een uitspraak waar 
zal blijken te zijn. 
9. Het motet Jesu.meine Freude van J.S.Bach wordt bij voorkeur solistisch 
- met één stem per partij - uitgevoerd. 
10.Al is het leven bezuiden de Nederlands-Belgische grens niet beter, het 
is er zonder twijfel aangenamer verpakt. 
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